Summary

The Uncertainty of Peace

In the aftermath of the massacre of 45 unarmed Tsotsil Indians in Acteal last December, pressure mounted to get the Chiapas peace process back on track. The Mexican government filed criminal charges against alleged paramilitary group members, the local mayor, and state police. The government also forced the resignation of numerous state officials, including the governor, and of the federal Interior Minister, a powerful ruling party official. Doubts remain about whether charges will be filed against higher level officials suspected of criminal responsibility.

At the beginning of March, the governor of Chiapas announced a peace initiative that was largely rejected by non-ruling party sectors. Then in an effort to break the 18-month-old stalemate in the peace process, President Zedillo introduced his own legislation to implement the February 1996 San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture. His proposed constitutional reform diverges on a number of points from the legislative proposal put forward in September 1996 by COCOPA, the congressional mediation body. The EZLN had accepted that proposal, but the government’s refusal to do so has been a major obstacle in the peace process.

Despite no longer having a congressional majority, the ruling PRI is counting on the support of the center-right PAN to have enough votes to approve its constitutional reform. The Zedillo administration argues that this reform reflects a Zapatista influence that is disproportionately large in relation to the size or geographic scope of the Zapatistas. Nonetheless the unilateral nature of the proposal and the degree to which it is seen to compromise the San Andres Accords, especially in the interpretation of indigenous autonomy, exacerbate the already explosive situation in Chiapas. CONAI, a mediator in the peace talks, issued a detailed critique of the government proposal.The EZLN reiterated its conditions for resumption of talks, key among which was implementation of the San Andres Accords based on the COCOPA proposal.

Several other factors have further strained the fragile social fabric of Chiapas in recent months. With the exception of those directly involved in the massacre, paramilitary groups continue to operate with impunity in several areas of Chiapas. The Mexican Army presence has been stepped up, but rather than reining in the paramilitary groups, the Army has appeared to target Zapatista strongholds. The January publication in the press of an alleged 1994 Army document calling for assistance to paramilitary groups in order to undermine support for the Zapatistas echoed what human rights groups have long charged. Meanwhile, the number of internal refugees in Chiapas has grown to approximately 15,000, constituting an alarming social and political problem. The killings of several peasant leaders tied to opposition groups by unknown assailants has further added to the tinderbox atmosphere.

The federal government’s unilateral initiative has been accompanied by efforts to weaken the role of the mediation bodies, COCOPA and CONAI. Both groups have been charged repeatedly with being partial, and Army officials even accused Bishop Samuel Ruiz, who heads CONAI, of being directly tied to the organizational structure of the EZLN.

Approval of the government’s initiative would cast into doubt not only the peace talks but their legal structure as well. That raises the prospect of the Army being called upon to disarm the insurgents. While the Zapatistas are not a formidable military force, they do enjoy a high degree of support in some areas, and they would not be expected to submit quietly. Meanwhile the paramilitary groups appear ready to go to war to defend their interests. What has been a tense situation could quickly explode.

In January, large-scale demonstrations in Mexico and in many other countries repudiated the Acteal massacre. As international criticism grew, the Mexican government stepped up an anti-foreigner campaign through harassment, expulsions, and an intense media effort. This campaign raises fears that the government seeks to shield Chiapas from international view. However the government insists it is only enforcing laws against foreign meddling in domestic politics.

The government did allow the visit of 200 human rights observers. The delegation’s sharply critical conclusions will help shape the debate in Europe about Mexicós compliance with human rights criteria as a condition for approval of a major trade agreement. Mexicós human rights record was further tarnished with the release of a U.N. report detailing the widespread and unchecked use of torture by military and police forces.

In March nearly 350 religious leaders from the U.S. and 13 other countries released a statement calling upon the Mexican and U.S. governments “to demilitarize the conflict and achieve a negotiated resolution.” The statement also criticized a “pattern of government tolerance” for paramilitary activities.

With the peace process in crisis, developments over the next few months may well fix the future course of the conflict and the prospects for a just and lasting peace.

Recommended Action

• Urge the Zedillo administration to: suspend its proposal for constitutional reform until a proposal based on the San Andres Accords is produced that reflects a consensus among the parties in conflict;
• order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue.
• recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
• Ask the COCOPA to renew its efforts to maintain its unity with regard to its proposals and actions and to continue its facilitative efforts in the peace process, prioritizing the commitment to peace over partisan politics.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 546 5350 / 546 7380

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 535 27 26

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Update

Chiapas: the Uncertainty of Peace

In March, with the presentation by the Zedillo administration to the Mexican Congress of a unilateral proposal for constitutional reforms regarding indigenous rights and culture, the peace process in Chiapas entered into one of its most serious crises.

Meanwhile, the growing militarization and paramilitarization of Chiapas and the approximately 15,000 internal refugees with no short-term hope of returning home only made the situation more explosive. With the killings of several peasant leaders and other outbreaks of violence in the northern region, the warning signs multiplied.

Proposals of the Government

Since the beginning of the year, the federal government maintained a constant presence in the communications media. On January 16 in Nayarit, President Zedillo said that it would be an error to establish constitutional distinctions for the Indians, “…treating them as though they were not equal to other Mexicans.” A week later in the Yucatan, he declared that there will not be a military solution in Chiapas. On January 31 in Switzerland, he stated that the violence in Chiapas is caused by confrontations between the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) “and other groups.” He added that the treatment that the government had given to the problem “had been exemplary.” In a February interview with The New York Times , he lamented that the federal government had not had a stronger presence in Chiapas and that “we have been too soft for the good of the negotiations,” but that that was no longer appropriate.

On March 1, the federal government presented its four (“indispensable” according to the Interior Minister) observations regarding the constitutional reform proposed by COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification; the commission created by the Mexican Congress to assist the peace talks.) The government insisted that its concerns were aimed at preserving national sovereignty, the integrity of the national territory, the functioning of the distinct levels of government, and respect for the law regarding the communications media.

On March 14, President Zedillo announced a legislative proposal regarding indigenous rights and culture that, according to the government, combined the positions of all the political parties, the observations of the federal government, and the COCOPA proposal. The Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, said that with this proposal the government would fulfill the San Andres Accords and that if the peace talks were not renewed, the government unilaterally could declare peace in Chiapas. He added that it is not up to the Zapatistas to define the system in Mexico but rather to all Mexicans.

The center-left opposition PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) accused the government of violating the principle of bilaterality. In response, the ruling PRI (Party of the Institutional Revolution) blamed the PRD for wanting to prolong the conflict in order to gain an electoral advantage.

Earlier in March, the PAN (center-right National Action Party) had presented its own legislative proposal regarding indigenous rights and culture. A committee made up of representatives from both parties is charged with drafting a bill that combines the two proposals.

Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, a PRI representative on COCOPA, suggested a different approach. He proposed that Civic Alliance, known for its election monitoring, hold a referendum so that the indigenous communities could vote on the various proposals.

Also in March, the governor of Chiapas presented his “State Accord for Reconciliation.” His initiative was immediately supported by groups tied to the PRI while other groups rejected it as a unilateral proposal.

Campaign Against CONAI and COCOPA

Currently both CONAI (National Mediation Commission, headed by Bishop Samuel Ruiz) and COCOPA are in a weakened position. The year began with a new campaign against Bishop Ruiz. PRI members and Chiapas business people called for his resignation from CONAI. Military intelligence disclosed “proof” of clergy-EZLN ties in the form of Bibles published by the diocese found in safe houses searched by the military in Altamirano. The commander of the Seventh Military Region also directly accused Bishop Ruiz of ties to the EZLN.

COCOPA was also the target of multiple attacks. The PRI president of the Indigenous Affairs Committee of the Congress criticized its work as “inefficient” and “protagonistic.” PAN members stated that the San Andres Accords should be re-interpreted, and they questioned the role of COCOPA. Recently, together with the PRI, the PAN threatened to withdraw its representatives from COCOPA if the peace talks are not re-established.

On January 11 CONAI called on the government to dissolve the paramilitary groups and to refrain from ambiguous statements and double messages. On January 22 COCOA and CONAI proposed ten “indispensable conditions” for renewing the talks, among them the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords; respect for the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas (the legal framework for the peace talks); a reduction of the military presence in Chiapas; and the disarming of the paramilitary groups and punishment of those responsible for the Acteal massacre.

In March, in spite of being weakened by a lack of internal consensus, COCOPA again requested an “urgent” meeting with the EZLN and clarified that it was not going to draft a new legislative proposal.

On March 17 CONAI stated, “The procedure with which the constitutional reform is being advanced…is incongruent and in violation of the spirit of the dialogue process and of peace.” Moreover, “it departs” from the San Andres Accords (see accompanying table). According to CONAI, the manner in which the government is acting opens the possibility that the Law for Dialogue could be rescinded and that military action could begin.

In response, the PRI and the PAN criticized the “partiality” of CONAI. The government coordinator for the dialogue, Emilio Rabasa Gamboa, commented that CONAI “does not fulfill its mediating function when it promotes the positions of the Zapatistas.”

EZLN: A Dialogue of the Deaf

The EZLN is increasingly isolated. In January, it declared, “We do not want everything. We only want the fulfillment of what the government has signed and which is well known. We only want that COCOPA should honor its word and defend its initiative.” In February the EZLN reiterated that it will not accept modifications to the COCOPA proposal.

At the beginning of March, Subcommander Marcos commented that the conditions stated in 1996 for renewing the talks continue to be in effect: the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords and the activation of COSEVER (Commission of Follow-up and Verification); serious proposals for the next round of talks on Democracy and Justice; a cessation of the military and paramilitary harassment; an independent government representative to the talks; and the release of the Zapatista political prisoners.

On January 24, 300 prisoners were freed. However, none of them were part of the support base of the Zapatistas. In the following weeks, 11 political prisoners obtained their freedom. Thirty-seven more remain in jail.

An “Army of Peace”? (President Zedillo, February 20)

At the beginning of the year, in the aftermath of the Acteal massacre, military officials announced that they would apply “indiscriminately” the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law. That would violate the Law for Dialogue which recognizes that the disarming of the Zapatistas would be the undoing of the peace talks. Francisco Labastida, the new Interior Minister, also announced the disarming of “all armed groups.” Subsequently he clarified that this would not include the EZLN.

On January 21 the Minister of National Defense announced that the Army will remain in Chiapas “as long as necessary,” and he stated that he was unaware of the existence of any paramilitary groups. Subsequently he said that weapons should not be allowed to do the talking. However an escalation of the militarization is observable: new checkpoints, intensification of patrols, low-level over flights, etc. According to CONAI, there are currently 70,000 troops in Chiapas. On February 20, in a celebration of the 85th anniversary of the Army, President Zedillo said that the Mexican Army will be the guarantor of the dialogue and will avoid falling into provocations.

Controversy about the role of the Army in Chiapas was heightened when Proceso, a leading Mexican intellectual weekly, published what it claimed to be an October 1994 Mexican Army document calling for “the advising and support of the self-defense forces or other paramilitary groups” in order “to break the support relationship that exists between the population and the [Zapatista Army].” The Mexican Defense Ministry denied its authenticity.

National and International Civil Society

After the Acteal massacre, national civil society staged a number of demonstrations calling for an end to the violence in Chiapas. In addition a Pilgrimage for Peace went from Chiapas to Mexico City. More than 500 indigenous Catholics participated from the 42 parishes of the Diocese of San Cristobal.

The international community also manifested its repudiation of Acteal through many marches, protests and scathing media commentary. On January 12 protests took place in 27 countries as part of a Day of International Solidarity. In the United States, the demonstrators demanded an end to military assistance to Mexico. In the last two years, Mexico has sent 384 officials to the U.S. School of the Americas (a center for military training, including counterinsurgency.)

On January 15, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the Acteal massacre. It noted the lack of response of the security forces that should have prevented or stopped the massacre, and it demanded the punishment of those responsible and the dissolution of the paramilitary groups.

In March the new Minister of Foreign Relations, Rosario Green, said in Brussels that there are no obstacles to the ratification of the trade agreement between Mexico and the European Union. At the same time, Mexican non-governmental organizations visited Europe to make presentations on the human rights situation to the European Parliament and to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations.

Beginning in February, there was an increase in the campaign against the international presence in Chiapas: harassment by immigration officials, defamation in the communications media, expulsion of human rights observers and of the French parish priest, Michel Chanteau, who had worked in Chenalho for 32 years. An indigenous person from the northern region was murdered, apparently by the paramilitary group Peace and Justice, after having given his testimony to members of the International Civil Commission (a delegation of 200 observers who visited Chiapas in mid-February.)

In March, nearly 350 religious leaders from the U.S. and around the world issued a joint statement, initiated by SIPAZ, urging the Mexican and U.S. governments to take resolute action “to de-militarize the conflict and achieve a negotiated resolution” in Chiapas and to address the “pattern of tolerance” for paramilitary groups like the one responsible for the Acteal massacre.

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Analysis

Is a Unilateral Peace Possible?

Never since the beginning of the peace talks in 1995 has the specter of war hung so heavily over Chiapas. Never have the actors in the conflict so polarized their positions as they have in the first months of this year. With the Zedillo administration’s unilateral legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture, the very legal framework of the peace talks has become uncertain.

The federal government is attempting to fulfill the San Andres Accords on its own. Ironically, for more than two years the government has refused to recognize what its negotiators had signed, at least in the form in which COCOPA presented it.

urrently the government is facing a great deal of pressure, both at the national and international levels, to resolve the conflict in Chiapas. Charges of human rights violations, escalating political violence, the perception of uncertainty and instability – all cast a long shadow over the Zedillo administration, especially as the PRI looks toward the national elections of 2000. With this initiative, the government seeks to find a short cut to a resolution of the conflict. In order to sell its plan, the government has orchestrated a media campaign, especially in those media outlets that it controls, assailing the EZLN for “blocking peace,” CONAI “for losing its impartiality,” and COCOPA “for not having done its work well.”

If the government’s initiative is approved, the principle of bilaterality will be lost. In that case, the peace process will be at risk, along with the support of the mediators (CONAI) and co-adjutants (COCOPA). That would open up the worrisome prospect that the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas would be derogated in order to permit the “legal” disarming of the Zapatistas and the use of military force in the event that they resist.

If this were to happen in this high-risk moment, the likelihood of a return to armed conflict between the EZLN and the Army would be very high. And given that the Zapatistas are of the communities, rather than apart from them, we could expect a guerrilla-style war in which the indigenous communities would be forced to take the brunt of what might well be a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign.

In these sadly unhopeful terms, the words of PRI Senator and COCOPA member Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia sound with singular terror and crude realism: “No one today can guarantee that there will not be another Acteal.”

We note that with the horrific massacre in Acteal and other events of brutal violence in that area and in other parts of Chiapas, the only sure thing that has come from the first quarter of 1998 is an enormous social uncertainty.

In Chiapas we see the continuation of a “low-intensity” war, although the cost is very high for the indigenous communities. They are the ones who supply the victims of this war and who suffer the most as a result of the presence of the security forces. They are also the targets of aggression and constant threats by the growing number of paramilitary groups that operate at the fringes of the law, sometimes with the support of the security forces themselves, as became clear in Acteal and as has been asserted for the last two years with regard to the “Peace and Justice” group in the northern region of Chiapas.

The role of international observers in the most violent parts of the state becomes more important in view of so many human rights violations. The current campaign against foreigners has resulted in the expulsion of dozens of persons in the last two years, among them individuals who have offered their pastoral services to indigenous communities for many years as part of the Diocese of San Cristobal. The government accuses the foreigners of meddling in internal politics. However, the scope and intensity of the campaign, especially when considered in the light of the actual activities of the accused, raise fears that the government is attempting to carry on a war without witnesses.

In this context, the “State Accord for Reconciliation” promoted by the governor of Chiapas has been seen by many sectors, including the opposition parties, as an attempt to show the international community a prompt response to the Acteal massacre and as a means of preparing the ground for the local elections in October and the national presidential elections in 2000.

The international community has been attentive, playing a very important role, especially following the Acteal massacre. In particular the European Union has communicated its protests and concerns regarding the increase of the violence and the lack of progress in the peace process. In connection with the ratification of the trade agreement with Mexico, these declarations may be a significant factor in moving the Mexican government to renew the peace talks and to advance toward a peace that guarantees the sustainable and just development of the Mexican people, especially those sectors – such as the indigenous – who are most marginalized and impoverished.

Never in the history of Mexico has the theme of indigenous rights been in the center of national attention. As this historic debate unfolds in the Congress, war and peace hang in the balance. As Senator Salazar commented in an interview, “An initiative may be perfect in a technical sense, but it doesn’t do any good if it does not lead to peace.”