The conflict in Chiapas is now seven years old. The third president since its beginning, Vicente Fox, inherits a particularly complex situation. Nevertheless, for the first time in years, signs point towards the renewal of the dialogue between the Mexican government and the EZLN. These signs of good faith were given by the new state and federal governments, as well as by the EZLN.

Unrest before the Inaugurations

Between the election (July) and his inauguration (December), President Fox occupied the front pages of the national press, reiterating his campaign promises, particularly in regard to Chiapas. It was a time of latent tension and transition; of expectations, debates, and definitions.

In Chiapas, tensions rose on more than one occasion. For example, in October eleven people from the alleged paramilitary group Farming and Forestry Indigenous Peasant Union (UCIAF, a group that broke off from Development, Peace and Justice) were arrested in the northern region. In November the federal Office of the Attorney General (PGR) botched an operation aimed at paramilitary groups in Chenalho in the Chiapas highlands. The power of the alleged paramilitary groups raised fears of a reaction and greater mobilization on the part of their supporters.

Since very little has been done to date against the paramilitary groups, several analysts applauded the government’s intentions in both actions. Others saw them as a “goodbye present from the outgoing government” to prepare for the entry of the next. Others suggested it was an attempt to create instability before the inauguration of Pablo Salazar as governor of Chiapas (also in December). No doubt there were other interests at play as well, in particular, that of the PGR which may have wanted to demonstrate its good work prior to a possible reform by the new government. Some analysts spoke of a possible accord between the alleged paramilitary groups and the local Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the case of the October arrests: they would turn themselves in voluntarily in order to avoid a political crisis in the region; the PRI would defend them in exchange for their votes. Whatever the real explanation, the result remains the same: at the beginning of December, in more than one region, several groups found themselves on the defensive, hostile to the new local government.

The EZLN Shows its Cards

After four years in which the peace process has been at a standstill, steps towards its possible resumption have occurred with surprising speed. The EZLN calculated its “entry” well: After five months of silence, it spoke on November 30 to invite journalists to a press conference, as if to give Fox the opportunity to adjust his inaugural speech the next day.

In its press conference on December 2, the EZLN appeared to perceive a panorama more favorable to its cause. Since 1996, it had proposed five conditions for the resumption of dialogue. These are now reduced to three. In fact, two of the five have already been fulfilled: the naming of Luis H. Alvarez as Peace Commissioner (he has been described by the EZLN as a “valid interlocutor”), and the formation of the Commission for Monitoring and Verification (COSEVER) in 1997, although it has never functioned because the San Andres Accords were not implemented. The EZLN did not take up the subject of the paramilitaries, perhaps because it realized that the solution to this problem would take longer to resolve or because the state government has already declared it a priority for its attention.

In the end, the EZLN is offering a more easily negotiable package in order to have a direct dialogue with the new government.

Governmental Responses

President Fox demonstrated his good will by partially fulfilling the Zapatista demands, presenting the proposal of the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) to Congress on December 5 and closing several military positions. He also rescinded restrictive regulations on international human rights observers. A corresponding effort was made by the state when Governor Pablo Salazar freed several Zapatista prisoners and abolished the Redistricting Commission (another source of tension in the conflict area during recent years).

The repositioning of the military ordered on December 1 generated much confusion both inside and outside Mexico because of the gap between President Fox’s message and the reality on the ground. Despite the withdrawal of dozens of checkpoints and four military bases from indigenous communities and the positive impact this has had on local residents, the overall military presence itself has not yet diminished significantly. There is no evidence that the soldiers previously stationed at those checkpoints and bases have left Chiapas.

Although the federal and state executives have shown signs of their good will, the definitive solution of many of the pending problems is up to other branches: judicial (for the prisoners) and legislative (for the San Andres Accords).

Certainly Fox presented the COCOPA proposal to Congress, but it still faces a long legislative battle with an uncertain end. Paradoxically, the National Action Party (PAN), the main party that carried him to power, could be one of the principal sources of resistance. In fact, that party already presented its own proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture during the past administration, and the fact that Fox has presented a different text generated frictions (adding to those that already existed).

For the first time, the president finds himself confronted with a multi-party Congress in which none of the parties has a simple majority in either house and any initiative will have to rest on alliances that have not yet been defined. The PRI also has its own proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture. Certainly, there is a latent risk of this party’s “Balkanization,” which could further complicate the political prospects of the COCOPA legislative proposal. The PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) is also threatened with divisions, but it has been in favor of the COCOPA text since it was drafted.

If in the end, the text were not accepted (and the process could take up to two years), Fox would have some political cover, since the decision is in the hands of Congress. However, since his economic project rests on greater globalization of the economy, it is in his interest to rid himself of the international critics of the Chiapas situation that he inherited from previous administrations.

One must also take into account that Chiapas has particular importance for his economic project because of its resources and because a resumption of peace negotiations would enhance his political credibility. Fox has made many promises in his campaign. He will have to carry out measures much less popular (for example in the fiscal sphere) or of even greater complexity (like the Reform of the State) and in this sense, Chiapas could be a reserve of political credit.

The electoral crises in the states of Tabasco and Yucatan raise the question of what level of involvement the federal government is willing to assume in these southeastern states where the PRI, defying the political order, refuses to let go of part of the power that it has left.

Governability in Chiapas?

The situation of Pablo Salazar, the new governor of Chiapas, is problematic. A few days after he took office, a struggle arose among the branches of government in response to his executive actions. The legislature and the judiciary (both with a PRI majority) began criticizing and blocking several of his proposals and even refusing to deal with some of them.

In a document submitted to the state legislature, the governor accused the PRI legislators of drawing up a political and economic strategy for electoral purposes and of seeking to increase their control over the county governments in the run-up to the legislative and county elections in October 2001. On the other hand, the legislature and judiciary accuse the governor of unconstitutional actions, describing them as acts of political revenge. They even speak of death threats against members of the judiciary.

It must be emphasized that any negotiation initiative will require intricate planning and extremely sensitive execution in order to restore cohesion to the political and social life of the state and to be able to resolve both older and more recent community and regional problems.

In Conclusion

In recent months, in Chiapas as well as in Mexico, crucial and necessary processes have begun which have not yet run their course. The problems faced by both governments are not easy to solve. It is important to guarantee greater governability, and above all, to proceed with actions in order to rebuild a minimum confidence in the indigenous communities.