SIPAZ Activities (September 1996 – January 1997)
31/01/1997ANALYSIS: Reconciliation, An Opportunity for Peace
31/07/1997ANALYSIS: A Smoldering Cease-fire
Summary
In Chiapas, the protracted suspension of the talks between the federal government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has plunged the peace process into its most profound crisis to date. In December the government rejected a legislative proposal for implementation of the agreements on Indigenous Rights and Culture and presented an alternative. The proposal it rejected was drawn up by COCOPA, the congressional commission formed to assist the negotiation process. The government insists that its counterproposal is consistent with the agreements signed in February 1996. However many observers disagree and accuse the government of de facto reneging on the agreements and deliberately undermining the peace process.
COCOPA insists that it stands by its proposal, which was presented to both sides on a take-it-or-leave-it basis after months of talks. (The EZLN accepted it.) However in a statement on March 4, COCOPA ambiguously added that “the text is perfectible” and declined to present it to Congress without the Executive’s support.
The EZLN continues to insist on specific “minimum conditions” for resuming the peace talks and is clearly loathe to negotiate new issues while the existing agreements remain unfulfilled.
Meanwhile, an upsurge of violence in Chiapas has refocused public attention on the stalled talks and the increasingly unstable situation there. In the embattled northern region, paramilitary groups tied to the PRI impose a repressive rule in some areas, resulting in confrontations, killings, robberies, and new internal refugees. On February 15 a delegation of the Northern Station for the Easing of Tension and Reconciliation (including a member of SIPAZ) was attacked and shot at by a paramilitary group while attempting to gather information on recent violence. The delegation was able to leave, but for residents of the area who don’t back the ruling party, this sort of violence is a common threat against which they have little defense or recourse. At the same time, a wave of protest across Chiapas against high electricity rates has provoked violent repression by state police forces.
Two events in particular underscored the crisis of the peace process and the fragile nature of the cease-fire now in place. A land dispute and a subsequent road blockade near Palenque resulted in a confrontation in which two police were killed and five wounded. The next day two peasant leaders and two Jesuit priests were arrested, beaten and charged with the killings. Although they were later released for lack of evidence, the arrests were seen as a troubling indication of increased belligerence on the part of the government.
On March 14, an intra-communal dispute in San Pedro Nixtalucum ended in an astonishing display of repressive force as state police, shooting from the ground and from helicopters, opened fire on civilian PRD/Zapatista supporters. Four peasants were killed, many wounded, 27 arrested (including one who was charged with killing his own son!), and 300 people were added to the number of Chiapas’ internal refugees. The police went on to destroy houses, belongings and crops of the PRD/Zapatista supporters.
The impunity enjoyed by security forces and paramilitary groups and the discriminatory treatment of Indigenous peoples not affiliated with the PRI reveal extreme deficiencies in the justice system.
An increase in military installations in conflictive areas in Chiapas and elsewhere in Mexico (including parts of Mexico City), combined with incidents like those mentioned, reinforces fears that the government has decided to seek military rather than political solutions, employing the strategy of low-intensity warfare.
The attempt to wear out the Zapatistas and their supporters while publicly proclaiming a commitment to dialogue and a negotiated solution is doubly risky for the government. In a situation of such high tension, with the prospects for progress in the negotiations dim, and with state and federal forces attacking and even massacring civilian Zapatista supporters, the cease-fire appears increasingly fragile and a renewed outbreak of war more possible. Moreover the inconsistency between the government’s stated policy and its actions causes a loss of credibility both at home and abroad.
The July elections for Congress and some governorships will be an important measure of how the PRI government is viewed within Mexico. Polls currently indicate that for the first time in the PRI’s long reign, its lower-house congressional majority is seriously threatened.
Internationally, the Mexican government has recently been subjected to criticism on human rights issues from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and from the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The government’s intervention to try to block a large grant from the European Union to a Mexican non-governmental organization for election monitoring is not likely to improve its image.
The hardening of the government’s position is in part the repressive response of an authoritarian regime that feels itself threatened. Secret deals with major national and international economic interests are playing a part as well. Forest and mineral concessions negotiated by the government are apparently threatened by the autonomy for indigenous communities proposed by the San Andres Accords.
Delegations in April from COCOPA and the Mexican Bishops Conference to the northern region of Chiapas and conciliatory statements from the “Peace and Justice” paramilitary group strengthen the tenuous prospects for peace.
The participation of Mexican civil society in the peace process has been integral to the progress to date. The recent National Peace Conference in March that brought together 91 organizations from 19 states continues those efforts.
At the same time, the role of international economic interests in shaping the direction of the conflict in Chiapas underscores the importance of the active engagement of the larger international community in the search for a just and lasting peace.
RECOMMENDED ACTION
- Urge members of the Zedillo administration to: respect the San Andres Accords and the international covenants that it has signed regarding the rights of indigenous peoples;
- recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process
- enhance the political climate in such a way as to promote the participation of the entire citizenry in the upcoming elections.
- Urge COCOPA and the Congress to carry forward the proposed constitutional revisions regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture in order to achieve the effective implementation of the San Andres Accords.
- Write to your own congresspersons or members of parliament, updating them on the situation in Chiapas and asking them to communicate to the Mexican government their concern for the prompt completion and implementation of a just peace agreement.
Please write to:
Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 535 27 26
Congreso de la Unión
Palacio Legislativo
San Lázaro
15969 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 542 1558
Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 271 1764 / 515 4783
Emilio Chuayffet Chemor
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 546 5350 / 546 7380
Lic. Julio C. Ruiz Ferro
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas – México
Fax: (52 961) 20917
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Update
A Smoldering Cease-fire
Just when it seemed that national attention would focus on the campaign for the July elections, especially in Mexico City, Chiapas returned to the spotlight. In spite (or because) of the massive military presence in Chiapas, there has been a sharp increase in violence in several parts of the state. This “low-intensity conflict” orchestrated by the government appears to be aimed at doing away with the organized indigenous/peasant movement, which is an important source of support for the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). In recent months this war has caused the flight of hundreds of families from their homes and dozens of killings, ambushes, assaults and arrests.
The negotiations between the Zapatistas and the federal government are in their most profound crisis to date. Dialogue has been suspended since September of 1996. The accords signed over a year ago remain a symbolic piece of paper. The congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) has experienced internal division and has adopted a rather indecisive public posture. The significance of the role of the National Mediation Commission (CONAI, presided over by Bishop Ruiz) has diminished as well in the last few months. Mexico’s organized civil society is worn down and somewhat disconnected from events in Chiapas. The prospects for the peace process in the coming months, as the election campaign becomes more prominent, are not encouraging.
The central issue would appear to be the differences between the parties in conflict with regard to the legislative proposal prepared by COCOPA for implementation of the agreements on “Indigenous Rights and Culture” (see SIPAZ Report, Vol. 2, No. 1). It is clear, however, that there is much more to it. Although the EZLN accepted the proposal, the government rejected it, saying the the autonomy provisions, as defined by COCOPA, would mean creating other countries within the country of Mexico. The government presented a counterproposal, asserting that it was consistent with the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture.
At the beginning of March, COCOPA released a statement concerning the uncertainty of the peace negotiations in Chiapas. In synthesis, COCOPA
- affirms its legislative proposal of 20 November, 1996;
- accepts that the language of the text could be improved;
- feels that the government and the EZLN could agree on another alternative to resolve the existing differences;
- rejects presenting its proposed legislation unilaterally to Congress.
The COCOPA statement prompted demonstrations throughout the country. Protestors demanded that COCOPA keeps its word and bring the proposal to the National Congress. Sub-commander Marcos of the EZLN responded in a communiqué,
“This is a summary of the situation, Honorable Legislators: A constitutional reform was agreed. It was not carried out. It was agreed that COCOPA would prepare it. It was not carried out. It was agreed that COCOPA’s proposal would be accepted. It was not carried out. It was agreed that COCOPA would accept only a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ from the parties regarding its proposals, not alternative proposals. It was not carried out. The EZLN was not the one who failed to comply in any of these cases.”
And he adds,
” We will not dialogue with the federal government until it complies with the minimum conditions which make the peace process serious, just and dignified.”
Another development that was interpreted as a “low blow” to the peace process was the boycott of the meeting of the Commission for Verification and Follow-up (COSEVER) which was supposed to take place on February 14 of this year. Representatives of the federal government, in open contradiction to previous agreements, did not attend the meeting.
During the months of February and March, considerable national attention focused on the election campaign. In most surveys, the front-runners correspond to who is paying for the poll. Overall the indication of the polls is that of the three most important parties competing, the PAN, the PRD and the PRI, the ruling PRI has the least support.
Meanwhile, the PRD is enjoying a significant growth of support on a national scale, as is evident from the results of the Morelos state elections, where they won 12 municipalities and gained a number of legislative representatives.
The PRI’s fear of losing its historic hegemony may explain the recent hardening of government policies. The impression is given that the rule of law, so prominent in the public pronouncements of the government, is increasingly far from being established in Mexico. For example, the government has rejected the recommendation by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the Organization of American States (OAS) to release General Gallardo from prison. Gallardo has been detained for over three years in a military prison, solely because he recommended to the Armed Forces that they appoint an Ombudsman to monitor human rights abuses within the military. At the same time, the government is pushing a campaign aimed at limiting the powers of the IAHRC in countries that are members of the OAS It has also sought to block a donation of nearly US$400,000 that the European Union had earmarked for the Mexican Academy of Human Rights for observation of the campaign for the governorship of the Federal District that includes Mexico City.
Regarding foreign relations, for several days the press featured the issue of the United States’ certification of Mexico as being fully cooperative in efforts to stop drug trafficking. The delay of the U.S. government in deciding whether or not to grant Mexico certification (a matter strictly related to U.S. law but which can have major economic and political repercussions in the countries under review) caused a series of reactions, especially after the Mexican government arrested General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo on February 18. According to the charges, General Gutierrez, who was in charge of combatting drug traffic, was instead protecting and receiving benefits from Amado Carrillo, who runs the infamous Juarez drug cartel.
President Clinton finally authorized the certification. Nonetheless, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a resolution decertifying Mexico, but suspended implementation of the decision for 90 days. The resolution established six areas of concern in which Mexico would have to demonstrate “substantial progress” in order to be recertified.
On the national level, several organizations and experts in the field are issuing warnings about the constantly growing levels of militarization in the country. Social organizations, human rights activists, and indigenous and peasant communities have been the most affected by this phenomenon. Parts of the country which have seen the worst side of the military presence are: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, the Huastecas and Mexico City. In the Iztapalapa area of Mexico City, approximately 3,000 soldiers from the Mexican army stood in for the police for several months so that they could attend an extended training session sponsored by the military.
In Chiapas alone, reports from the press and from non-governmental organizations describe an alarming increase in the presence of military encampments, particularly in the areas of the highlands, the jungle and the northern part of the state. This militarization has brought with it a systematic violation of human rights. Paramilitary groups in the northern region continue to act with the complicity of the police forces, provoking constant insecurity through confrontations, assassinations, robbery, and the displacement of entire families from their villages.
To mention only a few of the more recent incidents: the paramilitary group called “Peace and Justice” ambushed a delegation of journalists and observers from the Northern Station for Easing Tension and Reconciliation (which included a SIPAZ team member) just outside the community of Paraiso in Sabanilla; PRI supporters attacked Zapatista sympathizers in the community of Aguas Blancas; state police violently repressed peaceful demonstrations around the state against high electricity rates, and entire communities and even municipalities had their power cut off.
The events which occurred on March 7 in the community of San Martin Chamizal again focused national and international attention on Chiapas. Two policemen were killed and five were wounded in an ambush against the security forces. The following day, two leaders of the indigenous and peasant organization Xi’Nich, Ramon Parcero Martinez and Francisco Gonzalez Gutierrez, and two Jesuit priests, Jeronimo Hernandez Lopez and Gonzalo Rosas, were illegally arrested. The men were accused of being accomplices to murder, disrupting the peace, and acting against the physical integrity and patrimony of the state, as well as association with criminal intent.
According to their testimonies, the men were violently arrested, tortured and kept incommunicado for over 20 hours. This news generated a series of demonstrations in the state of Chiapas and letters of protest flooded state and federal authorities demanding their immediate release. Finally they were freed by a judge for lack of evidence.
On March 14, again in the northern area of Chiapas, in the community of San Pedro Nixtalucum, municipality of El Bosque, bloody events jolted the national conscience. It started out with verbal abuse between PRI sympathizers and PRD/Zapatista supporters over a dispute that could have been settled peacefully with minor sanctions. However it became a real massacre with the arrival of the state police forces who, without even attempting to investigate the facts, began shooting at the PRD/Zapatista supporters. According to accounts of local villagers, the shots came from police trucks and from helicopters overhead firing automatic weapons. The attack resulted in at least four deaths, several wounded and 27 arrests. Since the attack, an army unit has moved into the community and the continual harassment of Zapatista sympathizers by federal and state security forces has caused approximately 300 people to flee and seek refuge in the mountains. (See “San Pedro Nixtalucum – Another Trap for the Indigenous.“)
Ironically, while all this violence was transpiring in Chiapas, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations presented a document to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland that reiterated the desire of the Mexican government to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chiapas, as well as to find a solution to the problems that had caused the armed uprising of January 1994. On March 18, La Jornada reported that the United Nations Commission for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considered the document “insufficient and in contradiction with reality, especially with regard to Chiapas.” The Commission expressed an ongoing concern for the indigenous peoples and land tenure issues, the need to establish an impartial system of justice, conditions of extreme poverty, and the conflict. The special relateur for Mexico, Regis de Gouttes referred to the “impunity with which paramilitary groups such as Peace and Justice and the Chinchulines continue the repression of the indigenous people under the protective shield of the authorities.” Another member of the Commission, Rugiger Wolfrum, emphasized that ,“The facts indicate that the peace process is suspended, that the government does not respect the San Andres Accords and ignores Agreement 169 of the International Labor Organization, and that COCOPA has been weakened.” In spite of claims to the contrary from the Mexican government, the UN Commission stated that, “The situation in Chiapas is explosive, as it has been since the beginning of the conflict, and consequently it will continue to be of concern to the Commission.” Finally, the Commission urged the Mexican government to pass a law which would make any form of segregation or exclusion of the indigenous communities a punishable offense.
The crisis in the peace dialogue has served as a new incentive to seek a convergence of perspectives and efforts. A key initiative in this regard was the September call of CONAI for a broad National Dialogue that brings together organizations and issues in one unified movement that has as its principle focus peace, democracy, justice, and dignity.
The State Conference for Peace, which took place in San Cristobal in February, provided an indication of how far such an effort has to go. Although fewer than half the organizations in Chiapas participated in the conference, those that were there agreed to redouble their efforts to bring all of the groups together.
This conference was in preparation for the National Peace Conference which took place in Mexico City March 14-16. Ninety-one organizations from different regions of the country were present, representing 19 states with 564 people participating. The salient message of the conference was the commitment to work together for the achievement of peace. It was also agreed that these peace conferences must continue in order to give continuity to the advance of the construction of a just and democratic Mexico.
In April separate delegations from COCOPA and the Mexican Bishops Conference toured the northern region in an indication the the escalating violence is a matter of growing concern. Both groups committed themselves to continued efforts to renew the stalled peace talks. The bishops delegation also called for a reduction of the military presence in Chiapas.
In another encouraging development, the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice” proposed to the bishops’ delegation a northern region dialogue to further the search for peace. Noting that the EZLN demands are the same as those of the communities torn apart by conflict, the group suggested that the dialogue include the EZLN, the churches, political parties, the government, and other actors involved in the conflict.
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Analysis
A Smoldering Cease-fire
SIPAZ shares the opinion of many other analysts who believe that the current political dynamics in Chiapas are aimed at undermining the peace process. Whether the escalated violence is due to a power vacuum caused by the inability of the state government to control the situation there or due to a deliberate plan of the federal government, it would appear that the Mexican government is doing what it can to definitively collapse the peace process.
The arbitrary arrests of the Xi’Nich leaders and the two Jesuit priests in Palenque and the subsequent abuse of their civil rights can be interpreted as an attempt to weaken two of the most significant actors in the peace process: the indigenous/peasant movement and the Catholic Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas. Since the Jesuit Jeronimo Hernandez was an advisor to the Zapatistas during the San Andres negotiations, the arrests also appeared to be indirectly aimed at CONAI and the EZLN.
The direct participation in – or acquiescence to – violent confrontations by the security forces, be they police or military, underscores the fragility of the cease-fire now in place. The most serious incident, when the police opened fire on Zapatista supporters in San Pedro Nixtalucum, points to a troubling intention: after neutralizing the political and military strength of the Zapatistas, proceed to attack their unprotected bases of support through repression, arrests, or killings.
It appears clear that this spiral of violence is a planned part of the counterinsurgency strategy. The repression of the indigenous/peasant movement; the fabrication of crimes in order to eliminate opponents; the general impunity enjoyed by the security forces and the paramilitaries; the provocation of division and confrontation within the communities: all of this creates a dynamic that undermines the logic of peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, the disorder created serves to justify the militarization of new areas by the federal army.
Although the impact of the low-intensity warfare strategy is growing, the government’s public image is deteriorating in the process. Its policies are perceived as two-faced, its rhetoric as double-talk. In an electoral year such a profound loss of credibility could be very costly.
Seen in this light, the reticence of the EZLN is understandable: why return to a negotiating table when the other party does not respect agreements already made?
In such a tense situation, with the civilian base of the EZLN sometimes under attack and even massacred, the cease-fire appears more fragile, and a confrontation between the army and the EZLN more possible.
Many people are perplexed by the intransigence of the Mexican government. Why obstruct mediation and verification and risk a renewed outbreak of war? Why risk the political cost of ignoring the pressure not only of organized civil society but also of prestigious international organizations, including the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the European Union, who are calling on Mexico to implement the San Andres Accords signed in February of 1996?
A complete answer to these questions must include reference to the powerful economic interests that are at play. Indigenous autonomy is a threat to control of the rich natural resources in Chiapas. Several sources have referred to secret deals made with transnationals during the Salinas administration for the extraction of oil and uranium in Chiapas and the implementation of forestry plans that would produce big, quick profits at the price of the irreversible deterioration of the land. These deals were made without consultation with the affected indigenous communities.
Combining this information with recent public events, the anthropologist Ronald Nigh, who has lived in Chiapas for many years, offered an analysis that is echoed by some other political observers in Mexico. While it is somewhat speculative, it cannot be simply dismissed out of hand. Nigh observes,
” When [COCOPA] presented its proposal for constitutional changes reflecting the government’s signed commitments to Indian rights, Zedillo asked the Zapatistas for 15 days to study the issue. The President than boarded [his jet] and flew, not to Washington, but to Wall Street, where he met with Henry Kissinger and other top financial celebrities. Upon his return he announced the rejection of the proposed legislation by presenting a counterproposal, clearly designed to be unacceptable, which the Zapatistas rejected. In less than one month, Environmental Minister Carabias announced a large World Bank loan for ‘forestry’, i.e., commercial plantations. The government had won the approval of the financiers at the cost of throwing Chiapas, and the whole country, into a state of uncertainty and tension.”
However, the executive branch of the government is not solely responsible for the crisis in the peace process. Congress, through COCOPA, showed its subordination to presidential authoritarianism in its March 4 statement. In it, in a gesture that many analysts described as a “surrender,” COCOPA treated as concluded the episode in which the Zedillo administration rejected the COCOPA legislative proposal, and COCOPA announced that it would seek meetings with both sides to explore new alternatives.
In Chiapas, it is the judiciary – in the person of state Attorney General Jorge E. Hernandez Aguilar – that is responsible for the absence of the rule of law and of due process for Indians who are arrested without warrants, accused of fabricated crimes by their political enemies, convicted without proof, and denied access to a just and impartial trial.
Looking toward the future, the fate of the peace process depends in good measure on the capacity of the various sectors that are committed to seeking change to unite their efforts and to articulate their proposals in a joint project that encompasses their differences. This participation of civil society is precisely what Gonzalo Ituarte, Technical Secretary of CONAI, has referred to as “the great originality of the Mexican peace process.” The recent National Peace Conference in Mexico City is an example of the potential for change that exists in Mexican society.
It is hoped that these efforts of civil society, together with the recent initiatives of COCOPA and the Mexican Bishops Conference, will help to reduce the current levels of violence in Chiapas and elicit clear indications from the Mexican government of its will to reactivate the peace talks.