Summary

Disastrous flooding caused by torrential rains took an enormous toll in southern Chiapas in early September. Attention shifted to the human drama that cost hundreds of lives and left some 100,000 people homeless. Hundreds of communities were totally cut off, and some disappeared entirely under a thick covering of mud. In mid-October dozens of communities were still incommunicado and had not received any aid.

The government and Mexican civil society struggled to provide emergency assistance. Meanwhile a debate ensued about postponing the state and county elections scheduled for October 4.

In the end the elections went ahead except in a few of the hardest hit areas. The results were a big victory for the ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), which won 18 of 21 state deputy elections and 82 of 102 county mayor elections. The PRI even regained the counties in the conflict area that it had lost in the 1995 elections. Now the PRI will control all the constitutional counties in the conflicted highlands, Lacandon jungle and northern region.

Charges of irregularities in the election process were made in many areas. They ranged from the relatively minor to more serious allegations. For example, in the northern region where people may be killed because of their political party affiliation, PRI election officials were accused of opening ballots and making a black list of those who voted for the opposition PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution).

One of the most notable aspects of the elections was the high level of abstention. Overall it was 54%. However in areas of strongest Zapatista influence, it reached 74%. The EZLN did not impede the elections, as it had sought to do in the past. However many Zapatista communities simply chose not to vote.

Opposition parties denounced the electoral process and announced plans for organized protests.

In the end, there is little to suggest that the recent elections will contribute to achieving more representative government or to the resolution of the tense and polarized conflict in Chiapas that continues to erupt in sporadic violence.

Since breaking its four-month silence in July, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) has issued more than a dozen communiqués. In the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, the EZLN sought to resurrect the Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture. That is the legislation originally proposed by COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) in order to implement the San Andres Accords. The government’s refusal to agree to it has been the major stumbling block to renewing the peace talks. The EZLN is now working with sectors of Mexican civil society on a new effort for a broad dialogue between the two. In addition, in October the EZLN sent a communiqué to COCOPA, reinitiating public contact nearly two years after their last meeting. The EZLN continues to express deep mistrust of the federal government’s will for peace.

Unwilling to implement the COCOPA legislative proposal, and unable to lure the EZLN back to the table as a result, the federal government has devoted less public attention to the Chiapas conflict. It appears to prefer living with the current stalemate to the alternatives. Violent attacks on Zapatista autonomous counties have not continued, but the military and paramilitary presence in the conflicted areas remains very heavy.

Meanwhile international concern about Chiapas and Mexico’s human rights record has grown. Recent statements by commissions of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States criticized the impunity with which human rights abuses are committed in Mexico and listed related concerns. The Mexican government dismissed these statements, arguing that they reflect a lack of understanding of the situation. Nonetheless they constituted significant blows to Mexico’s international reputation on human rights. A visit by the U.N. Secretary General and the government’s invitation to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Mexico serve to maintain international interest.

In the U.S., word of a non-binding congressional resolution critiquing Mexico’s human rights record provoked a concerted effort by the Mexican government to discourage its presentation to Congress. The Mexican government called it an “unacceptable interventionist act.” The measure was finally introduced, but Congress adjourned without voting on it.

Some have seen the upcoming visit of the Pope in January 1999 as an occasion that might provide momentum to break the stalemate in Chiapas. That may yet be the case. However a more sober assessment would suggest that the rigid postures of the key actors leave little hope for a resolution before the current presidential term ends in 2000.

The EZLN’s overture to COCOPA reverses its recent posture of stonewalling the congressional peace commission and provides a glimmer of hope. The civil society/EZLN dialogue initiative that gets underway in November creates a new public space for spotlighting the continuing impasse. It remains to be seen whether the message it produces and the public support it is able to generate, combined with the efforts of COCOPA, will be enough to re-engage two adversaries who distrust each other deeply.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

• Urge the Zedillo administration to: guarantee the security of the EZLN delegation and the necessary conditions for its contacts with COCOPA and for the November 20-22 consultation with civil society sectors;
• disarm the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas;
• order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
• recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
• For citizens of the European Union: petition the members of your respective governments and parliaments to ensure the careful execution of the “democracy clause” that is part of the trade agreement between the European Union and Mexico.
• Urge COCOPA to strengthen its efforts to maintain unity behind its proposals and actions and to continue its work of assisting the peace process, placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 546 5350 / 546 7380

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 535 2726

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Update

Chiapas: Which way to Democracy?

In September, the coastal and border regions of Chiapas became a disaster area as a result of torrential rains, with hundreds of dead and disappeared in 40 counties. (See “Disaster in Southern Chiapas,” also in this issue). As a result of flooding rivers and landslides, highways and bridges were destroyed, and some communities were completely covered with mud. This latest disaster came on top of the already tense situation in the highlands, Lacandon jungle and northern region of Chiapas, caused by the still unresolved conflict between the government and the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation).

In the wake of the catastrophe, a heated discussion ensued regarding the viability of carrying out the October 4 elections. The state government and the State Electoral Council (CEE) argued that conditions existed for proceeding with the elections and that the Constitution prohibited postponing them. However, the opposition PRD as well as the PRI senator from Chiapas, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, proposed a postponement until December. In the end, the CEE decided to postpone the elections in three state legislative districts and eight counties severely impacted by the flooding and to take interim measures to comply with the state Constitution.

The vote was characterized by a high level of abstention (54%) and by reports of irregularities throughout the state. The EZLN did not attempt to impede the voting. However, many communities of Zapatista supporters chose not to vote. The PRI won 18 of 21 legislative districts and 82 of 102 counties. The PRI even regained the counties in the conflict area that it had lost in the 1995 local elections. (For more information, see “Elections in Chiapas,” also in this issue.)

EZLN

After breaking its four-month silence, the EZLN emitted a dozen communiqués between the middle of July and the elections. In several documents it blamed the failure of the peace talks on the federal government and also criticized the economic policies of President Zedillo. Days after the flooding, the EZLN denounced the diversion of humanitarian aid for personal and political party ends as well as the deficiencies of the emergency response plan.

In the Fifth Declaration of the Lancandon Jungle at the end of July, the EZLN invited civil society and the indigenous peoples to undertake a national consultation on the proposed “Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture” drawn up in 1996 by COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification). It accepted the response of civil society groups to establish a dialogue between civil society and the EZLN with the purpose of exchanging proposals regarding the proposed consultation and seeking solutions to the Chiapas conflict. According to the EZLN, this encounter will take place November 20-22 in San Cristobal de las Casas.

Government policy

In his Annual Report in September, President Zedillo avoided mention of the Chiapas conflict. The omission generated strong indignation on the part of COCOPA members, opposition parties, and some civil society and church sectors. Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida Ochoa responded by pointing out that in the appendices of the Annual Report, the government proposes seven avenues to pursue in order to resolve the Chiapas conflict. These include stimulating economic growth, protecting the rule of law, providing assistance to the displaced, approving initiatives for an indigenous rights law for Chiapas, and seeking dialogue with the Zapatistas. In August, Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen had announced his plan for an indigenous rights law for Chiapas that he said would guarantee the rights of the indigenous peoples in accordance with their traditional practices and customs.

In July the federal government proposed a plan to reduce tensions in Chiapas that granted an important role to COCOPA. The plan called on COCOPA to appeal to the EZLN to take a number of measures, including disarming, avoiding violence in the indigenous communities, and encouraging the participation of its supporters in the effort to redraw county boundaries and create some new counties. A month later COCOPA rejected the government’s request, saying that it could not become a tool of the government. In an October 18 communiqué, the EZLN reinitiated public contact with COCOPA, acknowledging its role in the peace process.

Since the violent incidents in June in the autonomous county of El Bosque where eight Indians and two policemen died, there have been no further open attacks on the autonomous counties. Nonetheless they continue to suffer the pressure of the heavy military presence and the threats of paramilitary groups. In July the Secretary of the Interior expressed the commitment of the federal government not to seek recourse in violence, but he also asserted that, “there will be no more gratuitous concessions” to the EZLN because that armed movement thwarts the peace process.

According to a poll done by the Rosenbluth Foundation in August, the Mexican people are very critical of the policy of the government. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed agreed that the indigenous peoples had good reason to rebel against the government in January 1994. Sixty per cent believe that there is a lack of consistency between what President Zedillo says and what he does. Fifty-five per cent consider the Mexican Army to be a danger to the indigenous peoples.

Strong international criticism

On August 20, the Sub-committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations approved a resolution calling on the Mexican government to end the impunity for those who violate human rights and to guarantee the security of human rights defenders. It also called on both sides in the Chiapas conflict to give priority to dialogue, and it proposed to the U.N. Human Rights Commission that it continue to monitor the human rights situation in Mexico. In the diplomatic world of the U.N., the resolution’s careful language amounted to a significant rebuff of Mexico’s human rights record. The Mexican representative to the U.N. commented that the Subcommittee’s statement “is absurd,” and that it was the product of legal experts “who have no political responsibility.”

The Interamerican Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States issued a report at the end of September regarding the human rights situation in Mexico. Although it acknowledged political and democratic advances, it criticized the violations of the human rights of the indigenous peoples and the impunity that “has led to the illegal tendency of the population to take justice into its own hands.” In addition it mentioned the heavy militarization of some Mexican states, including Chiapas.

During the visit of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to Mexico at the end of July, Mexican non-governmental organizations (NGOs) presented reports and documents regarding the human rights situation in the country. Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida Ochoa said that Annan left Mexico convinced that the Mexican government is doing everything possible to resolve the Chiapas conflict peacefully. In September, Foreign Relations Secretary Rosario Green invited the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to visit Mexico.

Also in September, U.S. citizen Tom Hansen, ex-director of Pastors for Peace, received a favorable ruling from a federal judge on the appeal of his expulsion from Mexico in February 1998. The judge said that the actions for which Hansen was expelled (observing the government/EZLN peace talks in 1995 and participating in the Intercontinental Gathering against Neoliberalism in 1996) are not prohibited.

A delegation of Amnesty International that visited Chiapas in September stated that the detentions that took place during the dismantling of some of the autonomous counties in the first half of the year were “arbitrary” and inappropriate under the rule of law.

A non-binding “Sense of Congress” resolution on Chiapas was introduced into the U.S. Congress on October 9. While it was not voted on before Congress adjourned, the fact that it was presented at all reflects a significant increase in congressional concern about Mexico’s human rights record. The resolution called for effective measures to ensure that U.S. military aid does not contribute to human rights violations; disarming the paramilitary groups and reducing the military presence in Chiapas; concerted efforts by the government and the EZLN to renew negotiations; and respect for human rights monitors. It had 15 co-sponsors in the Senate and 37 in the House of Representatives.

The Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry issued a communiqué stating that, “The initiative expresses several slanted, and even erroneous, opinions regarding the situation in Chiapas,” and called it an “unacceptable interventionist act.” The government’s coordinator for the Chiapas talks, Emilio Rabasa, was sent to Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to discourage its introduction.

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Analysis

A few weeks shy of the first anniversary of the Acteal massacre, things have not improved in Chiapas. In September the southern part of the state suffered disastrous flooding, yet another burden for a people that has already had to bear five years of a conflict that still has few near-term prospects for resolution.

The catastrophe showed again the deficiencies of the government in responding quickly and efficiently to urgent needs. However the public attention and the emergency aid permitted the displacement of the principle conflict from the center of national attention. In addition, the government’s announced plans to repair the damage, compensate the victims and return things to normal may easily become another instrument of co-optation and control of the population in a region where opposition political parties have been strong. At the same time, the humanitarian sense expressed by Mexican society in response to the natural disaster is an indication that the solidarity toward the people of Chiapas has not been exhausted.

Banking scandals, the fall of the peso, the fires several months ago and the flooding in September, even the extra-marital problems of Clinton have all been distractions from the deteriorating situation caused by the prolonged stalemate of the conflict in Chiapas. Not even the recent local elections have succeeded in dissipating the gray clouds that literally and metaphorically have covered the Chiapas skies in recent months.

The October 4 elections were characterized by a high level of abstention, especially in the areas of greatest Zapatista influence. The low turnout demonstrates the scant confidence in the ability of the political system to resolve pressing problems. The lack of physical and political conditions for free and fair elections, the insecurity and fear, the ambiguous posture of the EZLN (it did not impede the vote, but it also did not encourage it) also limited participation.

In this context, the triumph of the PRI in the highlands, Lacandon jungle and northern region of Chiapas leaves control of the entire area of greatest Zapatista influence in the hands of the current government. Now it will find less resistance to using all of its resources and its bureaucratic apparatus to extend its influence and reduce support for the EZLN. There is also concern about the potential for an increase in paramilitary activity in the counties where the PRI regained control. In other areas, paramilitary activity has been significantly strengthened through collusion with local PRI political authorities.

On the other hand, the limited political base of the new county authorities (elected with the support of between 13 and 30% of the eligible voters) constitutes a potentially destabilizing factor. Opposition groups have announced plans for protests, including the possibility of occupying county government offices in order to impede the installation of the new PRI officials.
The state government views the elections as a success. However, the documented irregularities and the high level of abstention indicate that once again, the electoral process is not a viable and effective means of democratizing the country, installing representative local governments, and finding real solutions to the Chiapas conflict.

While in Mexico the Chiapas issue seems to be relegated by some to the bottom of the political agenda, internationally it has become more prominent. Evidence includes the increasing frequency of visits to the state by foreign embassy staffpersons (including 9 visits by U.S. military personnel in recent months, according to U.S. Embassy sources) as well as statements by U.S. government spokespersons and members of Congress, Canadian and European members of parliament, and commissions of highly respected institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

These groups have recommended that the Mexican authorities redouble their efforts to reduce the indices of violence and discrimination in Chiapas and other states. The government, with the argument of defending its sovereignty, minimizes the criticism, saying that it is based on false information. Nonetheless, the strength of these international criticisms has led the government to invite Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, to visit Mexico.

After breaking its four-month silence in July, the EZLN issued several communiqués in which it commented on important recent events, dismissing the policies of the federal and state governments. For its part, the government declined to take seriously the documents and the assertions of the rebel army. Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen even referred to EZLN Sub-commander Marcos as a criminal. As things stand now, with the key actors having assumed rigid postures, it appears very difficult to achieve any kind of resolution before the current presidential term ends in 2000. A suggestion by the Catholic bishops that a peace accord might be signed before the arrival of the Pope in January seems to be a quite remote possibility.

Although it has lost some political clout, COCOPA continues to be actively engaged in seeking a real solution to the conflict, and it takes the EZLN more seriously than before. On October18 the EZLN announced a new willingness to meet directly with COCOPA, although it continues to resist direct contact with the federal government.

The recent election campaign was not the opportunity in which Chiapas civil society was able to make its voice heard regarding the future course of the state. Now expectations turn toward the new space of dialogue sought by sectors of national civil society and the EZLN and planned to begin in November. Once again it would appear to be civil society that may be able to peacefully pressure the political actors to take responsibility to resolve the Chiapas conflict and to change the strategy of militarization.

As long as this does not happen, the electoral path to democratization is likely to continue to be insufficient and inadequately representative of the majority, as we have just seen demonstrated in the recent elections in Chiapas.