Sumary

Amid continuing tension and violence, 3000 representatives of Mexican civil society gathered in Chiapas in November to discuss ways to revive the stalled peace process. It was the first meeting between the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) and Mexican civil society in two years. The primary result was a plan for a national consultation, scheduled for March 21, 1999. It will poll the Mexican people on their support for indigenous rights and specifically their support for the COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) legislative proposal to implement the San Andres Accords. The Accords were signed by the Mexican government and the EZLN in February 1996. Subsequently the EZLN accepted the COCOPA legislative proposal, but the government rejected it. The EZLN has insisted that implementation of the San Andres Accords is a necessary condition for reinitiating talks.

While the civil society meeting was underway, EZLN leaders met twice with COCOPA, which is charged with assisting dialogue efforts involving the EZLN and the Zedillo administration. While the meetings were useful in re-establishing direct EZLN-COCOPA contact after nearly two years, they did not produce progress toward renewed negotiations.

Four weeks later, 7000 people gathered in Acteal on December 22 to mark the first anniversary of the massacre of 21 women, 15 children and 9 men by a paramilitary group. At the same time, the federal Office of the Attorney General (PGR) released a “White Book on Acteal.” It faulted local authorities for not dealing adequately with what it suggested was a local dispute. It cited the EZLN as an indirect cause of the massacre, but it paid little attention to a more obvious direct cause: the existence of paramilitary groups such as the one responsible for the killings. The report suggested that one of the triggers was “the absence of institutions of the justice system,” despite the fact that state police stood by in Acteal for several hours as the massacre unfolded. The report documented the ongoing criminal prosecution of approximately 100 persons in connection with the case. Yet in seeming contradiction with the message such prosecutions send, paramilitary groups continue to operate with impunity in many parts of Chiapas.

The existence of such groups was the subject of an amnesty proposal sent to the Chiapas Congress by governor Roberto Albores Guillen. Its stated intention is to disarm “civilian groups,” and it is limited to amnesty for weapons charges. However it was criticized by business leaders and a paramilitary group for failing to include the EZLN (which is covered under the Law of Dialogue), while opposition parties and human rights groups suggested that it might actually reinforce the impunity and anonymity of paramilitary groups.

In the meantime, these groups continue to operate in many areas of Chiapas, the security forces continue to harass Zapatista supporters, communities are divided, and between 15,000 and 20,000 people remain displaced from their homes. Five years after the Zapatista uprising, poverty levels remain high, indices of violence and social conflict are up, and there are few prospects for imminent progress in the stalled peace process. Mexican immigration officials have renewed harassment of foreigners who travel to Chiapas. In January, two persons were expelled and forbidden to return for two years. They were visiting Chiapas with the U.S. organization Global Exchange, which observed, “Our educational activities have not received such strong and aggressive reactions by authorities in any other country in the world.”

In an unprecedented action, 50 dissident military officers marched in Mexico City in December to protest the military justice system. They also criticized as unconstitutional the expansion of the Army’s role into activities such as police work. It is unclear what degree of support they might have within the armed forces. Nonetheless, the public venting of internal dissent breaks with military tradition and inevitably raises questions about the military’s future role in Mexico.

The Mexican government faces a complex of difficult problems: a deteriorated economy, reduced income due to a drop in oil prices, consequent cuts in social programs, a bank bail-out controversy, major drug trafficking, and both armed insurgencies and paramilitary groups. With the 2000 presidential elections looming on the horizon, another element of pressure is added. It does more to hinder than to help efforts to resolve social problems. In this context, Chiapas is but one in a list of pressing challenges.

Several international human rights groups, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), issued reports that included strong criticism of the Mexican government’s human rights policy. However, it is important to mention the resolution of the Mexican Senate that recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court of the OAS in cases involving violations of individual rights.

In Chiapas, a just and lasting peace remains a distant hope. The national consultation scheduled for March is an attempt to mobilize civil society and pressure the government in order to break the current impasse. Meanwhile the possibility of constituting a new national mediation body for the peace process in Chiapas is being explored in civil society circles.
While it is difficult to be optimistic about these prospects in the near term, it is also certain that the Zapatistas and the much broader movement for indigenous rights in Mexico show no sign of fading away.

Acciones recomendadas

• Urge the Zedillo administration to: disarm the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas;
• respect the right of Mexican citizens to carry out the national consultation on the COCOPA legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture on March 21 and take seriously the results;
• recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process;
• order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue.
• For citizens of the European Union: petition the members of your respective governments and parliaments to ensure the careful execution of the “democracy clause” that is part of the trade agreement between the European Union and Mexico.
• Urge COCOPA to strengthen its efforts to maintain unity behind its proposals and actions and to continue its work of assisting the peace process, placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52 5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52 5) 546 5350 / 5 546 7380

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52 5) 535 27 26

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Update

Chiapas: One step forward… One step backward

At the first meeting between the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) and civil society in more than two years, 29 EZLN leaders met with 3000 representatives of Mexican civil society in San Cristobal de Las Casas from November 20 to 22 of last year. The meeting was seen by many people as a potentially significant step in breaking the impasse between the EZLN and the federal government. The EZLN and representatives of civil society discussed the viability and format of a national consultation on the COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification) proposal on indigenous rights and culture. This legislative proposal involves constitutional changes which would reflect what was agreed to in the San Andres Accords, signed by the Mexican government and the EZLN in February 1996. In December of that same year, the EZLN accepted the COCOPA’s legislative proposal, but the government rejected it, thus creating the stalemate in the dialogue. The implementation of the San Andres Accords is one of the EZLN’s five conditions for reinitiating dialogue.

During the meeting, the Zapatista delegation, among whom were Commanders Tacho, David, and Zebedeo and Major Moises, met twice with COCOPA in order to discuss a possible renewal of the dialogue between the EZLN and the government. At these meetings, the EZLN reiterated its conditions for reinitiating dialogue, and it called on COCOPA to support the national consultation. In January COCOPA decided not to support the Zapatista consultation, because “it cannot be allied with one of the parties.”

On the first of January, for the fifth anniversary of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN released a communiqué in which it called civil society “to peaceful mobilization, to the struggle for human rights…, to the demand for spaces of democratic participation…” In addition, it asserted that “1998 was the year of the government war against the indigenous communities of Mexico.” The government’s coordinator for peace talks, Emilio Rabasa Gamboa, appraised the five years of Zapatismo as “a failure, because the living conditions of the indigenous communities have not improved.”

One Year After the Acteal Massacre

Two thousand Zapatista civilian supporters were among the more than 7,000 persons gathered for the first anniversary of the Acteal massacre of December 22, 1997, in which 21 women, 15 children and 9 men were assassinated by alleged paramilitaries.

Days before the commemoration, the federal Office of the Attorney General (PGR) released its “White Book on Acteal.” One of this book’s conclusions is that, “The crime of Acteal was possible given the surprising absence of a peaceful resolution of conflicts, the lack of understanding by local officials responsible for the administration of justice, and the lack of conciliation among the different political interests of the communities and the state.” It also concludes that, “The Acteal massacre is an indirect consequence of an armed group (the EZLN)” and that one of the triggers was “the absence of institutions of the justice system.” These latter conclusions were strongly criticized by human rights organizations and the Diocese of San Cristobal. The Vicar of Justice and Peace of the diocese, Gonzalo Ituarte, noted that security forces were present just hundreds of meters from the massacre. He added that, “It is incredible that the PGR’s investigation goes into indirect causes [the existence of the EZLN], but not into the direct ones [the existence of paramilitary groups].” PRI Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, a COCOPA member, thought that the document was unsatisfactory for everyone, since it had not thoroughly investigated the organization and training of the paramilitaries. Another senator, Carlos Payan, observed, “It’s a second-rate report that does not take into account the low intensity war which exists in Chiapas.”

According to the PGR’s report, those detained include 84 civilians (for direct involvement in the killings), eleven former policemen (for carrying firearms restricted to the exclusive use of the army), the former mayor of Chenalho, and one military person. In addition, seven former public servants have been charged with abuse of authority and/or crimes committed during the administration of justice. There are still 32 outstanding arrest warrants. In January, a former Public Security official and a former Public Ministry agent were apprehended, accused of having allowed civilian groups to arm themselves in the area.
In the community of Union Progreso, county of El Bosque, tensions increased in mid-December. Residents were accused of having carried out an ambush with high-caliber weapons during which a child was killed. In response to the rumor of an impending police and paramilitary action against them, Zapatista civilian supporters in Union Progreso fled to the mountains, where they remained for one week. They returned a few days before Christmas, and a ‘civilian peace camp’ was set up in the community with national and international observers. Five indigenous persons died in Union Progreso during a police-military action in June of last year.

Amnesty Proposal for Armed Civilian Groups

While indigenous communities, such as Union Progreso, Acteal and Polho continued to denounce the presence of, and harassment by, alleged paramilitary groups, Roberto Albores Guillen sent the State Congress a proposal for a law for ‘Amnesty for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in the State of Chiapas.’ This initiative would provide amnesty for armed groups, establishing terms for exemption from charges limited to crimes of possession, carrying, and storing firearms and explosive substances. The proposal explicitly excludes EZLN militants, due to their being covered under the Law for Dialogue. Because of that, representatives of various organizations, such as the paramilitary group ‘Peace and Justice‘ and the National Chamber of Commerce, called for the disarmament law to include the EZLN. On the other hand, according to comments by some representatives of opposition parties and human rights organizations, the governor’s proposal could be an attempt to prevent the investigation and punishment of attacks and murders committed by paramilitary groups.

The governor explicitly denied the existence of paramilitary groups, explaining that the term implies that the Army was organizing and training the armed groups. According to him, this has not been proven. He also said that any group that says that paramilitary groups exist will be called to account before the federal Office of the Attorney General (PGR) and required to prove the existence of those ties.

Dissidence in the Federal Army

In December, some 50 military officers who are currently facing a variety of charges marched in Mexico City. They were members of the Patriotic Command for the Conscientization of the People (CPCP), who demonstrated their disagreement with the army system. They asked for, among other things, the dissolution of military courts so that military personnel would be judged in the same manner as any other Mexican citizen, and not by a special body. The dissidents also protested the fact that the army has engaged in “activities that do not correspond to it, such as police, legal matters and patrols to keep watch over the civilian population, which are unconstitutional.” During the march, which was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez, one of the slogans shouted was: “The authorities should govern obeying,” (a concept used by the Zapatistas).

Meanwhile, the Attorney General for Military Justice said that Bacilio Gomez has been under investigation for the crimes of insubordination and disobedience since 1997 and has been out on bail. They announced the initiation of legal charges against him for desertion and for not complying with the terms of his conditional release. In January, five members of the CPCP were arrested. Bacilio Gomez left the country in order to avoid being apprehended.

Special Elections Without Incident

Tensions grew in the conflict area as a consequence of the October 4 elections, and there were takeovers, without serious incident, of the government offices in several counties, such as Altamirano. In other places, such as Nicolas Ruiz and Venustiano Carranza, some killings related to the elections were reported. In Las Margaritas and Oxchuc, the opposition was able to negotiate with the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) Mayor-Elect in order to form a multi-party county council, and thus avoid problems. At the end of December, the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) accepted, in negotiations with the state government, the creation of Vigilance Councils in fifteen counties. Their role will be to keep an eye on the proper management of resources and the exercise of power. These multi-party councils will participate in the council meetings without voice or vote, and they will have access to information regarding administration and budget.

At the close of this addition, the political situation in the county of Ocosingo, the largest in Chiapas, remained uncertain. The October elections resulted in a victory for the PRI, with widespread abstention and fraud. These results generated strong criticism from opposition parties, who complained that the new council was not representative. In response, in mid-December these parties and some social organizations met and elected their own ‘sovereign county council.’ They once again asked for the formation of a plural county council with equitable representation by the PRI and opposition parties, as they had been able to negotiate following the 1995 local elections.

The special elections of December 6 passed without problems or incidents in the nine counties and four districts where they had not been previously held, due to the floods in September and the political conflict in San Juan Chamula. With an abstention rate of 70%, the PRI won six mayoralties, the PRD won in two counties and the PAN (National Action Party) in one. The four state congress seats were won by the PRI.

International Criticism

At the international level, criticisms of the Mexican government continue concerning human rights violations. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS) were blunt in their reports on Mexico. Pierre Sane, director of Amnesty International, said that human rights violations in Mexico are becoming more and more serious, and the government does not have a real commitment to protecting human rights. During his visit to Chiapas, and after meeting with several NGOs (including SIPAZ), British Vice-Minister for Foreign Relations, Tony Lloyd, commented that the Mexican government is aware that the framework of the commercial treaty between Mexico and the European Union requires respect for human rights within the participating nations.

Human Rights Watch stated in its 1998 report: “On the defensive, after the massacre [in Acteal], the federal government did not react by curbing the PRI supporters who are willing to employ violence; rather it acted aggressively against EZLN supporters and international observers in Chiapas.”

One positive change in Mexican policy was the approval by the Senate of recognition of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court of the OAS in all cases involving violations of individual rights. However, the Senate action excluded the cases of foreigners who are expelled under Article 33 of the Constitution.

Meanwhile, Mexican officials continue harassing foreigners who travel to Chiapas. Seven foreigners received citations when they traveled to the commemoration of the Acteal massacre on December 22. On the first of January, immigration officials cited three members of a delegation from the United States organization, Global Exchange, who had visited the Zapatista community of Oventic. Global Exchange commented: “Our educational activities have not received such strong and aggressive reactions by authorities in any other country in the world.”

Regarding the criticisms directed at the Mexican government by international bodies, the president of the government’s National Human Rights Commission, Mireille Roccati, observed that the government “cannot think that every denunciation is fictitious and something for getting attention; instead it must pay attention to each case.” She added that the government should pursue each case in order to correct the entire process which produced that human rights violation.

National Consultation

“For the Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and For an End to the War of Extermination”

The consultation will be held on March 21, 1999 in all 32 states of Mexico and in those places abroad where there are Mexicans. All Mexican men and women over the age of 12 can participate. The consultation will take place through balloting, or through practices and customs in indigenous communities that so decide. It consists of four questions to be answered with a ‘yes,’ ‘no’ or ‘I don’t know’:

1. Do you agree that the indigenous peoples, in all their strength and richness, should be included in the national project and take an active part in the building of the new Mexico?
2. Do you agree that indigenous rights should be recognized in the Mexican Constitution in accordance with the San Andres Accords and the corresponding proposal by the Commission for Agreement and Pacification of the Congress of the Union?
3. Do you agree that we should achieve true peace through the path of dialogue, demilitarizing the country with the return of the soldiers to their barracks, as established by the Constitution and the laws?
4. Do you agree that the people should organize themselves and demand that the government “govern obeying” in all aspects of national life?

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Analysis

Chiapas: Light and shadow in the internacional scene

Throughout Mexico one hears analysis and speculation that 1999 will be a year of greater difficulties and setbacks in both economic development and politics, including fading prospects in the search for peace in Chiapas. There are many signs that paint gray and even black colors on the horizon for the short and medium term.

It is true that at the beginning of the year, the Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, asserted that, “In 1999 there will not be irresolvable problems.” However, it is not likely that the federal government will be able to provide real solutions this year to serious problems such as the increasingly deteriorated domestic economy, the survival of the 40 million Mexicans who live in poverty, the conflict in Chiapas, the reduction in social spending, problems in the banking sector, drug trafficking, social insecurity, or the existence of armed groups.

This growing torrent of issues demanding attention portends a level of conflict that neither the government nor the opposition parties are prepared to confront, particularly since the presidential elections in 2000 constitute a looming dike. The incapacity of the current government to attend to these matters in recent years has generated growing discontent among the citizens.

Even in the Army one can hear dissident voices, such as the Patriotic Command, which broke the tradition of only addressing military issues internally. The demands of this group go beyond democratization and restructuring of the legislation that governs the armed forces. The level of actual support for this group within the Army is still not clear. What impact, if any, their actions may have on the role of the armed forces in the political decisions of the country is a matter of great interest.

It should be noted that over the last five years, the Mexican government has invested large sums in the purchase of modern military equipment as well as in special equipment for riot control. At the same time, the military has increased considerably its training in counterinsurgency and psychological warfare. For example, hundreds of military officials have been sent to the notorious School of the Americas in the United States. The continual military mobilizations, not only in communities with Zapatista influence but also in other states such as Guerrero and Oaxaca, constitute other counter-indications to any clearing of the skies that might indicate a reduction of tensions or an advance toward peace.

The response of the government to criticisms of its capacity and will to resolve the problems mentioned above seems to remain at the level of talk and to follow systematically the same pattern: minimize and criminalize. This is true as much in the case of the Zapatista movement (‘the problem of Chiapas is only in four counties’) as in the case of the military dissidents, who are dismissed as a few isolated delinquents.

In Chiapas, another point of concern is the proliferation of “armed civilian groups,” primarily affiliated with the PRI. The recent public discussion regarding whether such groups are or are not paramilitary (as they are classified by the Zapatistas and by human rights organizations) distracts attention from the heart of the matter: the lack of an adequate official response to put an end to such groups, whatever they are called. In this regard, it is unclear how the amnesty and disarmament law proposed by the Chiapas state government would contribute to shedding light on the functioning of these groups and their responsibility for political violence in recent years. To the contrary, the amnesty may actually guarantee their impunity and anonymity.

In this dark panorama, the national consultation called by the Zapatistas for March may be a tool to help break the logjam in the peace talks. This consultation not only offers an invitation to Mexican society to vote on the incorporation into the Constitution of the COCOPA’s legislative proposal that resulted from the San Andres Accords. It also seeks to generate a massive mobilization of civil society. The Zapatista hope is that such a mobilization may contribute to the renewal of peace talks through a series of steps that include the implementation of the San Andres Accords, the formation of a mediation body recognized by both sides, and the fulfillment of the other conditions that the EZLN has set for rejoining negotiations.
Meanwhile the public positions of the parties in conflict have continued to polarize. Each one uses the same information to blame the adversary. For example, they accuse each other of blocking the dialogue, of not having real political will to negotiate, and of responsibility for the Acteal massacre.

In this latter regard, a year after its occurrence few advances are evident in the case either in the administration of justice or in assuring the necessary conditions for the return of the thousands of displaced or in the disbanding of the armed civilian groups and the arrest of their members. The “White Book on Acteal” of the federal Attorney General offered conclusions that are similar to his observations of a year ago shortly after the massacre. The credibility of the government’s report is undermined by its failure to acknowledge official involvement in supporting paramilitary groups such as the one responsible for the Acteal massacre and by the fact that those groups continue to operate with impunity.

In recent months the federal government has pressed for a direct dialogue with the EZLN. The EZLN has strongly rejected this proposal in the absence of fulfillment of the conditions it set two years ago. At the same time, the government has indicated an openness to the possibility of mediation, but only if it is national. Meanwhile, sectors of Mexican society, responding to the call of the Zapatistas and also on their own initiative, are pushing for a strengthening of civil society so that within it a group of Mexicans might be formed that would respond to this urgent task.

Fortunately, the active concern of the international community for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Chiapas will certainly continue to bring a constructive message to a Mexican government highly sensitive to its international image. This was evident in January at the annual meeting of Mexican ambassadors in Mexico City. During discussions, administration officials placed particular emphasis on their efforts to achieve peace in Chiapas.