The “National Consultation For the Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and for an End to the War of Extermination,” promoted by the EZLN and groups from civil society, has been one of the most significant events so far this year. It has allowed the EZLN to break the military, political and news blockade that seemed to characterize its position of late.

At a political level, it was a means of retaking the initiative in the stalled peace process. The military circle was broken through the departure from their communities – without much hindrance from the army – of the 5000 Zapatista delegates who went out to publicize the consultation. The news blockade was punctured through these delegates’ activities in all corners of the country.

It is the first time that the Zapatistas have managed to extend their movement to all the states in the nation, relating to social sectors that had been, up to this point, rather far removed from the Chiapas reality (from workers to youth and even to businesspersons). Such a broad-based mobilization seems to illustrate that, in contrast to some comments in the media, time has not worn down the support of the citizenry for the Zapatista movement, nor has it isolated it. It is also evidence of the commitment by many actors in civil society to the search for peace.

A great deal of resources were invested in this initiative, even when the economic crisis (in a country with more than 40 million people living in poverty) invites a greater individualism. In fact, these difficulties – economic, as well as in terms of media access – make the value of this effort of organization and participation even more striking.

Its significance could be even more meaningful as a complementary way of doing politics, where direct consultation with the people could contribute to the establishment of laws and constitutional changes. The consultation results send a clear message to the possible presidential candidates for next year’s elections: the conflict in Chiapas will have to form part of the political agenda. In addition, while the consultation results are not legally binding, they represent a call to legislators of all parties to re-evaluate the COCOPA’s proposal for constitutional revisions (which has yet to be formally presented to Congress).

The re-accommodation of political forces within the framework of the preparations for the year 2000 presidential elections could have repercussions for the potential resolution of the Chiapas conflict. The creation of new alliances among particular political actors will certainly modify the dynamics of political power in the Congress.

A number of political analysts think that there will be no major changes made in the Zedillo government’s policies regarding the Chiapas conflict until the 2000 elections. According to them, the administration will try to “administer” it, nothing more. While one continues to hear messages of peace from the federal government, as well as from state officials, many of their actions seem to lead more towards generating greater conflict at the local level.

The state government seems to have opted to seek a solution to the conflict through laws that exclude the EZLN from the political scene or that try to reduce its importance. These proposals were presented at moments that coincided with the carrying out of the Zapatista consultation, and they were reinforced by the federal executive branch, through a series of visits to the state by President Zedillo.

A prime example of this tendency has been the “Amnesty Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas.” There have been several criticisms made of this proposal. According to some, the conditions are not in place for an amnesty. For others, it is not clear who is covered under this law, since it excludes the EZLN and civilian organizations with a structure, training or discipline similar to the Army’s (which would seem to be very close to the definition of a paramilitary group). On the other hand, the state government has organized a multiplicity of meetings in order to promote it, generating even more confusion. The strongest critics argue that this law is just part of a propaganda campaign that is aimed at demonstrating that the government is working towards resolving the conflict or that it is only the EZLN, by not wanting to disarm, that is hindering its resolution.

Another more recent example is the proposal for the state law on Indigenous Rights and Culture. Once again, there were strong criticisms that cast it as one more way to hamper the EZLN in its demand for the carrying out of the San Andres Accords based on the COCOPA proposal. It should be recalled that last year, two other proposals for federal constitutional changes in this area were introduced: one from the Zedillo government and another from the PAN (center-right opposition party). It is difficult to believe that the conflict would now be resolved if either the Zedillo or the PAN proposal had been approved. In the same sense, neither can the state proposal generate many expectations. The conflict will not easily be resolved unilaterally, without the participation of the Zapatistas and of all the actors.

Another way to wrest political space from the EZLN is through the imminent approval of new county boundaries within the framework of redistricting by the state, thus extending the control of state officials over the indigenous communities. This could generate more conflicts, since it leads to the establishment of centers of power in PRI strongholds, apart from any apparent geographic logic.

On another matter, the displacing of the Autonomous County Council from the government offices in San Andres Larrainzar – an especially symbolic site since it was the site of the peace dialogues – is seen as one more element within the strategy that is seeking to counteract the development of the Zapatista autonomous counties. It is unclear what led the state government to reverse course and withdraw the police when the Zapatista supporters returned in numbers the next day. Clearly, building on the success of the consultation, the Zapatistas will use San Andres to continue to advance the autonomy project.

All these proposals were widely covered by the media, along with a rather successful propaganda campaign, whose objective was to discredit the EZLN. That campaign was implemented through strong criticisms of the national consultation by different members of the state and federal governments, and, in a much more “spectacular” way, through the turning in of weapons by purported EZLN members to the Chiapas governor. The event itself was staged. The deserters either had never been Zapatistas or at least had not been Zapatistas since 1995. And they had been allowed to pass unmolested through several military checkpoints where travelers are searched for illegal arms and explosives.

At the end of the day, each party continues to try to assign all the responsibility for the stalemated peace process to the other. In its new plan for dialogue, delivered to COCOPA in January, the government says it wants a direct dialogue with the EZLN, and that it considers the EZLN to be intransigent. It expressed openness to the possibility of a national mediation effort of high prestige, discretion and professionalism. For the moment, this option is not considered to be very realistic. The EZLN refuses to dialogue without the fulfillment of the five conditions it presented in 1996, beginning with the implementation of the accords already signed.

Civil society is at the heart of the dispute. As the elections draw near, it is the center of attention of the political parties. For the EZLN, it has turned out to be the only factor capable of disentangling a situation that remains stalled, even as it constantly becomes more complex and conflictive.