Uncertainty is the best word to characterize the current moment in Chiapas. This pre-electoral period the entire country is experiencing has a special cast to it in this state, due to the opposition alliance consolidating there to contest the state governor’s election. Simultaneously, the imminent departure of both bishops from the San Cristobal de Las Casas Diocese is generating tension about the future, not just of the diocese, but of the whole peace process it has pushed along since the Zapatista uprising.

Though the conflict at the UNAM (the National Autonomous University of Mexico, in Mexico City), has gripped national attention in recent months, some analysts believe that the violence with which the federal government ended the student occupation of the school and the negotiations with strikers could be a sign that a similar deployment will occur in Chiapas. Some have also noted worrisome parallels between the Mexico City process and the one which, in February of 1995, interrupted the incipient dialogue with the EZLN and began an era of persecution of its leadership and the militarization of the conflict zone.

Now that national, including presidential, elections (July 2) and the governor’s election in Chiapas (August 20) are drawing near, the political world is revolving increasingly around the electoral dynamic. Recent primary elections within the PRI at the national and state levels showed, on the one hand, the efficacy of the ruling party in controlling the electoral apparatus; on the other hand, according to some analysts, the inflated turnout figures cannot mask an apathy among the citizenry toward a process regarded with little credibility, in which everyone knows the results ahead of time.

According to independent analysts, in the race for governor of Chiapas, the opposition alliance led by Senator Pablo Salazar Mediguchia (ex-member of the PRI, evangelical, and formerly an outstanding member of the congressional peace commission, COCOPA) is likely to keep growing up to the August elections. In recent months it has received increasing support from social organizations in the state, and it now includes all opposition parties. This opposition proposal has real possibilities to unseat the PRI from the state governorship.

However, there is no shortage of pessimistic opinions either, as people point out that the minimal conditions do not exist, neither in Chiapas nor at the national level, that would favor honoring the results of the election should Salazar win. In Chiapas, the 1996 electoral reforms have done little to alter the tradition of fraud that has characterized the Mexican electoral system. Moreover, even if Salazar were inaugurated, he would have to govern until at least 2001 with a state Congress and the majority of county councils controlled by the PRI, as well as the instability factor represented by the presence of the army, paramilitary groups, and organized economic power-holders.

Meanwhile, Salazar continues to canvass the state and to marshall increasing support from organized popular sectors, to the concern of some corporations and traditional economic power groups which in the past year and during the November crisis closed ranks around interim governor Roberto Albores. One still undefined but certainly significant factor will be the position the EZLN takes regarding the opposition alliance: whether, as has been its position in the past, it will encourage a boycott of the electoral process, which it considers to be without guarantees; or whether it will endorse Salazar.

In any case, the development of the electoral campaign in Chiapas should be followed closely. A substantial presence of national and international observers would be helpful in order to guarantee respect for the popular will and to minimize possible irregularities.

Parallel with this uncertain electoral moment is the impending power vacuum in the San Cristobal diocese. It is difficult to accept the Vatican’s argument that the removal of Coadjutor Bishop Raul Vera–natural and rightful successor to Samuel Ruiz–was “for purely ecclesiastical reasons.” If the Vatican, represented by the conservative figure of Secretary of State Angelo Sodano, was seeking continuity of the work of Ruiz, it could simply have confirmed Vera as successor, given the strong identification he has with the current pastoral plan of the diocese. The reality is that for years now the pastoral policy established by the diocese, with a strong emphasis on social advocacy, organization, and indigenous empowerment, has been a cause for worry for the Vatican. But it is difficult to understand this concern apart from another: the importance the Vatican places on continuing to develop its diplomatic relations with a Mexican government that has seen the diocese as a source of political problems.

Analysts feel it is likely that the new bishop–whose appointment is expected soon–will tend to lower the social and political profile of the diocese, its work denouncing the condition of human rights and militarization in Chiapas, and its commitment to the peace process and the rights of indigenous peoples. If so, the new bishop will have to confront a Church rooted solidly in the indigenous communities, with a social fabric articulated in a network of more than 400 indigenous deacons and 8000 indigenous catechists, and organized programmatically around the policies established by the recently completed Third Diocesan Synod, which highlighted these factors in its mission.

However, in view of the fact that the diocese is an important reference point for the Catholic population and even for Evangelical sectors, as well as for the NGO’s and grassroots organizations struggling for change in Chiapas, its weakening could be a blow to these actors. Already they are struggling against exhaustion as a result of the counterinsurgency strategy employed by the federal government and its local operator, the state governor, since the beginning of the conflict.

Samuel Ruiz’s retirement and diminished role in Chiapas is another cause for worry about the future of the peace process, since his leadership has been fundamental in stopping violence, seeking routes for dialogue and negotiation, and avoiding a military solution to the conflict. On a stage increasingly polarized and tense, where the space for negotiation has practically disappeared, the risk is that military logic will finally be imposed over political process–whether because the government decides to take advantage of the transition period to strike a decisive blow, or because the EZLN, in view of the prolonged stagnation of the process, decides to take up weapons once again. Although neither of these options seems reasonable nor probable, their possibility cannot be discounted.

As always, the vigilance of the international community will be crucial throughout this delicate period. The Mexican government’s actions regarding the human rights situation should be followed closely, in order to monitor government compliance with the important recommendations issued by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and by other experts from that organization who visited Mexico during the last year and who have made critical statements regarding the human rights situation in Chiapas and other states.