To glance through local as well as national newspapers could give the impression that the inconclusive chapter on the Zapatista uprising of 1994 has been closed. Most of the headlines are taken up with the next presidential elections (July 2) and the Chiapas gubernatorial elections (August 20), various political scandals which must be linked to the elections in order to fully understand them, and the increased violence linked to the drug trade.

If indeed the subject of Chiapas appears in the platform of all the candidates, it is diluted within other policy issues such as the struggle against poverty, trade policy, and national security. Moreover, despite the needs and problems that face the country due to its historical backwardness in terms of social justice, in many cases the electoral battle does not appear to be focused on underlying issues but rather on personal attacks.

For their part, members of the current government have continued to minimize the situation in Chiapas without recognizing their possible responsibility for it. They are deaf to the public support many indigenous and other civil society groups continue to express for the EZLN, speaking contemptuously about the possibility or advantage of a dialogue with the Zapatistas. To illustrate this, one can mention the recent comments by President Zedillo (“Dialogue with the EZLN will not resolve the problem of Chiapas”) or by governmental Coordinator for Dialogue in Chiapas Emilio Rabasa (“If there is no dialogue, in the end it would all be just an incident”) or by the PRI’s presidential candidate Francisco Labastida (“Laws are not made from the Jungle”). Such comments do not help to promote a possible rapprochement or to legitimate the government’s oft self-proclaimed desire to renew the peace process. Most significantly, the comments of candidate Labastida indicate that he does not intend to raise the San Andres Accords to the level of constitutional reform, as the Accords themselves require. In the meantime, the current government claims to have already complied with them.

Recently the most commonly heard official position refers to the conflict in Chiapas as a problem of economic development. In this regard, there is no recognition of the responsibility of the PRI governments of the last decades for this historic lack of development.

In the current context, the EZLN has not yet positioned itself with respect to the upcoming elections. The risk of excluding itself completely from this process would be to limit its political margin for negotiation. And depending on the results, it could result in being seen and treated the same as other armed groups. If that were to occur, the EZLN could see its profile and the political platform that it achieved in the San Andres Accords reduced, and it could move closer to violence as the last resort to make itself heard.

Another period of instability for the peace process will be in August, when, with the new Congress, the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) will be reconstituted. Meanwhile, the Commission – made up of deputies and senators from all parties currently in the Congress – remains stymied by the rule of consensus. Felipe Vicencio (PAN deputy and member of the Commission) went so far as to speak of a “situation of ‘brain death.'” Increasingly in the last few months, decisions have been made based on party interests.

Meanwhile, the prolonged stagnation of the peace process continues to have dramatic consequences at a local and community level. It should be emphasized that although there may not be a war in Chiapas in the traditional sense of the term, the presence of two armed forces persists (although different in size and ways of operating), and federal troops continue to surround the conflict zone.

An unknown in the ecclesiastic sphere was cleared up with the naming of Monsignor Felipe Arizmendi, considered a moderate, as the new bishop of the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas. Some pessimists fear that this appointment leaves a void that could entail risks and have possible political-military consequences. They warn that without fanfare, the change of bishop could lower the profile of the diocese in political arenas such as the peace process between the federal government and the EZLN. To the extent that outgoing bishop Samuel Ruiz is a great defender of the indigenous peoples, his exit opens the possibility that the government, faced with a lower-profile diocese, will try to implement a more violent strategy against the indigenous communities and the EZLN.

For their part, from their faith and obedience to the church hierarchy, the Catholic rank-and-file expressed their readiness to accompany the new bishop on the road he will travel at their side. Many of them trust the strength and depth of the pastoral work carried out by Samuel Ruiz, in the structure of the diocese as well as in the indigenous communities. Nevertheless, nothing is yet known about what will happen with the current vicars and other key positions in the diocese’s structure.

At the international level, the last year has been characterized by an increase in commercial accords between Mexico and various countries. The treaty with the European Union remains the most controversial, especially with the refusal of the Italian Parliament to ratify it. This could impede the treaty’s going into effect as scheduled on July 1.

Antonio Seguro, president of the European Parliament for Relations with Central America and Mexico, offered to mediate the Chiapas conflict if invited by the Mexican government. There are now several international figures who have offered to mediate, but, given its frequent assertions regarding “national sovereignty” and its repeated denial in international arenas of the existence of a conflict in Chiapas, it is doubtful that the current Mexican government would accept.

Representatives of the United Nations, international organizations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), and foreign governments (U.S. Department of State) observe that in Mexico there are serious violations of human rights and many problems in the judicial system (corruption, lack of independence, impunity, etc.). Nevertheless, the Mexican government continues to use national sovereignty to defend itself, even denying the criticisms coming from the highest levels. To accept the criticisms could mean weakening the PRI during an electoral process in which the possibilities of losing the presidency have never been as real as they are today.

At this point, the polls show a close race between Fox (the PAN candidate) and Labastida (PRI) while the Cardenas (PRD) campaign has not totally taken off. The polls indicate that any of the three leading candidates could accede to the presidency, but there appears to be no chance for the candidates from the smaller parties.

In regard to the Chiapas conflict, the three leading candidates raise the theme tangentially. Perhaps the PAN candidate has offered the most unequivocal proposals: withdraw the Army, direct dialogue between the President and the EZLN and compliance with the San Andres Accords. However, in view of the emphasis on economic issues of the Fox campaign, neither the intent nor the realism of his proposals to resolve the Chiapas conflict are clear.

At the state level, Albores, the current governor, does not seem to want to cede space to the PRI candidate Sami David in his campaign for the August elections. Meanwhile, Pablo Salazar, ex-member of the PRI and gubernatorial candidate for the opposition alliance, appears to be the favorite. More and more social organizations of different political colors are joining his campaign. However, both at the state and federal levels, the situation remains uncertain because of the history of fraud and the difficulty winning candidates may face when it comes time to implement programs presented in their campaigns.