Summary

Chiapas – Failed Peace Talks: The War Advances

With the dissolution of CONAI (National Mediation Commission) on June 7, one stage of the Chiapas conflict ended. According to its ex-president, Bishop Samuel Ruiz, the dissolution was a denunciation of the posture of the government with regard to the conflict and its campaign against him, the Diocese of San Cristobal, and the mediation effort. The government denied this accusation, claiming instead that when the bishop has thwarted the peace process, it has said so.

Increasingly, events point to a reliance by the government on a military strategy to resolve the conflict. The application of a low intensity warfare strategy over the last four years has eroded Zapatista resources. The government’s resistance to the mediation efforts of both CONAI and the congressional COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification) effectively backtracks on agreements signed at San Andres. The campaign against international observers and the continued impunity of the right-wing paramilitary groups suggest strategic decisions that further undermine prospects for a political solution.

In addition, recent police-military operations to dismantle four Zapatista autonomous counties (Taniperlas, Amparo Agua Tinta, Nicolas Ruiz, and El Bosque) reflect a serious escalation of the conflict. In the most recent case, the June 10 operation in El Bosque, eight Indians and two police were killed. Three days earlier, in the neighboring state of Guerrero, an army unit attacked a group of suspected members of the ERPI (Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People), killing eleven. Evidence indicates that at least some were captured and subsequently executed on the spot, although the PGR (Office of the Attorney General) denied this.

While the Zapatistas’ strength has always been more political than military, as the EZLN becomes more militarily contained, it may be more difficult for the government to accept it as a worthy partner for serious negotiations. Presumably this inclination is reinforced by the fact that the government is faced with armed insurgencies in several other states. Moreover, a successful negotiated solution in Chiapas might well lead to rising demands elsewhere. Another likely factor for the government is access to natural resources in Chiapas, such as oil, uranium and hardwoods, which may be complicated by more participatory political structures and indigenous autonomy.

The investigation of the Acteal massacre, where 45 displaced indigenous were killed, continues. At the beginning of July, orders were issued for the arrest of ex-state government officials on charges related to the massacre, including the former state Assistant Attorney General. Also in July, family members of the victims received compensation from the government.

The situation of the 10,000 displaced in the county of Chenalho and the 4,000 in the northern region continues to be alarming. Their health is precarious, there is a constant lack of adequate humanitarian assistance, and they have little prospect of a quick return to their communities. On June 25, 850 members of the organization Las Abejas (the Bees) who have taken refuge in X’oyep, planned to return to their communities. But at the last moment, they decided to postpone their return indefinitely because of supposed threats from paramilitary groups.

When the Zapatista command broke its silence with several statements by Subcommander Marcos in July, it shifted the dynamics of the conflict. Marcos dismissed the possibility of re-initiating the peace talks in the short term. In additiion, the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle appealed to civil society to weigh in with its opinion on the 1996 COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture.

President Zedillo’s unilateral initiative regarding indigenous rights, introduced to Congress on March 15, has languished in the face of criticism both from the opposition and from his own party, the PRI.

After the dismantling of the autonomous county in El Bosque, the government promised to suspend such operations in order to reduce the level of tension. On July 10, the federal government presented its new plan to reduce tensions in Chiapas. This proposal, which seeks a new role for COCOPA, was strongly attacked by the opposition who asserted that it does not address the root causes of the Chiapas crisis.

Following the dissolution of CONAI and the violent incidents in El Bosque, several Mexican NGOs (non-governmental organizations) called for international mediation to overcome the crisis in the dialogue.

The Mexican government has been the target of a number of strong criticisms from abroad. The head of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, declared in June that there are “serious violations of the rights of the indigenous people” in Chiapas. The government of the United States said that it was “pressing” the Mexican government to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Chiapas conflict. In addition a resolution was introduced in the U.S. Congress questioning the impact of U.S. military assistance on human rights in Mexico and calling for the demilitarization of the conflict.

At the end of May, the Interior Ministry released new regulations for international observation in Mexico. National and international human rights organizations criticized the new regulations (“without precedent in the Americas,” according to Amnesty International), arguing that they will obstruct effective work in this area.

Despite its military superiority, the political costs of a military solution appear to be prohibitively high for the government. Meanwhile the lack of resolution and the potential for new explosions of violence constitute a continuing political liability.

On the other hand, it is difficult to foresee a solution without sharply increased domestic pressure. Given the vacuum created by the dissolution of CONAI, perhaps the biggest question at this moment is the future role of Mexican civil society.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

For U.S. citizens:

Urge your senators and congressional representative to support the Sense of Congress Resolution on Chiapas initiated by Senator Leahy. (The number of the resolution was not available at press time; it is hoped that it will come to a floor vote in August or September). The resolution calls for:

• effective measures to ensure that U.S. military aid does not contribute to human rights violations;
• disarming the paramilitary groups and reducing the military presence in Chiapas;
• concerted negotiation efforts, with UN assistance;
• respect for human rights monitors.

The Honorable __________________
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable __________________
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Congressional switchboard (for Senate and House): 202 224 3121

For citizens of the European Union:

Urge members of the European Parliament and the European Commission to:

• Ensure the careful execution of the “democracy clause” that is part of the trade agreement between the European Union and Mexico;
• Actively support the participation of Mexican and international NGOs in the evaluation of progress in the area of human rights in Mexico.

Por favor, escribir a europarlementarios ó a:

European Commission
Vice-president Manuel Marin
Webstraat 200
1049 Brussels, Belgium
fax: (int-32) (2) 295 01 38 / 39 / 40

For everyone:

• Urge the Zedillo administration to: order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
• recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

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Update

Chiapas: Failed Peace Talks – The War Advances

CONAI Dissolves

“We decided to fold because of a lack of effectiveness and in order to not be complicit with what is happening. It was not so much a resignation as a denunciation in order to generate reactions.” This was the explanation Bishop Samuel Ruiz, ex-president of CONAI (National Mediation Commission) gave to SIPAZ for the dissolution of the mediation group. The June 7 public statement that announced the dissolution denounced “the constant and growing aggression” against the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, the mediation effort, and the bishop. The Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, denied that “there is any persecution against the diocese. What is true is that when we have noticed that the attitude of Mr. Samuel Ruiz has thwarted the peace process in the conflict in Chiapas, we have pointed that out.”.

Police-military operations

The dissolution of CONAI took place in a period of high tension in the Zapatista communities. One of the factors in this tension was the decision by the state government in recent months to dismantle four autonomous Zapatista counties. (See “The Autonomous Counties in Chiapas,”). These actions combined police and army forces and involved significant use of force, including at times tear gas, grenade launchers, armored personnel carriers, and attack helicopters. The ostensible reason for these operations has been re-establishing “the rule of law” that Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen called for in his proposed State Agreement in March of this year. The most recent incident took place in El Bosque on June 10, three days after the dissolution of CONAI. It resulted in an armed confrontation between Zapatista support groups and the security forces. In this operation two police and eight civilians were killed.

The night of the El Bosque operation, SIPAZ visited the area and spoke with some of those from Chabajeval and Union Progreso who had fled from the security forces. They denounced the ransacking of their houses and community buildings; theft of documents, money, tools, medicines, and food supplies; slaughtering of domestic animals; and destruction of domestic appliances and cooking utensils. Residents of Union Progreso charged that some of the victims were captured alive and later executed, a charge which the government denied.

Regarding the military presence in Chiapas, the government National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) observed that the constant presence of the armed forces is “a factor that, among others, alters the internal life of the indigenous communities.” The CNDH also called for the relocation of the military forces in Chiapas as the peace process advances and the disarming of the civilian armed groups who, except for those imprisoned for the Acteal massacre, continue to operate with impunity. After the dismantling of the autonomous county of Taniperlas on April 11, the CNDH issued a recommendation to the governor of Chiapas, criticizing the human rights violations that took place. The governor did not accept the recommendation.

During this same period, in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca, the Army undertook operations against the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army). The most serious incident occurred in the early morning of June 7 in El Charco, Guerrero where eleven suspected members of the ERPI (Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People, a spin-off of the EPR) were killed. According to eye-witnesses and to several human rights organizations that investigated, the eleven were executed after surrendering. In addition, some of those who were arrested in the same action charged that they were later tortured. The Attorney General’s office issued a report saying that the dead were killed in a shoot-out.

Follow-up on Acteal

Seven months after the Acteal massacre where 45 internal refugees were killed, family members of the victims received compensation from the government. However the investigations have not ended. Detention orders were issued for 90 persons, including a police commander who was within earshot as the massacre unfolded. At the beginning of July, arrest orders were issued for ex-state officials involved in the events, including the then-Assistant Attorney General. Local PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) supporters, led by Pedro Mariano Arias Perez, the municipal president of Chenalho (which includes Acteal), view the arrested as political prisoners. “The majority are innocent. We don’t trust the investigation of the [federal] Attorney General.” On the other hand, the relatives of the victims continue to denounce that the paramilitary groups have not been disarmed and that the intellectual authors of the atrocity have not been charged.

The situation of the 10,000 displaced persons in Chenalho continues to be worrisome because of health problems and lack of sufficient humanitarian assistance. At the beginning of June, 850 members of Las Abejas (the Bees, the group targeted in the Acteal massacre) who have taken refuge in X’oyep, decided to return to their communities of origin, Yibeljoj and Los Chorros, on June 25. “Anything would be better than to stay in this situation,” they told SIPAZ. However on the day of the planned return, they received reports of paramilitary activities in the region. As a result they decided that the conditions for their safe return did not exist.

On a subsequent visit to Los Chorros, SIPAZ met with PRI supporters and with members of Las Abejas who have continued to live there. Both groups reported that on that day they had been waiting with music and a big feast to greet the returning community members. A representative of Las Abejas, who are a minority in Los Chorros, commented that there is no violence, and that they hoped their companions would return. At the same time, he noted that they were afraid to leave the community and that, “We just hope that SOMEONE will come to solve this problem.”

For the 4,000 displaced persons in the northern region, the situation continues to be problematic. They are in constant need of humanitarian aid with no hope of a quick return to their homes. In a recent visit to the region, SIPAZ staff observed the constant tension due to the control by the paramilitary group Peace and Justice.

In Search of Dialogue

From March to July, the EZLN command maintained a silence that accentuated the sense of total breakdown of the peace talks. COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification, the congressional mediation body) assumed the task of seeking a direct dialogue between the government and the EZLN. However the EZLN maintained its silence, and COCOPA did not receive a reply. In mid-July, Subcommander Marcos broke the silence with several comuniqués. In them he acknowledged the good work of CONAI and COCOPA, and he dismissed the possibility of renewing the peace talks in the short term. In addition he issued the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in which he called upon civil society to express its opinion on the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture.

After the violent confrontation between the security forces and the Zapatista support groups in El Bosque, and before its visit to Chiapas, COCOPA asked the government to cease its operations to dismantle the autonomous counties. The government promised to suspend those operations in order to reduce the level of tension. However the Zapatista communities do not trust this promise. They continue on “red alert.” As one of the authorities of the autonomous county of Polho told SIPAZ during the patron saint festival of St. Peter at the end of June, “It is a simple festival, because we are still in struggle.”

President Zedillo visited Chiapas several times in recent months, saying that he seeks a direct dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In addition he implicitly criticized the Diocese of San Cristobal with phrases like “apostles of hypocrisy” and “theologians of violence.” He also attacked repeatedly the presence of foreigners in Chiapas.

Meanwhile, Zedillo’s unilateral initiative regarding indigenous rights, introduced to Congress on March 15, has languished. It has been criticized by both right and left-wing elements within the PRI as well as by opposition parties.

On July 10 the federal government presented a new plan for reducing tensions in Chiapas. The proposal was harshly attacked by the opposition who charged that there is nothing new in it. Meanwhile, after the dissolution of CONAI and the violent incident in El Bosque, several Mexican non-governmental organizations requested international mediation in order to overcome the crisis in the dialogue.

International Criticism of Mexico

In view of the dismantling of the autonomous counties, the climate of violence and the lack of dialogue, the Mexican government has been the subject of harsh criticism internationally. In June (after El Bosque), the head of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, decried “serious violations of the rights of the indigenous people.” Foreign Relations Minister Rosario Green responded that the opinion of the United Nations was based on a lack of information about the efforts of the government. The Minister also characterized as offensive a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright who said that the U.S. government was “pressing” the Mexican government to resolve the Chiapas conflict peacefully. Such a direct expression of concern represents a marked departure from previous official U.S. statements regarding Chiapas.

In May Amnesty International called for a halt in the growing number of forced disappearances for political reasons that have occurred in Mexico as a result of the counterinsurgency operations and security force involvement in the war on drugs.

After expelling 30 foreigners and then a group of 40 Italians in recent months, at the end of May the Interior Minister released new visa regulations governing international observation in Mexico. (See “International Observation Under Attack in Chiapas” in this issue.) National and international human rights groups expressed their disagreement with the proposed regulations, arguing that they would impede an effective job of international observation. In a July letter to President Zedillo, 48 U.S. congresspersons recognized the essential role of international observation and expressed their concern about the new regulations.

Also in July, a non-binding “Sense of Congress” resolution was introduced for debate, calling for effective measures to ensure that U.S. military aid does not contribute to human rights violations; disarming the paramilitary groups and reducing the military presence in Chiapas; concerted negotiation efforts, with U.N. assistance; and respect for human rights monitors. (A vote is expected in September.)

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Analysis

Chiapas: The War in Depth

The resignation of Bishop Samuel Ruiz and the dissolution of CONAI mark a new and more troubling stage in the Chiapas conflict. The ascendancy of a military logic is reflected in the undermining of the mediation commissions, the campaign against international observers, the continuing impunity of the paramilitary groups, and the recent military escalation.

Beginning in March 1995, a legal structure and a process were developed to enable a dialogue that addressed both the immediate and the underlying causes of the conflict. While the legal structure (the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas) persists, the San Andres process is dead. Moreover recent events in Chiapas (e.g., El Bosque) and elsewhere (El Charco, Guerrero) reflect the escalation of the low intensity warfare amid ominous indications of state-sanctioned torture, extra-judicial killings and other human rights violations.

The government has in the past indicated a willingness to negotiate, and it even concluded agreements with the EZLN on major issues regarding indigenous rights and culture. At the same time it has sought to exploit its military superiority to strengthen its political position. The result has been the progressive erosion of Zapatista resources through military encroachment and a full array of low intensity warfare tactics. Considered from a military perspective, the government sees little reason to negotiate now other than to arrange the terms of a Zapatista surrender.

Further strengthening the militarist perspective is the fact that the army is now engaged in fighting insurgencies in several other states, including Oaxaca, Guerrero, Veracruz and Hidalgo. The specter of ongoing conflict beyond Chiapas must tempt the government to play from its military strength to check the Zapatistas. That is especially true when the alternative appears to be accepting the vagaries of political negotiations which even – or especially – if successful, will lead to rising demands elsewhere.

Another likely factor in the government’s increasingly hard line is exploitation of natural resources. The government’s stated objections to the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords have focused on autonomy. As we have previously discussed (see “Indigenous Autonomy,” SIPAZ Report, January 1997, Vol. II, No. 1), many experts reject the government’s concerns that the autonomy provisions would threaten the integrity of the Mexican nation. Nonetheless, they would certainly give indigenous communities more control over their affairs and could result in political impediments to the unrestrained exploitation of natural resources such as oil, uranium, and hardwoods. This runs counter to Mexico’s free market economic policy which, unlike its immigration policy, welcomes international involvement.

Miguel Alvarez, Technical Secretary of the ex-CONAI, likens the San Andres talks to a boxing ring, with clearly defined rules and agreed upon referees who enforce the rules. After the initial agreement in February 1996, the government seemed to drag its feet on implementation measures and showed little engagement in the succeeding round of talks. Along with other pressures, this led the EZLN to withdraw from the San Andres talks. In the judgment of Alvarez, this decision was an error that threw them into the equivalent of a street fight. From there on, it was anything goes, and there was no one to blow the whistle on dirty tricks.

According to Bishop Ruiz, CONAI continued to attempt to mediate and sent a number of private communications to the government regarding what it viewed as the government’s lack of consistency with the San Andres process. Eventually, when these appeared to have no effect, it began to make such observations publicly. “That was our epitaph,” he observed. The government launched severe criticisms of CONAI for failing to be impartial and for “calling on governments and organizations to pressure one [side in the conflict].“

The bishop’s decision to step down was months in the making. During this time the EZLN was less and less communicative, and it became increasingly clear that the government had long since rejected the San Andres process and that, given the government’s profound mistrust, he could no longer hope to be an effective mediator.

In this complex and dangerous panorama, hundreds of Chiapas communities, many Zapatista, some not, continue to demand fundamental political and economic change. The actions of the security forces may continue to be used to intimidate and repress or they could be used in such a way as to ignite a conflagration, for example by undertaking an operation to capture the EZLN leadership. The only effective check on their operations would appear to be their political cost.

Less likely is the use of the security forces to disband the paramilitary groups, with whom they have demonstrated ties. While indigenous communities have always had their conflicts, they rarely resulted in the loss of life. The hundreds of deaths of the last three years in the northern region and the highlands of Chiapas are directly attributable to the training and arming of these paramilitary groups, which we believe to be an integral element of the government’s low intensity warfare strategy. Chiapas Governor Albores Guillen’s defense of the operations against Zapatista communities as necessary to restore the rule of law rings hollow in view of his lack of action against the paramilitary groups. In this context, efforts to strengthen local actors and enhance local peacebuilding capacities are essential to forestall explosions and to establish the basis for long-term trust-building.

Internationally the Mexican government has undertaken extraordinary initiatives to make its case in the face of mounting criticism. Mexican diplomats have disseminated enormous quantities of official statements and documents, published opinion pieces, and appeared in official and non-governmental venues to explain the government’s position. But while the government argues that it has nothing to hide, it has instituted new visa regulations for international observers that are “unprecedented in the Americas,” according to Amnesty International. However one views these matters, they clearly indicate the high level of sensitivity of the Mexican government to international criticism.

Given the vacuum created by the dissolution of CONAI, perhaps the biggest question at this moment is the future role of Mexican civil society. While the government has always sought to treat the conflict as a local problem, the events of the last four years have demonstrated that it is not. However the national mobilization of civil society has diminished considerably. As a result, the government has not been compelled to find a settlement. It is difficult to foresee a solution without sharply increased domestic pressure. While some stirrings are visible, it remains to be seen whether the dissolution of CONAI will prompt a resurgence.

Yet neither can the government be complacent. Three Interior Ministers (the second most powerful political post in the country and a stepping stone to the presidency) have lost their jobs because of the Chiapas conflict. Its lack of resolution and its potential to explode again at any moment (viz. Acteal) make it a serious liability for the ruling PRI, increasingly so as the 2000 presidential elections approach. In the nearer term, it could sour the impact of the Pope’s planned visit in January 1999.

The words that broke the EZLN silence, indicating the difficulties in re-initiating the peace talks, challenge the Mexican government to fulfill its word (the San Andres Accords.) They also challenge civil society to express itself regarding the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords. Once again, as it should be in a democracy, civil society has the opportunity to offer its opinion on the government’s handling of the Chiapas conflict. It remains to be seen how it will handle its historic role.