The democratic transition advanced by the victory of the opposition in July’s federal elections and those in August in Chiapas opens new possibilities. The electoral results do not immediately guarantee the resolution of multiple pending problems: increasing poverty, impunity and political violence, the unresolved conflict in Chiapas, to name some of the most urgent. But they could lay the foundations that would permit those problems to be processed in a new relation between government and society in Mexico. Both at the federal and state levels, the challenge is similar: to prioritize the needs of the population as a whole over partisan interests, and to learn to work like a mature democracy on the basis of ongoing negotiations and give-and-take between political forces.

Correlation of forces

The federal elections of July have given rise to a new and more complex political map. Shortly after the victory, Fox declared that he does not intend to govern for the PAN (National Action Party), the center-right party that was the main force that carried him to the presidency. For its part, the PAN declared that it would not be taking orders from the new president. In addition, the president no longer will be able to rely on an absolute and unconditional majority in the Congress. No party will be able to impose itself on the others. The necessity of negotiation represents a democratic advance. It will also complicate the negotiations to achieve the necessary reforms. The government of Vicente Fox will not be able to fortify itself except on the basis of his capacity to convince the other political groups of the legitimacy and pertinence of his proposals for change.

In this new context, all the political parties have entered into a phase of realignment and the alliances among them remain to be defined. The results of July and those of August in Chiapas represent a significant weakening of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), which lost the presidency after more than 70 years in power. The big question is what role will the PRI choose to play, having lost the presidency but still holding power in many state and local governments as well as solid ties with local political bosses and powerful economic groups. The challenge for the PRI is to rebuild the unity of the party now that the defeat has created internal fissures and struggles in the search for new leadership. It will have to worry about the possible unforeseen consequences of all the maneuvering. The violent confrontations between PRI factions in Chimalhuacan (in the state of Mexico), which left ten people dead, are an indication of this risk.

The PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), in spite of having recaptured the governorship of Mexico City in the July elections, has been shaken by its federal defeat. Mexico’s principal left-wing party is also going through a difficult period of structural and ideological redefinition.

Times of change

The shock waves even seem to have shaken the Armed Forces, an institution that has seemed monolithic. In these times of transition, internal fights between the different fractions are happening. Some advocate the need to clean house while others support the maintenance of the “old order.”

The detention of Acosta Chaparro and Quiros Hermosillo, two hard-line generals accused of ties with drug trafficking, seems to indicate a new correlation of forces, since both belonged to an elite group of officers previously considered untouchable.

Other developments point toward change and an eagerness to arrive at a more consolidated and transparent democracy. Examples include the Supreme Court decree that President Zedillo is required to provide an accounting of the financing of his successful 1994 campaign for the presidency and the handling of several scandals implicating high-level staff within Zedillo’s government.

It is also worth noting the openness shown by Fox towards non-governmental organizations (NGOs). His announced intention to include them in the process of formulating and implementing public policies and his meetings with those groups may indicate a new attitude within the political elite towards civil society. Fox indicated that the meetings are just a first step, but it remains to be seen to what extent they represent an interest in a truly substantive relationship.

EZLN: the option of non-intervention

Before the presidential elections, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) limited itself to saying that it would respect the electoral process and its results. After the victory of the opposition in July, a change of attitude might have been expected. Nevertheless, the EZLN maintained absolute silence with respect to the governor’s election in Chiapas, even though the opposition for the first time had a definite possibility of prevailing. In the end, some increase in Zapatista participation was noted, but overall few Zapatistas voted, thus favoring the prospect that the PRI would win in areas of strong EZLN influence.

Challenges for the new state government

The great political diversity of the groups that promoted Pablo Salazar’s campaign constitutes the first challenge for the new government. In addition, his proposals for change will have to face a state Congress and most county governments that will remain under the control of the PRI at least until the next elections in November 2001. It remains to be seen how the forces with past ties to the PRI government (peasant organizations, labor and teacher unions, communications media, big money groups) will reposition themselves.

Some tasks may seem titanic for the new governor: reversing poverty and social alienation, promoting development, reconstructing the social fabric, solving explosive agrarian disputes, controlling armed groups, etc. At the same time, his triumph has created a new political space in which social forces have been invited to participate – including indigenous and peasant groups – that historically have been marginalized. It might be argued that the fortunes of the democratic transition in the state and the country will largely depend upon the ability of the different sectors of civil society in Chiapas to articulate creatively their demands for the construction of a new political project for Chiapas. The question is if Salazar will be able to maintain the citizen movement that he was able to coalesce around his candidacy. How will he be able to respond to the demands and expectations of such diverse social and political sectors who have historically been at odds?

The conflict in Chiapas after the elections

The resolution of the conflict in Chiapas will surely be on the agenda of both governments. Certainly the victory of the opposition at federal and state levels opens new perspectives in this sense. The fact that the issue continues to lose visibility in the media should not obscure the fact that its causes remain unresolved and the situation is still explosive. In many cases, the living conditions of the indigenous have even gotten worse. In addition, the accelerated deterioration of the social fabric results in many additional conflicts in Chiapas today, on top of that between the EZLN and the federal government. The situation is increasingly complicated and the solutions will have to be pursued at both the federal and state levels.

Although Salazar cannot order the withdrawal of the Army – which answers to the federal government – nor is the solution to the conflict with the EZLN in his hands, the governor could become a facilitator who helps to create conditions to resume the dialogue.

Controversial silence of the EZLN

The silence of the EZLN towards the proposals of the president-elect (including the possibility of a direct dialogue) has been criticized as a lack of will to negotiate. Other explanations exist. It could be that the EZLN is waiting until the president-elect takes power. Another possibility is that it thinks that conditions for dialogue do not exist as long as the massive presence of the Mexican Army remains unchanged.

The defeat of the PRI at the ballot box and not by means of force has been seen by some as calling into question the way that the EZLN has chosen, while others stress that the defeat would not have been possible without the democratic consciousness raising done by the EZLN. In any case, the Zapatista movement still must stake out its role in the new democratic context.

Pending dialogue

In fact, the EZLN has already “spoken.” At the time that it suspended peace talks in September 1996, it identified conditions for resuming talks that, no doubt, it continues to feel are necessary. Given this state of affairs, the prospects are not so encouraging. Both parties (EZLN and the Fox transition team) appear to be awaiting some demonstration of the will of the other as a condition for taking next steps.

The problem is clear when considering the first condition of the Zapatistas: withdrawal of the Army and the dismantling of the paramilitary groups in the region. For his part, the president-elect conditions the withdrawal of troops on an agreement with the Zapatistas to resume the dialogue. In fact, a “total withdrawal” of the Army appears unlikely. In many divided communities, a part of the inhabitants requests its protection. Moreover it can seem like the only viable means to control the paramilitary forces, given that local political and legal institutions continue to be dominated by the PRI. Nevertheless, a way to build confidence at a minimal strategic cost to the government would be to immediately withdraw some of the military camps that are generating the most tension (for example, Amador Hernandez).

Another key point is the San Andres Accords, which were signed by the federal government and the EZLN in 1996. In order to implement the Accords, the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) drew up a legislative proposal for constitutional reform in the area of indigenous rights and culture on the condition that the parties (federal government and EZLN) consider it on a yes-or-no basis. While the EZLN approved it, the Zedillo administration did not. Subsequently other political parties presented their own proposed texts, including one from the PRI that was backed by President Zedillo. (None of them were actually voted on). Although Fox said that he will present the initiative of COCOPA to the Congress, it seems clear that without obtaining previous agreements, the proposal has little chance of being approved. In addition, the PAN already declared that it will not withdraw its proposal. Therefore, in addition to the will already expressed, a clear commitment and a strong job of lobbying will be required of the new government.

In the end, much remains to be invented in the new political relations that Mexico requires in order to face the challenges of the transition in a constructive manner. The international community can play an important role in insuring that the new federal government faces up to its responsibility in the Chiapas conflict and other pressing national issues in a way that guarantees a real advance in the process of democratization.