Chiapas: Elections in a mine field

Analysts of all political persuasions agree that the July 6 Congressional and Gubernatorial elections will be a watershed in the history of the democratic struggle in Mexico. For the first time an opposition party will govern Mexico City and opposition parties will carry real weight in Congress. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which held uninterrupted and complete power for 70 years has been challenged. The elections are a significant step towards a multi-party system.

Within the new electoral geography, the PRI lost its absolute majority in the House of Representatives. According to most recent reports the tally was: the PRI, 238 seats; the conservative National Action Party (PAN) 124 seats; and the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) 123 seats. Only 40% of voters did not vote at the national level, one of the lowest abstention rates in history.

In Chiapas, nevertheless, the elections were marked with violence and confusion. And, according to Civic Alliance (Alianza Civica), more than 65% of Chiapas voters stayed away from the polls. Arguments between the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), who insisted that preparations to carry out fair elections were in place, and those who denounced the lack of guarantees: citizen councils, the PRD, the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, Civic Alliance, and indigenous and peasant organizations, further complicated the proceedings.

The high abstention rate is partly attributable to the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), which broke a prolonged silence on July 1st with a communiqué reiterating the political ideals of the Zapatistas: radical democracy beyond the political parties, new relations between voters and elected officials, a key role for the new figures who are emerging to take leadership roles in “civil society” (i.e., committees organized on the local level that are not affiliated with political parties), etc.

The communique announced that “indigenous communities, both Zapatista and non-Zapatista, in the south and southeast of Mexico, have decided not to participate” in the elections. Non-participation would be a protest against the militarization and civil war environment promoted by the local and federal governments, and serve as a protest against the government’s refusal to comply with the agreements made with the Zapatistas in San Andres regarding the democratic rights of the Indian peoples. Mass abstention would call attention to the lack of serious proposals coming from the political parties for resolving problems of the indigenous national movement.

Zapatista sympathizers in the northern region of Chiapas declared they would not go to the polls because of the insecurity and violence that reigns in that region. In other areas the opposition, mostly Zapatistas, decided that they would not vote in the election because they have no confidence in a process that is rigged to benefit the official party.

In the days leading up to the election, disturbing accounts of irregularities in Chiapas circulated: polling booths were being set up adjacent to military camps, or in zones controlled by the PRI or by the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice”; Zapatista-controlled towns acted to prohibit polling booths in their communities; and military patrols stepped up activities in Zapatista strongholds in the highlands, the Lacandon Jungle and the northern region of Chiapas.

The actual voting produced several irregularities, according to Civic Alliance: voters were reportedly drafted or coerced into participating; there were attacks and ambushes on voters by armed groups; some voting booths did not allow for privacy; voting instructions and voter lists were incorrect or incomplete; political propaganda was distributed by partisans at polling places; election officials were absent at some polling places, etc. Abuses included reports of stolen and burned ballots, highway blockades, and other actions that otherwise impeded or made voting difficult.

Even with the large abstention, about half of the polling places in Chiapas were not even monitored because only a small number of electoral observers were ultimately assigned to the state. On top of this, Civic Alliance noted that out of nearly 200 polling booths requested by communities (but not granted by the government), about 80% of these were in Chiapas.

Specialists interpreted these acts in the context of the violence, impunity and injustice, war and military occupation in which the people of Chiapas live. They note that three years after the uprising the government has not responded to indigenous demands and, for that reason, political institutions and the electoral system have been discredited in many communities.

A week after the election, results are still being contested in the three conflicted areas of Chiapas that had the most irregularities: the highlands, the Lacandon Jungle and the northern region.

Conflicts of not such low intensity

While the peace process is still frozen, violence in Chiapas has increased in these last few months to truly alarming levels. The daily news is full of the growing polarization and confrontations between civilians in different communities, principally in the northern region.

Unfortunately, the public is becoming accustomed to the reports.

More than 4000 people have been displaced from their homes, around 300 killed and a hundred imprisoned in the northern region of Chiapas in the last two years. Just in the first three months of this year, 2419 people had to abandon their communities, 768 were arrested and 22 assassinated (figures from CONPAZ).

Conflicts that in the beginning were limited to four municipalities— Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbala and Salto de Agua, today have expanded to other municipalities, with incidents reported in Palenque, El Bosque, and Chilon, as well as highland towns such as Chenalho and Pantelho and the Central Chiapas community of Venustiano Carranza.

The PRI-affiliated paramilitary group “Peace and Justice,” formerly concentrated in the municipality of Tila, is now acting with the same belligerence in Sabanilla. Between June 22 and June 24, members of “Peace and Justice” ambushed and attacked Zapatista sympathizers, killing four (including two minors, 11 and 15 years old), wounding eight and displacing dozens. The acts appear to be revenge for the unsolved death of a member of “Peace and Justice” that occurred on June 15. One year after the attacks on Bachajon, people in the neighboring municipality of Chilon denounced the re-formation of the armed group called “Los Chinchulines.” This group recently took several families hostage, burned two houses and threatened the PRD municipal president with death.

State police and federal army troops in the Northern Zone have done nothing to prevent the acts of violence. In fact, civilians have repeatedly denounced the security forces for sharpening antagonisms between indigenous groups.

Government political proselytizing and discrimination in the distribution of government resources adds to the conflict. President Zedillo, in his recent visit to Chiapas, declared that in 1997 the federal government showered Chiapas with 2.2 billion dollars, the largest sum budgeted to any state by the federal government. However, it is common knowledge that government resources are regularly channeled primarily through organizations that support the ruling party, such as ARIC-Oficial and SOCOMA.

Meanwhile, a popular caravan called “Wejlel” (meaning “liberty” in Chol) was launched on April 25 when 200 displaced Choles from the northern region of Chiapas broke through the ranks of “Peace and Justice” and marched to the state capitol. They demanded liberty for all political prisoners, an end to paramilitary violence and political persecution, compensation for property stolen or destroyed by members of the PRI, guarantees and support for the return of those who have been displaced, etc. Since then, delegates of the displaced and the representatives of the political prisoner movement “The Voice of Cerro Hueco” have maintained a sit-in in front of the Government Palace in Tuxtla Gutierrez.

Thirty-one political prisoners were liberated as a result of a complex process of negotiation with state government officials (including 24 from San Pedro Nixtalucum; See SIPAZ Report, Vol.II, No.2). But 61 others, the majority from the northern region, remain in jail. As defense lawyers have repeatedly shown, guarantees of due process have been ignored in these cases (charges are trumped up, there is no proof, confessions were extracted under torture, etc.) The lawyers state that the only reason for some arrests was to eliminate the opposition to the official party. None of the prisoners are members of the PRI, in spite of grave accusations that have been made against some of the leaders of “Peace and Justice.”

The Peace Process

In response to a request by the Zapatistas the government appointed a new delegation for the Dialogues in San Andres Larrainzar. This is a good sign, but it has not resulted in new peace talks. Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) delegate Pedro Joaquin Coldwell expressed a desire to gather all the parties that are involved in the process together so that they can voice their opinions and attain a better understanding of the challenges ahead.

The EZLN remains silent about the peace process. They have not made a pronouncement about the new government delegation, nor about the latest COCOPA proposal. For the last few months the EZLN has maintained that it will not take any initiative until the federal government clearly demonstrates a true desire to follow through with the conditions demanded by the Zapatistas.

Meanwhile, the civilian bases of the EZLN have been active in trying to consolidate their control over rebel municipalities and autonomous regions, defining their territories, and electing and reelecting officials in political actions presided over by their commanders. In the most conflicted areas, civilian Zapatistas have been responding to provocations and armed aggression, a response that has threatened the cease fire which is still technically in place.

In April, after the death of senator and COCOPA representative Heberto Castillo, the COCOPA undertook an initiative to address the stalemate, proposing a “Joint Meeting” where, with wide participation of all concerned parties, work could begin on finding solutions to the conflicts in the northern region.

The National Mediation Commission (CONAI) and members of non-governmental organizations were enthusiastic about the COCOPA proposal, but unfortunately, neither the state nor the federal governments supported it. Rather, the state government proposed separate negotiations with representatives from the northern region on economic, judicial and political themes. That way, the state government would assume a position of arbitrator of the conflict, when, in reality, it is a party to the conflict. After three months of similar maneuvers, none of the proposed meetings has taken place.

There are other indications that the state government is pursuing a hard line. For example, the state Congress, without advance notification, suddenly replaced its member in COCOPA, PRI representative Juan Roque Flores, who had enjoyed a reputation for independence as the organization’s mediator. The state Congress also supported the proposals of the “Commission for Remunicipalization and Redistricting,” whose work had been rejected by the civilian bases of the EZLN.

Then, on June 8th, CONAI announced that

“The lack of fulfillment of the agreements of San Andres has precipitated a crisis—not just in the dialogues between the EZLN and the federal government—but also in the process of political negotiation as a way of finding peaceful solutions to all the conflicts. If that which is agreed upon is not fulfilled, trust is betrayed and it makes any advance impossible.”

CONAI urged all the political actors and civil society to mobilize to achieve the constitutional reforms necessary to complete the Agreements of San Andres, including the release of political prisoners, agreement to participate in the “Joint Meeting” proposed by COCOPA , and reactivation of the Commission on Follow-through and Verification (COSEVE) to implement the agreements already signed. Also, CONAI asked all parties to respect the will of the citizens as expressed in the elections of July 6th.

CONAI voiced concerns about violations of human rights and the escalation of violence in the neighboring states of Oaxaca and Guerrero, where confrontations between the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) and the federal army occurred in May. The principal victims were, as usual, the civilian population and members of popular organizations. The numbers of dead, arrested and disappeared from indigenous communities in these states have increased dramatically.

In another development, at the end of June, the Chiapas media unleashed a new campaign of attacks and defamation against the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work to support the peace process. The press accused several NGOs of enriching themselves and of using funds originating from international solidarity groups for “anti-government and destabilizing actions.” Since the media obtained this information about funding from confidential reports, there is speculation that the NGOs and the diocese have been subjects of spying and espionage.

Mexico loses points in international opinion

International human rights organizations continue to severely criticize the Mexican government for the increase in violations and impunity for violators, especially in regard to political violence committed against the opposition in regions of intense conflict in Mexico.

In April and May, about 20 international observers visiting the states of Oaxaca and Guerrero were expelled from Mexico, including members of the International Federation of Human Rights. This action caused profound concern and unrest in the international community in Mexico.

Soon after, Human Rights Watch—Americas presented its report about the situation in Mexico. With abundant documentation from the northern region of Chiapas and the Lacandon Jungle, the document confirmed that “Impunity remains the norm for human right violators and supporters of the government.” It also observed that state government authorities in Chiapas exhibit “a pattern of discriminatory application of justice.”

Jorge Madrazo, Attorney General of Mexico and former President of the National Human Rights Commission, has pointed out that the administration of justice in Mexico is going through a grave crisis of effectiveness and credibility.

Amnesty International, in its recently released 1996 report, noted that dozens of prisoners of conscience in Mexico are condemned without due process and that last year dozens of extrajudicial executions and 20 arrest-disappearances occurred. Security forces reportedly tortured hundreds, including minors, reporters, members of ethnic minorities, and human rights workers.

The United Nation’s Committee Against Torture heavily criticized the report released by the Mexican government, describing it as “theoretical, imprecise and lacking in data.” The committee lamented what it called “the profound dichotomy between the law and its application” in Mexico.

In a move that could further tarnish its international image, the Mexican government has mounted a campaign to modify the statutes of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, in order to prevent NGOs from presenting accusations against the government’s human rights violations. President Clinton’s visit to Mexico reinforced North American support for the Mexican administration’s economic policies. However, Clinton’s openness to meeting with members of opposition parties and Madeleine Albright’s rendezvous with human rights NGOs were interpreted as signs that the North American administration is not indifferent to the process of democratic transition in Mexico, nor to the new political and social actors that are behind it. Clinton praised the July elections a step towards more democracy in Mexico.

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Analysis

The fragile and violent situation in Chiapas has been temporarily displaced in the Mexican national consciousness by political events which are potentially highly significant. The recently concluded electoral season, if nothing else, succeeded in capturing the attention of the national media for the better part of 1997.

Federal officials, electoral authorities, disparate political parties, members of civic organizations, and other national and international observers all agree that the election which took place on July 6 was the most transparent vote in the history of modern Mexico.

The results represent what may be an historic turning point and may engender a new and largely unknown political dynamic, leading towards the further democratization of the political culture of the country. There were important advances made by the major opposition parties, particularly by the PRD in Mexico City and by the PAN in the states of Nuevo Leon and Queretaro, as well as an increase in the number of opposition party representatives in the lower house of the Congress. For the first time in history the PRI has lost its absolute majority, and there is now talk of a new correlation of forces on a national level and of an important change of direction, making a new and better form of politics possible for Mexico.

According to observers, the newfound Congressional pluralism will foster a competitive rebalancing of the national political spectrum, with as yet unforseen consequences for the looming problems of the nation: neo-liberal economic displacement, unemployment, social conflict, and the process of peace in Chiapas.

While we certainly welcome these long-overdue developments, it may be worthwhile to temper our enthusiasm by contrasting how the news of the elections was received in the states that have the highest rates of social marginalization and poverty— such as Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca— with Mexico City, where for the first time since 1928 citizens exercised their right to elect their own mayor.

In Chiapas, indigenous people were more likely to be dealing with the consequences of increased militarization of their communities than with the outcome of largely abstract elections in faraway cities. Political violence and the deterioration of the quality of life and of communal relationships, that have spread as a result of official indifference towards indigenous demands as reflected in the unfulfilled agreements of San Andres, are the pressing daily concerns which naturally overshadow other events.

Consequently, some analysts question whether a consistent democratization of Mexico will be possible if the deep and unresolved conflicts persisting in states such as Chiapas are ignored. As the outward signs of the peace process gradually fade from view, turmoil and conflict engendered by the government’s counterinsurgency strategy are becoming manifest. The growing polarization and interior divisions within indigenous communities constitute the most visible forms of “success” of the low intensity war. The strategy not only aims to weaken the bases of support for the EZLN, but is also inflicting more profound and longer term damage on the most crucial aspects of indigenous culture: its social, economic, and political organization, and communal relations.

Indigenous lifestyles and forms of government, social organization, and the administration of justice are organized by a different logic and pace than those determined by electoral events and the official political system. In fact, in some cases the rhetoric and confusion surrounding election day events only served to accentuate antagonisms between different fractions within the indigenous communities. Only a year and a half ago, the Mexican government had the opportunity to recognize, understand and respect the distinct reality of the indigenous people and to incorporate the San Andres agreements into the Federal Constitution. Instead, recent actions of the state government of Chiapas have unwittingly exacerbated the deterioration of the social fabric and only served to radicalize religious and ideological conflicts. The government, by delaying negotiations with members of displaced communities, by placing the state police in a provocative role which worsens the confrontations between civilians, and by conditioning the distribution of resources to indigenous communities on their loyalty to the official political party, has effectively blocked any efforts that have been made toward renewing the peace process. Hence, the largest obstacle is that the fate of the negotiations in the northern zone rests in the hands of the state government of Chiapas.

It is therefore imperative that the federal government put Chiapas back at the top of its agenda by raising the negotiations to the national level. Otherwise the trend towards a total breakdown in the Chiapas peace process would be a dangerous setback for Mexico, where social unrest is increasingly expressing itself through more violent means. By properly emphasizing and supporting the mechanisms that foster rather than injure the peace process, Chiapas could be converted into a conflict resolution laboratory, where a new relationship between the Mexican nation and its indigenous people could begin to address the injustices which feed the violence.

The idea was captured the day after the election by Jaime Martinez, a PRI Senator and member of the COCOPA, in the La Jornada newspaper:

“At this moment of civic triumph, we should not forget: A commitment made to the indigenous people of Mexico must be fulfilled before we can truly speak of democratic maturity in Mexico.”

Given the lack of visible progress with their concerns, it is understandable that the indigenous people of Chiapas view these seemingly “distant” electoral processes with either scepticism or indifference. Once the electoral euphoria subsides, the federal government, the new legislature, as well as a renovated COCOPA, would do well to reinvigorate negotiations with the aim of advancing a fair and dignified peace in Chiapas.