July 2 of the year 2000 is a date that will permanently remain in Mexico’s history. After 71 years of dominance by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), an opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, won.

Fox’s victory was principally due to the combination of two factors: the exploitation of his charisma and personality through skillful management of the media, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the majority of Mexicans had had their fill of the PRI. The votes of the undecided contributed to this overwhelming triumph. Paradoxically, given that Fox is from the center-right, so too did the votes of thousands of people who generally vote for the left. A controversy erupted during the last weeks of the campaigns about the “useful vote” concept. For those who defended it, the idea was to “get the PRI out of los Pinos” [the presidential residence], so that a change could take place.

Democratic Advances

Previous elections had been stained by suspicions of fraud. Those of July took place in a general context of calm. There were relatively few complaints of irregularities during the voting. Actual co-optation of the vote took place before the elections through a variety of abuses of incumbency, including the use of federal assistance programs (like PROGRESA and PROCAMPO) for propaganda goals, irregularities in the selection of election officials, inequality among the candidates in access to the media, etc. This may be one of the reasons why the PRI continued to carry the state of Chiapas.

The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) played a key exemplary role in the process before and during the elections. It was able to maintain autonomy in its actions, demonstrating efficiency, independence, impartiality and professionalism.

The democratic advances were seen most clearly in two aspects: citizen participation (in the process of preparing for and during the elections themselves, with a particularly low abstention rate compared with previous elections), and the public recognition of the preliminary results by all political figures.

Nevertheless, there are still five long months of uncertainty left, from forming the new cabinet to the inauguration of the new President of the Republic on the first of December.

The defeat of the PRI and its possible risks

To a certain extent, we can see an anti-PRI tendency in many of the July 2 votes. The crushing defeat has not signified, however, immobility within the party. Readjustment of forces and internal paybacks for such a crashing fall, as well as resistance to assuming the role of opposition have begun to generate accusations, finger pointing and struggles for control of this ship which seems in danger of going under.

Consequent re-composition of blocs

The simple fact that the opposition (Fox) won, constitutes a step forward in the transition to democracy. It is also important to recognize the previous steps that have been taken to get to this point, including the ’88 and ’94 elections, the electoral reforms of ’96, and the elections of ’97, which gave the Chamber of Deputies a new configuration in which the PRI no longer held an absolute majority.

Today the triumph of an opposition candidate is an important advance in the process of democratization, but it is only one, since democracy will have to continue to be built among the three powers, in each of the houses of Congress, in the different parties, and with the participation of civil society. Surely those members of civil society unaffiliated with a political party will express themselves more actively during this six-year term, particularly those groups that publicly supported Fox. They will be in a position to demand the fulfillment of campaign promises.

Without doubt there are many pending issues that must still be resolved: the challenge to develop a political economy that overcomes the profound inequalities that exist in Mexican society, promoting and including the 30 million people who are below the poverty line; Chiapas and the resumption of the peace process; the cleanup of FOBAPROA (financial scandal that occurred in 1998 around the operations of the Savings Protection Bank Fund); social and educational aspects; the human rights situation, and flaws within the system of administration of justice.

The president-elect speaks a lot about inclusion, of putting together a plural government. Nevertheless, after the elections he set himself apart from the PAN, in order to let it be seen between the lines that in this new stage, the patterns of the past wouldn’t be repeated. On the other hand, the PRD already announced its firm decision not to collaborate with the Fox government and to assume the posture of the “responsible opposition.” If Fox relies on the PRI, it is possible that Mexican politics would return to the point of departure. On the contrary, if he succeeds in gathering the support of others, the government will be able, with greater security, to go forward with the country towards democracy. It is one of the first challenges that Fox will have to confront.

Fox’s Proposal for Chiapas

At the beginning of the campaign, a comment by Fox about “being able to fix the problem of Chiapas in 15 minutes” caught the attention of sectors linked to the conflict. However, later he proposed to present the COCOPA bill regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture to the next session of Congress. It should be remembered that the impasse in the Chiapas peace process has to do, in large part, with the reluctance of President Zedillo to take on this bill as a way of implementing the San Andres Accords which were signed by the government and the EZLN in 1996. The president-elect also proposed to pick up the dialogue on the outstanding issues that were previously identified. An important factor of the legislative proposal is that it will be presented in a Congress dominated by the PAN and the PRI, parties which to date have opposed the COCOPA text, each proposing alternatives. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the proposal will prosper.

Fox’s Chiapas policy contemplates the majority of the conditions raised by the Zapatistas for resumption of talks. Some analysts think that this proposal, which arrived quite late in the electoral campaign and which closely resembles that of Cardenas, was a ploy to gain the vote of some sectors of the left for whom the conflict in Chiapas was a particularly important electoral theme.

The EZLN and the electoral process

By announcing that it would not block the electoral process in Chiapas and by giving its supporters the freedom to vote, the EZLN was able to situate itself in a sufficiently neutral position so it would not be marginalized from the democratic process. This could be a factor that strengthens the August electoral process in Chiapas.

Local elections in Chiapas; an opportunity for peace

The PRI candidate for governor, Sami David, had based a large part of his campaign strategy on the victory of Francisco Labastida in the presidential elections. The opposition victory at the national level as well as the EZLN’s position with respect to the participation of its supporters in the election could allow the opposition candidate, Pablo Salazar, to win the elections in Chiapas scheduled for August 20.

But at the same time, the most hard-line PRI groups could generate instability in the region during the time that remains before the elections. One can’t forget that elections in Chiapas have a long history of violence, fraud, coercion and other arbitrary acts that have not simply disappeared with the federal elections. In fact, that could explain in large measure the triumph of the PRI in Chiapas on July 2. The same happened in the neighboring state of Tabasco. Southeast Mexico continues to be a bastion of the PRI.

Difficult electoral context in Chiapas: between ambushes and militarization

Before the presidential elections, complaints from the indigenous communities painted a picture of a hardening of the posture of the Army at its checkpoints (although they were taken down on the day of the elections.) This military presence surely inhibited the opposition vote in more than one part of the state, even after the communiqué from the EZLN.

In recent months, two types of situations were used to justify that presence: the new ecological concern of the government about the areas under Zapatista influence (Montes Azules) and the increase in the number of unresolved ambushes, with their mounting toll (Chalchihuitan, Chenalho, El Bosque). Doubtless the presence of the state police, the military and recently the Federal Preventive Police contributed to the strained political atmosphere before the elections.

International Approval

Vicente Fox’s economic policy guarantees continuity with that of Ernesto Zedillo government. This explains to a large extent the favorable reaction of the Stock Market and the fact that the currency has maintained its value. In fact this continuity was already secured in large part by the Free Trade Treaty with the European Union, which went into effect one day before the July 2 elections. In this sense, the international community’s approval is explained. The democratic advances in Mexico are taking place in a context that doesn’t threaten economic interests.