“Chiapas is an inactive volcano that could explode at any time.”
(Cardinal Roger Etchegaray – president emeritus of the Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace, and Papal emissary — following his visit to Chiapas in early January.)

A year ago, our analysis of the Chiapas conflict was much more optimistic regarding the possibilities for renewal of the peace process: the EZLN was announcing its march to Mexico City, and seven years after the beginning of the conflict, the new governments, both at the federal and state levels, were giving encouraging signs. (see SIPAZ reports from February and May 2001).

This process of rapprochement was frustrated last April with the approval of a reform regarding indigenous rights which indigenous organizations rejected because it conflicted with the San Andres accords signed between the government and the EZLN in February 1996. Since approval of these accords was one of the conditions raised by the Zapatistas for resuming the dialogue, this constituted a crucial point.

Decreasing maneuvering room

The EZLN has kept silent for more than nine long months, and analysts do not expect it to break this silence until the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) resolves the more than 300 constitutional challenges filed against the new indigenous law. The influence of the highest judicial body has increased notably since the beginning of the Fox government. As a possible counterweight to the other powers, it could become the referee of the democratic transition.

So far, this temporary hiatus has served to contain the growing tendency toward polarization. As a result, the SCJN bears a significant responsibility in handling the issue: if it rules in favor of the law, the margin for political and legal action will close even further. This decision could lend legitimacy to the more radical armed groups and cause the resurgence of violence as the only possible option. On the other hand, if the SCJN rules against the law and the topic is reopened in Congress, the actors will have greater possibilities of handling the tension politically.

Another margin for maneuvering might still be found in the proposal of 160 congressional representatives to reintroduce the original COCOPA reform. However, in an unfavorable international context, with Plan Puebla-Panama already in the pipeline, and given the current conformation of Congress, reopening the debate is likely to offer few possibilities for constructive change.

At the first anniversary of the Fox government

Chiapas is only one of President Fox’s many pending campaign promises. Although the government has managed to maintain a certain degree of macroeconomic stability in the midst of an adverse international context, many social issues remain unresolved or are worsening. In more than one area, the situation lends itself to increased instability and conflict.

Although it is undeniable that there have been some advances in the democratic transition (in particular a greater respect for the division of powers), some topics have been postponed pending more auspicious times. Such is the case for example with the promised state reform, which has been tabled for lack of support in Congress.

An important initiative was the unexpected presentation of the CNDH report on forced disappearances, barely four days before the end of Fox’s first year of government. It constitutes a first step in clarifying the crimes of State committed in past decades, and a key decision in the struggle against impunity. This also reopened other pending topics: the massacre of ’68, the case of general Gallardo, etc. This tendency has provoked uneasiness in certain sectors of the Army and the PRI.

Following the murder of human rights activist Digna Ocha in October 2001, threats to defenders of human rights, journalists and political figures have multiplied. Beyond the cases themselves, however, it becomes ever more difficult to deny the structural character of the problems in Mexico: impunity, limitations on and lack of guarantees in the system of administration of justice, privileges and growing influence of the armed forces, etc. The repeated occurrence of cases of this nature introduced a flat note in the relations of the Fox government with international human rights organizations, following several months of relative harmony.

At the first anniversary of Pablo Salazar’s state government

The reality noted at the federal level displays more than a passing similarity with the experience at the state level: heads of the executive branch governing without the support of the parties which brought them to power or with an opposition controlled Congress; shifting of political powers and actors; contradictions within and between the levels of power; institutional inertia and lack of experience on the part of newly appointed officials; growing social discontent, . . .

Although the PRI retained its majority in the state Congress, that does not mean that it has control as a party. The governor’s strategy seems to have relied on individual lobbying of congress members rather than on negotiating with the party blocs. In fact, party divisions are blurring more and more, a fact which is even more apparent at the county level. In the communities, many choose to be “pro-government,” whichever party may be in power.

The state PRI finds itself weakened by pressures from two sides: on one side is the changeover in leadership in which personal interests appear more clearly, thus reviving tensions between national and state party leaders; on the other side are the judicial processes initiated against officials of the previous (PRI) administration.

In his first year, the first non-PRI governor of Chiapas had to expend a great deal of energy to maintain a minimum of governability, able neither to reduce tensions nor to respond to the enormous economic and social challenges in the state. Moreover, faced with the polarization of the political-social scene, it is particularly difficult to promote development projects without these becoming another source of tension and division between opposing sectors.

Chiapas: Ready to explode?

In the meantime, the stagnation of the peace process continues to exact a high cost at the local level, since it brings with it a radicalization of positions. The EZLN is distancing itself ever more from local organizations with which it was previously allied and which are now aligned with the government of Pablo Salazar. Confrontations over agrarian matters and political differences — including ongoing post-electoral conflicts — have multiplied in several parts of the state, and the way in which they have been handled provides dramatic evidence of the lack of tolerance and of a democratic culture.

Beyond the future of the indigenous law and the dialogue process, this situation of division and growing violence within the indigenous communities reduces possibilities for building autonomy, a subject that could then become another source of conflict.

In addition, in 2001 Chiapas again ranked first as the most marginalized state in the nation, a worrisome reality now affecting not only the indigenous communities but some racially mixed regions as well.