“Today war is a little further away and peace with justice and dignity a little closer. Today dialogue is closer and confrontation is more distant.”
(Subcommander Marcos, upon returning to Chiapas after the “March for Indigenous Dignity”, April 1, 2001)

Recently, after several years of stalemated negotiations, there have been a number of steps that have been taken toward the possible resumption of the peace process in Chiapas. The panorama improved, at least for a few weeks, although various unknowns continue to cast a shadow over the long-term possibilities. In April, several outbreaks of violence in Chiapas contributed to straining the political atmosphere, creating doubts about the solidity of progress toward renewed peace talks.

Words and Deeds of Peace

Starting last December, the EZLN began to move its political pieces with good results. Its initiative in proposing to hold a march to Mexico City with the purpose of persuading the Mexican Congress to approve the COCOPA legislative proposal had a positive impact and increased its political capital with a view toward a renewal of the dialogue.

Since then, the issues of the conflict in Chiapas and indigenous rights have received unprecedented coverage in the national and international media. A prime victory for the Zapatistas and indigenous peoples as a whole was to be able to attract attention, increase awareness, and maintain their demands at the center of national attention for a several weeks running.

One contributing factor was that President Vicente Fox referred to the issue of Chiapas in many of his speeches, while at the same time he was working to send the three “signals” requested by the Zapatistas for renewing talks.

The March for Indigenous Dignity

A few days before the caravan began, a polemic surrounding the frustrated participation of the International Red Cross distorted the environment. To the EZLN’s invitation to accompany the march as a security measure, the Red Cross had initially indicated its willingness but later refused to participate, creating suspicions about the role of the federal government in its decision. The result was to create distance between the positions of Fox and the Zapatista leadership. The public debate became heated, creating the fear that the march would fall apart. To many it seemed that what was at stake in the march was the choice each side would have to make between the paths of negotiation or of force, between dialogue or radicalization.

In spite of some of the tough talk along the way, the clear objective of the Zapatista caravan was to speak to legislators, which can be seen as a recognition of and a minimum trust in the new democratic reality made possible after the July 2000 elections.

In the third national meeting of the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) in Nurio, representatives from 42 ethnic groups accepted as their own the COCOPA bill as well as the three conditions put forth by the Zapatistas for renewing peace talks. This decision makes it impossible to continue to view the EZLN as an isolated group and the conflict in Chiapas as a local matter. The meeting in Nurio also signifies the growth and maturing of the CNI as an important actor on the national level, given the broad representation of the country’s indigenous groups that was evident there and their unprecedented capacity for coordinated action.

In spite of some voices raised in opposition to the march, including the PAN (National Action Party), sectors of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), some Catholic bishops and evangelical groups, businessmen, ranchers from Chiapas, etc., recognition and support of the fairness of the indigenous demands was what prevailed.

The EZLN on the floor of Congress

The support that the march achieved throughout the country and its international resonance played a role when it came time to define the format for the meeting between the Zapatista delegation and the legislators. The difficulty in Congress in agreeing on how the meeting would take place generated rising tension among the legislators themselves as well as within the Fox administration and among the EZLN representatives. The announcement by the Zapatistas that they would return to Chiapas – before having been received by Congress – was another able move that pushed the other players to make a last effort to arrive at an agreement.

In the end, the presence of the EZLN in the lower house of Congress and especially the tone of the speeches defined the opening of a new stage in the conflict. The Zapatistas confirmed their option for political rather than military struggle and signaled this by indicating they would not advance militarily upon the positions from which the Mexican army had pulled back.

The commanders explained the notable absence of Subcommander Marcos, recognizing him as a military commander but reaffirming that “this is no longer the time for arms.” At the same time, they responded indirectly to a common critique of the role played by Marcos in the EZLN, indicating that they are the commanders who give the orders.

The Zapatistas recognized Fox’s efforts. In a significant gesture just a few hours after the meeting in Congress, Fernando Yañez, designated as official go-between for the Zapatistas, met with Luis H. Alvarez, the governmental Peace Commissioner, thus re-establishing direct formal contacts between the two sides.

Congress, key actor in restarting the peace process

The Zapatista appeal to Congress made apparent the new power configurations in Congress. The PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), PT (Labor Party) and PVEM (Mexican Green Ecology Party) endorsed the text. For the PRI, the debate revealed the divisions that exist within the party. The PAN hardened its public posture, including opting not to attend the meeting. The hard-liners called the shots, making evident the differences between Fox and his party. This indicated that Fox designed his strategy for Chiapas without benefit of any firm agreements with his party.

With regard to the democratization of power in Mexico, the relative strength of the parties is becoming balanced. The same is true of the relations between the executive and the legislative branches. Freedom of expression (exemplified in having allowed the Zapatista and CNI delegation to speak on the floor of Congress) is another significant democratic advance that could not have been imagined a year ago.

The first 100 days of the Fox administration

It is worth noting that many of the steps taken could not have been possible without a conciliatory and tolerant attitude on the part of the Fox administration. Some (including those of his own party) strongly criticize Fox for having conceded too much to the EZLN. They think that it was a mistake to make Chiapas a priority issue when it was clear during the July 2000 campaign that it was not a top concern for most Mexicans.

Two hypotheses have been given to explain this choice on the part of Fox. According to one, he is acting on moral conviction and according to another, on political calculation. Most likely it is a combination of the two. His management of the conflict in Chiapas and its possible solution also could be a form of projecting within and outside of Mexico the image that change has truly arrived in the country, an image that is very helpful in his efforts to advance his economic plans.

What next?

Most likely the Zapatista strategy now will be focused on two axes. The first is constitutional and institutional reform related to the approval of a new indigenous rights law. This is likely to require substantial work and further debate.

The other axis would be the negotiations regarding the sizeable unfinished agenda set out in 1995. Despite what the media may project in a given moment, that agenda makes it clear that peace is not “around the corner.” The steps agreed upon between the EZLN and the previous administration include three more rounds of talks on the themes of Democracy and Justice, Welfare and Development, and Women’s Rights.

This process is likely to take a good deal of time. Attempting to hurry it up could have a counterproductive effect and undermine the possibility of arriving at a lasting peace.

Meanwhile, there is another pressure that makes progress in the peace process in Chiapas an urgent necessity. It might have been hoped that the recent events at the national level would serve to reduce the violence and tension in the state. However, those advances are not yet reflected in the situation on the ground in Chiapas. Instead what prevails is a multitude of simultaneous conflicts: the growing social discontent around land tenure and related issues; the demands of some social sectors in the face of unfulfilled commitments of the new state government; the regrettable recent acts of violence in which more than a dozen peasants have perished (including the case of Venustiano Carranza), etc. These realities, added to the ongoing power struggle among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of state government, have raised doubts in some minds about the capacity of the new governor to resolve adverse situations and to provide a minimum level of governability in the conflicted state of Chiapas.