In the absence of progress in the peace process, the violence in Chiapas has worsened in recent months. It reached an unprecedented level of brutality on December 22 when paramilitary forces tied to the ruling PRI massacred 45 displaced Tzozil Indians.

A serious escalation had already occurred on November 4 when a caravan in which Bishops Samuel Ruiz and Raul Vera were traveling in the northern region of Chiapas was ambushed. Three pastoral workers were wounded in the attack that was apparently the work of a paramilitary group active in the area. Two days later Bishop Ruiz’ sister was severely beaten. These attacks underscore the degree to which Ruiz has become the target of a relentless defamation campaign, thus increasing his own personal vulnerability as well as that of the peace process that he represents.

Unresolved conflicts have exploded in sporadic violence in the isolated northern region. Paramilitary groups, whether assisted by security forces or simply tolerated by them, operate with impunity.

Even more troubling is that the violence has extended to other areas such as Chenalho in the Chiapas highlands. Dozens of people have been killed and at least 6000 forced to flee their homes because of recent fighting. An observation mission in which SIPAZ participated at the end of November met with several hundred of the internal refugees and reported: ” . . . they have only torn plastic sheeting to protect them from the constant rain, and they only have the clothes on their backs . . . They don’t have food or clean drinking water . . . All of their personal belongings were stolen or burned.”

The Acteal massacre marked a new low point in the deteriorating situation. The paramilitary forces appeared dressed in clean, black uniforms, many of them carrying high-powered weapons restricted to army use. They hunted down, shot and mutilated their unarmed victims, 36 of them women and children, over a five-hour period. For most of that time, state police stood by in a nearby school, ignoring pleas to intervene from witnesses who escaped the carnage.

On December 23, President Zedillo harshly condemned the attack and announced that the federal government would take over the investigation. Subsequently, 46 suspects were arrested, including the PRI Mayor of Chenalho, Jacinto Arias Cruz. In addition, Chiapas Governor Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro and federal Interior Minister Emilio Chuayffet resigned amid accusations regarding their failure to prevent the massacre.

In the days following the massacre, 5000 more soldiers were sent to Chiapas, including 2000 more to Chenalho. Also, 3500 refugees streamed into Polho, a base of Zapatista support close to Acteal.

Despite the massive army and police presence, paramilitary groups and PRI supporters continued to threaten and intimidate. In one incident, massacre witnesses were impeded from traveling to give testimony. In another a caravan of humanitarian aid going to the refugees was stopped and several people were temporarily taken hostage.

Meanwhile the army entered a number of Zapatista strongholds, including La Realidad, searching for arms and conducting interrogations in what some called a violation of the the 1995 law governing the peace process. Several indigenous communities protested the increased military presence.

Some analysts argue that these conflicts are in fact part of an official strategy to weaken communities who have demonstrated support for the EZLN. Given the predictable negative fallout from the massacre, both within Mexico and abroad, it appears implausible that it was ordered by federal officials. However, the escalating violence throughout the northern region and the highlands, the brazen ambush of the bishops’ caravan, the growing tension and violence in Chenalho, coupled with the lack of official response made the massacre itself predictable. Far from curbing the paramilitary groups, in July state government officials granted one of the largest ones, “Peace and Justice,” US$580,000.

All of this feeds the impression that the paramilitary presence is part of a larger political strategy of waging low-intensity warfare in Chiapas while stalling on peace talks and watching national and international attention dissipate. As a Mexican “senior official” told the Los Angeles Times in August, “Chiapas has disappeared as a public theme. It’s become a local, contained issue. It’s not a problem of national policy but of security.”

Since the massacre, the Mexican government continues to send conflicting signals. On the one hand the government initiates a federal-level investigation, calls for a renewal of the peace talks, and offers new proposals. On the other hand, it refuses to implement the existing San Andres Accords, it fails to contain the continuing intimidation and violence of the paramilitary groups, and instead targets Zapatista communities in aggressive actions that push legal limits.

The implications of the appointment of Francisco Labastida Ochoa as the new Interior Minister are unclear. His predecessor, Emilio Chuayffet, was widely viewed as a key impediment to progress in the peace talks. Clearly his resignation and that of Chiapas Governor Ruiz Ferro reflect the fact that Chiapas is not a “local, contained issue.” Labastida Ochoa promised a renewed, concerted peace effort. However he is viewed by some as a hard-liner. Moreover, the raid on the Zapatista strongholds on the day he took office was not viewed as an auspicious beginning.

In any case, the talks remain stalled, with each side blaming the other. The EZLN continues to insist that certain conditions be fulfilled before the talks can be renewed, including the implementation of the 1996 agreements on Indigenous Rights and Culture. The government says that it cannot accept the Congressional COCOPA’s implementation proposal, but that it is ready to talk . . .

October and November saw large demonstrations in Chiapas and elsewhere in Mexico demanding that the government fulfill the San Andres Accords. Also, in the absence of progress in the talks, the EZLN is seeking to move ahead with a key provision of the agreements regarding the establishment of autonomous indigenous municipalities. The EZLN points to these efforts to begin building their vision of the future as evidence of its commitment to peaceful means. The government views such initiatives as a destabilizing factor. The autonomous municipalities have been the target of attacks on a number of occasions, including the Acteal massacre.

The federal Congress may be prepared to assume a more active role in the coming weeks and months. While up until now the Chiapas conflict has not been a major concern, that may be beginning to change, especially after the spilling of so much innocent blood. Congressional leaders recently called for a suspension of state powers in Chiapas and for a special session to formally consider the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords. (Neither proposal won quick approval.)

In the international arena, Mexico continued to be the target of persistent criticism for its human rights record. Amnesty International’s secretary general lamented the lack of “political will to protect human rights.” Human Rights Watch noted serious human rights violations and charged that “the police and legal systems” are responsible for many abuses. The massive international response, both official and non-governmental, to the Acteal massacre once again put Chiapas in the international spotlight and demonstrated broad, abiding international concern.

Recommended Action

• Urge the Chiapas state government to: disarm the paramilitary groups, especially in the northern region and in Chenalho;
• provide urgently needed humanitarian aid to all displaced persons in Chenalho.
• Urge COCOPA to carry forward the proposed constitutional revisions regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture in order to achieve the effective implementation of the San Andres Accords.
• Urge the Zedillo administration to: guarantee compliance with the “Federal Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas” in order to reduce the risk of armed confrontations between the Mexican Army and the EZLN;
• respect the San Andres Accords and the international covenants that it has signed regarding the rights of indigenous peoples;
• recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.

Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write to:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional:
06067, México, D.F.
Fax: (52-5)-516-57-62/515-47-83

Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1er piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (52-5)- 546-5350/546 7380

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (52-5)- 535-27-26

Lic. Roberto Albores Guillén
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas – México
Fax: (52 961) 20917

• In addition disseminate information – like this report – to mobilize international public opinion and be prepared to mobilize in the event of an escalation of violence in Chiapas.

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Update

Violence Spreads like an Epidemic in Chiapas

The hopes raised by the elections of July temporarily obscured the delicate character of the peace process in Chiapas. However, the logic of violence has ruled in recent months, once again calling attention to the conflict in Chiapas. The most horrific incident was the December 22 massacre in Acteal in the municipality of Chenalho in which 45 people, mainly women and children, were killed. (See “Chenalho – Chronicle of a Massacre Foretold,” in this issue.)

Violence had been escalating in the weeks prior to the Acteal massacre. One alarming development was the attack on the bishops of the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, Samuel Ruiz and Raul Vera. On November 4, a caravan of vehicles in which they were traveling was ambushed by a paramilitary group near Tila in the northern region of Chiapas. Three pastoral workers were wounded by gunfire.

Two days later, the sister of Samuel Ruiz was attacked and beaten on the head with a hammer in the diocesan offices in San Cristobal. According to the bishop and to CONAI (National Mediation Commission), this attack is directly linked with the other and with the ongoing campaign of persecution and defamation of the diocese.

There have been other attacks against the Diocese of San Cristobal in the northern region. On October 6, members of the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice” took over the chapel in Limar. On October 15, they announced that they would not allow any Catholic priests or catechists in the municipality of Sabanilla. On November 14, members of the same group broke up an ecumenical meeting in Salto de Agua that was to focus on analyzing the current political situation. Members of “Peace and Justice” did meet with Papal Nuncio, Justo Mullor, during his December visit to Chiapas.

Another troubling development is that the violence has spread to other parts of Chiapas. In the municipality of Chenalho, the casualties and destruction have been growing: housing burned, families forced to flee, a mounting toll of dead and wounded.

The absence of the rule of law that prevails in Chiapas was denounced by opposition parties in the Chiapas State Assembly on November 27 when Governor Ruiz Ferro presented his third Annual Report.

Amidst this bleak backdrop, some encouraging signs must be noted as well. On November 17, representatives of 150 communities from the northern region met to analyze the situation of the internal refugees. On December 4, 450 indigenous persons who had been displaced since June, 1996 were able to return to their homes in the community of Jesus Carranza in the municipality of Sabanilla.

On December 21, the two factions of ARIC (Rural Association of Collective Interest), a key peasant organization from the Lacandon Jungle Valleys, signed a reconciliation pact that was the fruit of a year-long process.

As we go to press, 46 persons, including the local PRI mayor, have been arrested in connection with the Acteal massacre. In addition, Chiapas Governor Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro and federal Interior Minister Emilio Chuayffet resigned amid accusations regarding their failure to prevent the massacre.

The Peace Process According to Its Protagonists

After the elections last July, President Zedillo, both in Mexico and abroad, has repeatedly described the political situation in Mexico as normal democracy, without making much reference to the conflicts in Chiapas or in other parts of the country.

On October 1, during his seventh visit to Chiapas, he said that the causes that might have justified the “sad and dramatic” events of the armed uprising of 1994 no longer existed, and he announced an “Agreement for the Well-being and Social Development of the Highlands.”

A few days later, he told the French newspaper Le Monde that he did not believe that a short term solution was possible in Chiapas and that he regarded Zapatista leader Sub-Commander Marcos as “an idealist who has not chosen a good means.” He added, “We invited the EZLN to renew the talks and we continue to await its reply.” He also clarified that the government could have responded with force, “but it did not do so and it will not do so.”

On October 3, the leader of the official delegation for the peace talks, Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, stated that the recent attempts to create autonomous municipalities “contribute to increasing nonconformity and discord.” (Provisions for greater autonomy for indigenous communities are included in the 1996 San Andres Accords that have yet to be implemented.) After the attack on the bishops, he acknowledged that in the northern region there was reason “to fear that the situation could become completely out of control.” He asserted that the government should comply with the signed agreements “without any haggling,” and that “it should give signals that it wants to negotiate, and the EZLN as well.” He also commented, “In reality, none of the proposals [of Marcos] threaten the integrity of the State, all of them are negotiable and capable of being institutionalized.” Regarding autonomy, he added that he did not think that it could lead to “balkanization,” but rather that it was “an opportunity that we should not allow to pass.”

However, in November, during a meeting with Presbyterian pastors, he stated that the COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification) proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords “contains errors and inadequacies that could be dangerous.” He also said, “If the EZLN would retract its declaration of war, it would be an important step for the dialogue.”

After the Acteal massacre, President Zedillo condemned the killings and, while stating his support for the government of Chiapas Governor Ruiz Ferro, announced that it would take responsibility for a thorough investigation. The federal government also sent thousands of additional troops and police to conflicted areas in Chiapas and at the same time called for a renewal of peace talks. On December 26, Coldwell met with Samuel Ruiz, President of CONAI, and gave him a proposal for ending the conflict. It included an immediate renewal of peace talks, the investigation of the Acteal massacre and the situation in Chenalho, the presence of the army to prevent further violence, and ideas for political and social programs to combat poverty.

On January 3, after the resignation of Interior Ministry Secretary Emilio Chuayffet, President Zedillo named Francisco Labastida Ochoa to the post. He gave him ten priorities, one of which was the conflict in Chiapas.

With regard to the army, in October 500 troops installed a new military base near La Realidad with the objective of cutting the link between the ex-Aguascalientes of Guadalupe Tepeyac and the military base of San Quintin. Five hundred civilian Zapatistas from the autonomous municipality of San Pedro de Michoacan organized a protest demonstration.

On October 28, Mario Renan Castillo, military commander for the region, reported that the Mexican Army had reduced its troop strength in Chiapas by 50%. (This information could not be confirmed.) Several days later, General Wabi Rosel dismissed the possibility of a new offensive against the EZLN.

In November, the Secretary of Defense denied that the army trained or organized paramilitary groups in Chiapas and asserted that the armed forces comply with their constitutional duties. However, members of the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice” attended the going-away party of General Renan Castillo (when changes in military leadership were made.)

After the Acteal massacre, 5,000 additional troops were sent to Chiapas (including 2,000 to Chenalho). This provoked protests on the part of civil society, including demonstrations in some indigenous communities. The army was placed on a state of alert and has recently engaged in searches for arms, including in the conflict area. As part of these efforts, on January 3 the army occupied the Zapatista stronghold La Realidad for several hours, raising fears and tensions in the region.

After the march in Mexico City in September, the EZLN opted for promoting the autonomy process. Hence the creation of the autonomous municipality of Ernesto “Che” Guevara was intended to demonstrate that autonomy “is a reality that we are building” and that “our path is civil and peaceful.” The state government denounced the unconstitutional character of such an initiative, and CONAI commented that it may generate new conflicts.

In a statement at the end of October, Sub-Commander Marcos said that the top hierarchy of the Catholic Church wants to assume a “more active role in the conflict.” That means reducing the role of Samuel Ruiz and the Diocese of San Cristobal in the peace process. The long-term objective would be to use “its influence over the largely Catholic indigenous in the EZLN in order to ‘lead them’ to a quick signing of peace, the unconditional surrender of their weapons, and a break with and an attack against the political and military leadership of the EZLN.” In addition, Marcos highlighted the regrouping of different organizations under the rubric “third way,” that is, allied neither with the government nor with the Zapatistas. Two days later, the four Catholic bishops of Chiapas responded, “The imputations that have been made are unacceptable…The Church does not need the permission or the applause of anyone in order to fulfill its mission” and its “efforts for dialogue and reconciliation.”

The December visit of Papal Nuncio Justo Mullor sharpened the differences. The EZLN boycotted his visit to Tila, making it clear that he was not welcome.

On November 5, in what may be seen as an expansion of Zapatista influence toward the Guatemalan border, 2000 EZLN sympathizers marched in Frontera Comalapa to demand the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords.

In a statement on November 7, Sub-Commander Marcos said that the attack on the bishops was meant as a clear message to the EZLN: “Neither mediation, nor dialogue, nor peace.” He emphasized that, “The strategy of the government for Chiapas is to administer and feed the conflict in such a way as to be able to present it to the public as a war between Indians.” He added, “The federal government is preparing a military solution to the conflict.”

The EZLN blamed the federal government for the Acteal massacre. It also accused the government of breaking the Dialogue Law by harassing Zapatistas within the conflict area, as defined by the law.

At the end of September, COCOPA members for the new Congress were named. (COCOPA is made up up representatives of all of the political parties represented in the national Congress.) The press criticized the low profile of most of the members and noted that two of them (one from the PRI and a former PRI member now with the PRD) are tied to elite groups in Chiapas.

At the end of December, after a visit to Chiapas and a meeting with Attorney General Madrazo Cuellar, COCOPA issued a joint statement with the Interior Ministry underscoring the urgency of renewing the peace talks.

In general, the political parties have given more priority to other issues (the budget, reducing taxes, etc.) or political maneuvering in the new, more open Congress.

However, on December 14 the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) accused the government of bearing primary responsibility for the oppression in Chiapas. One week later, the PRD coordinated a humanitarian aid project for the displaced in the northern region and stated that it would try to stop official support for the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice.” (According to the Mexican daily La Jornada, in July the Chiapas state government signed an agreement with that group to provide $580,000 to support agricultural development.) On December 24, after the Acteal massacre, the PRD and the PAN (National Action Party) called for a suspension of the powers of the Chiapas state government.

Throughout this period, CONAI has denounced the escalating violence. In a November 5 press release, CONAI condemned the attack on the bishops and noted that

” all of their denunciations and proposals regarding the northern region of the state have not been taken into account by the authorities, that the paramilitary groups continue to operate with impunity, and that the absence of the rule of law is spreading in Chiapas.”

Some weeks later, Bishop Samuel Ruiz, President of CONAI, told a group of European members of parliament that efforts to find a solution are faced with “darkness and contradictions.” He noted that there is currently no contact between the sides and that the talks will not resume as long as the violence continues.

On December 24, CONAI requested that President Zedillo suspend the powers of the state government and disarm the paramilitary groups.

On October 12, demonstrations took place throughout the country. In Mexico City, some 3000 indigenous completed their “March for Dignity,” demanding the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords. That same day, 4000 demonstrators in San Cristobal de las Casas asserted that “peace is becoming increasingly remote in Chiapas because of the government’s failed commitments.” In Ocosingo, 400 representatives of 40 indigenous groups formed the Coordinating Committee of Autonomous Organizations of the State of Chiapas (COAECh) that will struggle to achieve the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords. Another space for dialogue at the grassroots level was afforded by the Conference for Reconciliation and Peace organized by CORECO (Commission of Support for Unity and Community Reconciliation) in Ocosingo in November. On November 29, 10,000 indigenous from all over the state marched in San Cristobal to demand the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords.

In October Mireille Rocatti, President of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), commented that some international non- governmental organizations are hiding “petty interests” behind their defense of human rights and that they become “instruments of sophisticated interventionism in Third World countries.” In Chiapas, the State Human Rights Commission (CEDH) is pushing a legislative initiative to control independent organizations.

At the beginning of November, CONPAZ (Coordinating Agency of Non- governmental Organizations for Peace), which was created in Chiapas in January, 1994, announced its dissolution because of internal problems. However, according to members of the coordinating team, “the non-governmental organizations [who were members of CONPAZ] leave strengthened and more free to chart their own political course in the future.”

Mexico and the International Community

During the visit of Amnesty International General Secretary Pierre Sane at the end of September, neither President Zedillo nor his Secretary of Government, Emilio Chuayffet, met with him. Mr. Sane asserted, “The political will to defend human rights is lacking.” The Mexican government stated that an appointment had never been agreed to, which was contradicted by Sane. His criticisms regarding human rights were diluted in the polemic caused by his “snubbing.”

On October 5, President Zedillo met with French human rights groups in Paris who questioned the attitude of his government regarding human rights. Later in Bonn, a journalist asked why he had not received Pierre Sane when he visited Mexico. Zedillo denied that version of the events, saying, “Sane went to Mexico with the intention of not seeing me and of creating a scandal; and I am still waiting for an apology. I am deeply offended because he lied.”

These controversies may complicate the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union that was signed on December 8. A clause in the agreement stipulates that it may be suspended if certain standards regarding democracy and human rights are not maintained. For that reason, at the beginning of October the Mexican government created the Intersecretarial Human Rights Commission, which will be charged with analyzing the cases of human rights violations presented by international non-governmental organizations.

In its global report, Human Rights Watch also criticized the serious human rights violations in Mexico, in particular in the rural areas. The report identified the “police and legal systems” as the perpetrators of many abuses.

The international community was quick to repudiate the Acteal massacre. President Clinton condemned it, and the Mexican government was harshly criticized in some U.S. media outlets. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan, condemned “the repugnant crime in Chenalho.” The Interamerican Human Rights Commission gave the Mexican government six months to report on its investigation of the case and to announce which measures it would take in response. Human rights groups requested a visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions, who is in charge of investigating crimes against humanity.

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Analysis

Four years after the January 1994 Zapatista uprising, a peaceful solution to the conflict seems increasingly distant. In political terms, the November ambush of the bishops of the Diocese of San Cristobal in the northern region as well as the beating of the sister of Bishop Samuel Ruiz may be seen as attacks on CONAI and by extension on the negotiation process. The stagnation of the peace talks has exacerbated tensions and social decomposition. Paramilitary groups tied to powerful political and economic interests have emerged to act with impunity. Thousands of indigenous have been displaced. And the violence has increased and spread, reaching a new level of brutality with the December 22 massacre of 45 indigenous in Acteal.

The unchecked violence of the paramilitary groups has prompted many voices, ours included, to decry the deteriorating situation and warn of the risk of larger confrontations. As long as the violence and repression continue, the political and social conditions for a possible renewal of the peace talks appear remote.

Faced with the lack of progress in the negotiations, Zapatista communities and others are developing autonomous municipalities. In this manner they seek to build in the present the alternatives that were envisioned in the San Andres Accords but that have not been legislated.

These initiatives have been viewed by many as factors that risk increasing tensions in a number of areas. According to the Chiapas PRI chairman, the development of the autonomous municipality of Polho was the “detonator of the violence” in Chenalho. Representatives of the state and federal government have also argued that they reflect ideas of “segregation and anarchy.”

This is part of a war of information and disinformation on the part of both sides, the EZLN and the government, to blame the other for the lack of progress in the peace process. Meanwhile, when the government cites technical legal problems as its reason for not accepting the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords, the consequence may be a matter of life or death for thousands of indigenous.

The extension of this fratricidal war from the northern region to the highlands (Chenalho) has led many analysts to believe that the eruption of these conflicts responds to a government strategy to justify the presence of the federal army and state police and to intimidate and undermine the social organization of entire communities who have declared themselves EZLN supporters. While the attempt to remove the “water” (the civilian support base) from the “fish” (the EZLN) is textbook counter-insurgency strategy, developments such as the Acteal massacre raise the chilling specter of the recent tortured history of Guatemala where no tactic of repression was too extreme.

Given the predictable negative fallout from the massacre, both within Mexico and abroad, it is unlikely that it was ordered by federal officials. However, the escalating violence throughout the northern region and the highlands, the brazen ambush of the bishops’ caravan, the growing tension and violence in Chenalho, coupled with the lack of official response made Acteal a massacre long foretold. It is difficult to cite any action by either the federal or the state government in Chenalho or elsewhere to curb the paramilitary groups and forestall such a predictable explosion. Moreover, state government officials recently granted one of the largest paramilitary groups, “Peace and Justice,” US$580,000. All of which feeds the impression that the paramilitary presence is part of a larger political strategy of waging low-intensity warfare in Chiapas while stalling on peace talks and watching national and international attention dissipate. As a Mexican “senior official” told the Los Angeles Times in August, “Chiapas has disappeared as a public theme. It’s become a local, contained issue. It’s not a problem of national policy but of security.”

In this sense, the suggestion by federal officials that the massacre was the result of “inter-communal and inter-familial” conflicts obscures as much as it illuminates. Needless to say, the indigenous peasants who pulled the triggers did not provide their own new uniforms or AK-47s.

Since the massacre, the Mexican government continues to send conflicting signals. On the one hand the government initiates a federal level investigation, calls for a renewal of the peace talks, and offers new proposals. On the other hand, it refuses to implement the existing San Andres Accords, it fails to contain the continuing intimidation and violence of the paramilitary groups, and it appears to violate the law governing the peace process (“Federal Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas,” approved by Congress in March 1995. As this report goes to press in early January, information is coming in about incursions of the army into Zapatista strongholds, confiscation of weapons, and interrogations of indigenous peasants in the conflict area.)

The appointment of Francisco Labastido Ochoa as the new Interior Minister was itself seen as a mixed signal. It responded to the post- massacre chorus that called for the resignation of Emilio Chuayffet, widely viewed as a key impediment to progress in the peace talks. Labastido Ochoa promised a renewed, concerted peace effort. However he is viewed by some as a hard-liner. Moreover, the occupation of the Zapatista stronghold of La Realidad on the day he took office was not viewed as an auspicious beginning. Whether the change reflects an actual policy shift toward political solutions and a greater will to achieve a just and lasting peace remains to be seen.

The replacement of Chiapas Governor Ruiz Ferro by PRI deputy Roberto Albores Guillen on January 7 is significant less for any policy shift that may result than as a reflection of the impact of the enormous criticism that has been brought to bear as a result of the massacre. Once again Chiapas is revealed for what it is: a blistering sore whose infection reaches well beyond its isolated mountains.

For their part, the police and army, despite their enormous presence, have not managed to provide security in large regions of the state. President Zedillo sent 5000 additional troops to Chiapas after the massacre, but their apparent focus on Zapatista supporters only generated more protests, heightening the risk of new conflicts. In this climate of violence and insecurity, the elections scheduled for October 1998 may become a point of great danger for the already feeble peace process. The civil authorities appear either in collusion with the violence or simply outstripped by the reality. Human rights groups and opposition political parties talk of an absence of the rule of law, and call for the resignation of the governor.

Although both sides, the government and the EZLN, have expressed their desire to renew the peace talks, in this climate of “dirty war” the actions and the public statements of each have become more radical in some respects. In their most recent communications, the Zapatistas have assailed actors such as the Catholic hierarchy and social and indigenous organizations that have always shown sympathy and solidarity with their struggle. Increasingly, criticisms of some Zapatista positions or errors they have made are heard. The result is splits among the civil society groups who are seeking peaceful solutions to the conflict.

In this discouraging context, one spark of hope may be seen in the opposition-controlled Congress. While up until now the Chiapas conflict has not been a major concern, that may be beginning to change, especially after the spilling of so much innocent blood. Whether – or how much – more blood and violence may be necessary before the constitutional reforms proposed by COCOPA successfully implement the San Andres Accords depends a great deal on the role of Congress, the political parties and COCOPA in the coming weeks and months.

Sensitive to all this, the international community has continued to follow developments in Mexico and to provide support for the process of change there. A variety of international human rights organizations have called upon the Mexican government to attend with greater speed to cases of human rights violations. The fact that President Zedillo did not meet with the general secretary of Amnesty International during his visit to Mexico and, later, the severe criticism he received from French and German human rights groups had a big impact. Finally the massive international response, both official and non-governmental, to the Acteal massacre once again put Chiapas in the international spotlight and demonstrated broad, abiding international concern.