The international consequences of the September 11 attacks on the United States have shifted other regional conflicts to a secondary level of public attention. This includes the stymied peace process in Chiapas and with it the poverty and marginalization of Mexico’s ten million Indians that the conflict had brought to light.

During his October tour of Europe, President Fox minimized the Chiapas conflict, presenting it as already resolved. This view was well received in the European Union countries that see Mexico as a promising trade partner, transitioning toward democracy, with increasingly credible institutions. However, several aspects of the situation in Mexico and Chiapas would appear to contradict the optimistic declarations of President Fox.

Optimistic speeches for a not so encouraging reality

In his speeches in Europe, President Fox spoke of “tranquility and peace” in Chiapas. However the silence of the EZLN since its last statement on April 29, rejecting the indigenous rights law, does not signify acceptance of the situation. As on other occasions during these eight years of conflict, the prolonged silence is a form of categorical rejection of the government’s position. In this case, the Zapatista communities have again entered a phase of “resistance.” This includes putting autonomy into practice on their own terms as well as the rejection of any kind of government assistance.

Moreover, it is difficult to speak of peace when many communities continue to denounce military and paramilitary harassment and when there are renewed flare ups of community conflict among organizations that were formerly friendly. After a period of renewed optimism at the beginning of 2001, the prolonged stalemate in the peace process, exacerbated by congressional approval of an indigenous rights law that does not do justice to the San Andres Accords, led to increased divisions and polarization.

As we explain in more detail in an accompanying article (Dilemma of the Displaced in Chiapas: Return without Justice?), and in contrast with the statements of President Fox, the return of some groups of internal refugees cannot be seen as a resolution of the problem of displaced people in Chiapas.

Another alarm bell has been the murder of Digna Ochoa, a leading human rights lawyer, and the wave of threats against human rights defenders that followed. These events reveal serious institutional problems, in particular since one of the lines of investigation is directed toward the Army.

It is also true, however, that progress has been made in the construction of a democratic culture in Mexico. The national debate generated by the indigenous rights law, and the independent positions of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government regarding the law are an indication of that progress. But the persistence of power structures from the old regime within the new, a phenomenon found at the local, state and national levels, is one of the largest challenges facing the transition process in Mexico.

Stalemate on indigenous rights

The polemic around the indigenous rights constitutional reform approved earlier this year continues. While its defenders insist that it reflects an advance in relation to previous legislation, it is indisputable that it will not serve as a step toward the renewal of peace talks in Chiapas but rather an obstacle and a new source of conflict, since it has been rejected by its supposed beneficiaries.

Efforts to improve the law are grouped in two camps: those who propose the possibility of a “reform of the reform” (i.e., revising the law that was approved) and those who propose improving the law through the implementing legislation that will be required. While the latter position appears more pragmatic, critics argue that it would represent a shirking of the responsibility of the national government to guarantee adequately the recognition of indigenous rights within the Constitution. In addition, the historical experience of the Indians leaves them with little confidence in the state governments, which are subject to political interests and shifting power politics.

Appeals to the Supreme Court and to the International Labor Organization (ILO) will not necessarily permit the issue to be reopened, since their decisions are limited by the nature of those institutions. If in the end the law is not modified, those who have rejected it completely will have to redefine their strategy with regard to the secondary legislation and policies related to implementation of the law.

This latest stalemate in the peace process may be the most difficult to overcome. The administration is claiming that it has done everything possible, while the EZLN dismisses the new law as a “betrayal,” and in the indigenous communities, one begins to hear commentaries about how Fox “is the same as [former President] Zedillo.” This growing distance between the government and the Zapatistas is a far cry from the renewed hope that emerged during the first months of the Fox administration, and is increasingly reminiscent of the polarization that prevailed during the preceding regime.

The absence of a mediation body further complicates the possibility of finding channels for dialogue. COCOPA, the congressional peace commission, has not been able to overcome its internal divisions, and, in fact, has become an apt reflection of the disagreements among the political parties of its members.

Readjustments after the Chiapas elections

The political power map continues to be reorganized in the aftermath of the county government elections in October. Notable factors in the process were the low credibility of the State Electoral Institute and the low voter turnout.

Analysts had expected a more balanced outcome among the political parties, especially in view of the internal conflicts within the state PRI in recent months. The PRI’s victory may be explained in large part by the prohibition on coalitions of political parties together with a particularly wide variety of political parties from which to choose. While old practices continue (vote buying, domination by political bosses), the political landscape in Chiapas is increasingly blurred.

Certainly the election results will not make the job of Governor Salazar any easier. He will continue to have to lead with a state congress dominated by the PRI, even though the PRI is more divided than ever. This situation may complicate the resolution of a number of outstanding issues, unless the two powers can achieve a minimal political understanding.

Other consequences of September 11

September 11 exacerbated some tendencies that do not help the advancement of the Chiapas peace process. One of the most immediate consequences was the increased militarization of the state, which augmented tensions given that] the military presence has long been very high.

The discussion about which armed groups in Mexico are terrorist seems to have exculpated the Zapatistas. However there is continuing concern that as a result of fear, intolerance may grow and with it the risk that the rights of dissident and minority groups may be more vulnerable.

The economic factor will also be an important element in the coming months as tensions rise in the indigenous communities between those who continue in resistance and those who accept government assistance. Of course the crisis extends far beyond Chiapas, the reduced possibilities of migration to the U.S. being but one indication