Summary

Chiapas lies in a region of southern Mexico where the dichotomy of wealth and poverty is painfully evident in the reality of a country that acts as a buffer between the First World to the north and the Third World on her southern border.

A brief armed uprising in Chiapas led by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in January 1994 resulted in an extended negotiation process with the government. The Zapatista delegation broke off the dialogue in September, claiming that the government had failed to show adequate respect for the San Andrés Accords, signed in February 1996, on Indigenous Rights and Culture.

As the Zapatistas marked the third anniversary of the insurrection, two slogans reflected the feelings of the moment of the indigenous peoples: the first, “In three years nothing has changed;” the second, “Never again a Mexico without us.”

The February agreement offers the first ever opportunity to recognize in the Mexican Constitution the right to self- determination and autonomy of the indigenous peoples. In November, after numerous attempts at breaking the seemingly insurmountable deadlock, indirect negotiation efforts between the government and the EZLN began to show some signs of hope. The Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) presented a document that incorporated the positions that each side had agreed upon in February 1996 in San Andrés Larrainzar to grant autonomy to the indigenous peoples. It was presented as a “final” document, to be accepted or rejected but not modified.

While expressing certain reservations, the EZLN approved the COCOPA bill, considering it a solid basis for the creation of laws governing autonomy. The government rejected the COCOPA document and instead presented a counterproposal, which on January 11 was emphatically rejected by the EZLN.

The federal government insisted that its proposal is consistent with the San Andrés Accords and that the EZLN lacks a commitment to build consensus. The Zapatistas responded that the proposal “implies a serious negation of the spirit and the letter of the San Andres Accords,” and that the rights that it supposedly recognizes are undermined in the text itself with the intention of leaving the indigenous peoples, as always, the victims of discrimination.

The debate continues, but a review of the two texts leaves little doubt that the government proposal represents a revision of what had already been agreed. In any case, in the year since the agreements were signed, nothing has happened to improve the terrible conditions of poverty and marginalization of the indigenous peoples, a fact that weakens the government’s arguments.

Some analysts theorize that by presenting a counterproposal the government missed an historic opportunity to bring peace to the region. The Zapatistas hold firm to their position that the peace agreements reached with the government at San Andrés must be respected.

The future of the EZLN is now tightly linked to the ability of the indigenous movement to consolidate its base. Whatever the future brings, the issues that the Zapatistas have brought to the political scene in the last three years are of such national relevance that they will be difficult to ignore in the future.

While many had hopes that the government would present something the indigenous communities might interpret as a signal of rapprochement, the terms of the counterproposal offered by President Zedillo indicate that a formula for peace is not at hand.
The SIPAZ team notes with concern other developments that are not at all encouraging for the peace process. The economy is insolvent, poverty is growing across the country, and new guerrilla groups are emerging. Military figures are being assigned to important civilian positions, and there is a burgeoning militarization in several states. The army, police, and paramilitary groups work together and enjoy impunity, especially in the northern region of Chiapas.

Uncertainty about the future of the peace process weakens the social fabric and promotes polarization, especially within the more isolated communities. In the urban centers, a new wave of terrorism and intimidation directed at the symbols of organized civil society creates a social environment that lends itself more to violence than to peace.

In this electoral year, the political parties and other pressure groups will concentrate their efforts in the arena of the legislative elections to be held in July. The peace process in Chiapas could enter into a protracted crisis where the struggle of the indigenous peoples and the very roots of the conflict may be distorted or even lost in the rhetoric of political campaigning.
At the year’s end some positive signs were the tenuous consolidation of the National Indigenous Congress, the release of nearly all the alleged Zapatistas from prison, and the installation of the Commission of Follow-up and Verification (COSEVE). The “follow- up” role that COSEVE can possibly have without an agreement between the parties in conflict continues to be an enigma.

After the categorical “No” of the EZLN to the President Zedillo’s counterproposal, it is now up to the members of COCOPA, as they promised publicly, to take their bill to Congress. If public opinion is capable of influencing Congress to incorporate the amendments into the constitution, Mexico will be at an historic turning point in which federalism and democracy may be greatly strengthened. It is clear that it will not be easy.

Recommended Action

1.- Urge COCOPA and the Congress to carry forward the proposed constitutional revisions regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture in order to achieve the effective implementation of the San Andrés Accords.

2.- Urge members of the Zedillo administration to: redouble their efforts to achieve an agreement with the EZLN regarding implementation of the San Andrés Accords

• take immediate and efficient measures to disarm the paramilitary groups and to foster reconciliation in the northern region of Chiapas
• attend to the specific needs of the affected population in the northern region
• halt the growing militarization in Chiapas and withdraw troops from the communities
• recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.

3.- In addition:

• disseminate information – like this report – to mobilize international public opinion
• be prepared to mobilize in the event of an escalation of violence in Chiapas

4.- We invite you to subscribe to SIPAZ to receive Urgent Action Alerts from our team in Chiapas regarding specific conflicts or human rights violations. To receive the SIPAZ Report, to send contributions, or for information about serving as a team member in Chiapas, please contact the SIPAZ International Office

Please write to:

COMISIÓN DE CONCORDIA Y PACIFICACIÓN
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 535 27 26
Congreso de la Unión
Palacio Legislativo
San Lázaro
15969 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 542 1558

LIC. ERNESTO ZEDILLO PONCE DE LEÓN
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

EMILIO CHUAYFFET CHEMOR
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 546 5350 / 546 7380

LIC. JULIO C. RUIZ FERRO
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas – México
Fax: (52 961) 20917

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Update

What is an agreement worth?

The San Andrés Dialogue has been suspended since last September. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) withdrew from the negotiations, demanding that the government demonstrate the credibility of the process by meeting a set of five conditions. (See The Long Hard Road to Peace, Vol. 1 No. 2). The conditions were related primarily to compliance with the San Andrés Accords signed in February 1996. When violence erupted in the northern region of Chiapas, the EZLN added a further condition: the disarming of the paramilitary group “Peace and Justice,” tied to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), that operates in the region with apparent impunity.

The National Mediation Commission (CONAI) and the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) made significant efforts to break the deadlock. On September 12, CONAI, presided by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, presented an analysis of the causes of the conflict. The CONAI document indicated that the San Andrés Accords contained some basic premises that must be accepted or the entire negotiation process would be at risk of collapse.

According to CONAI, these assumptions include that the negotiations must yield efficient and verifiable agreements that address the roots of the conflict. CONAI also insisted that any advance at the negotiating table should bring about a corresponding reduction in the deployment of the police and the military. Furthermore, it was suggested that any progress achieved in Chiapas would be a catalyst for finding solutions to other national issues.

In September, CONAI called for a “National Dialogue for Peace in Mexico.” The appeal, which was signed by 200 organizations and more that 500 prominent citizens, states,

“The burning question of peace will not be resolved unless it is linked to urgently needed social reforms throughout the country. The transition to a comprehensive democracy is the best path to ensure that peace is not obtained at the cost of freedom and justice.”

The initiative called upon the armed forces, militant groups, political parties, civic organizations, the three branches of the federal government, and the main actors in the conflict in Chiapas to participate in this National Dialogue. It was to be a

“multilateral process that would seek common ground based on the conviction that pluralism and respect for different perspectives would open the way to a constructive consensus.”

The Interior Ministry responded by waging a vigorous defamation campaign against Bishop Samuel Ruiz, accusing him of setting conditions and seeking to be a protagonist in a national arena that went beyond the mandate of CONAI.

Meanwhile, the climate of hostility between the federal government and the EZLN was further aggravated when the Zapatistas were invited to attend the National Indigenous Congress to be held in Mexico City between the 8th and the 12th of October. A public debate ensued when the government warned that, under the terms of the special “Law for Dialogue and Pacification” which restricted the Zapatistas’ freedom of movement to Chiapas, they would be risking arrest if they crossed the state’s boundaries. Uniting under the slogan “Breaking the Siege,” various organizations and prominent individuals worked to organize the Zapatistas’ safe passage to the capital.

Behind these threats and the political/legal polemic that they generated, it was clear that the Mexican government was determined to curtail the reach of the Zapatista movement. After some delicate negotiations, mediated by the COCOPA legislators, the government conceded. In a surprise move, the Zapatista leadership appointed the famous Commander Ramona as their representative, and a COCOPA delegation accompanied her to Mexico City. There, besides being warmly welcomed at the National Indigenous Congress, she was also able to participate in a series of ceremonies and was honored with many gestures of solidarity.

Between October and December, COCOPA played a decisive role in creating the conditions for the re-establishment of the Chiapas peace negotiations. COCOPA held a series of talks with the EZLN leadership that resulted in three “Special Meetings” in San Cristobal de las Casas involving the EZLN, COCOPA and CONAI. The primary focus of these meetings was to address the conditions set by the EZLN for the resumption of the peace talks with the government.

By the end of the year, the two most significant achievements in this regard were the installation of the Commission for Follow-up and Verification (COSEVE, responsible for overseeing the implementation of the San Andrés Accords) and the presentation by COCOPA of a draft bill of constitutional amendments that embodied the terms of the San Andrés Accords (see Feature article: Indegenous Autonomy).

The COSEVE office was opened in San Cristobal de las Casas on the 7^th of November. The Commission is composed of a delegation of eight members, two permanent guests and a technical secretary from each side. COCOPA and CONAI have observer status. The EZLN invited the National Civic Alliance, the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Human Rights Network “All Rights for All,” and the National Indigenous Congress, as well as political dignitaries and intellectuals to be part of their delegation. Once again, the EZLN demonstrated its will to include civil society, through some of its most prestigious and representative organizations, directly in the supervision and implementation of the San Andrés Accords.

It seems that whenever there is a significant advance in the negotiations, factions interested in disrupting the peace process carry out – or acquiesce to – a series of violent acts that engender fear, foment conflict and strain the political and social climate in the state.

Shortly after the installation of COSEVE there was an outbreak of violence throughout Chiapas. Post-electoral fighting broke out in San Andrés Larrainzar and peasants clashed in Amatenango del Valle. In San Cristobal de las Casas, molotov cocktails were thrown at the doors of the Church of Santo Domingo, two coffee shops, and several stores – all identified as pro-Zapatista. In attacks coordinated by the military and police against peasants who set up roadblocks to protest the low price of corn, three demonstrators were shot and killed on the highway at Laja Tendida (municipality of Venustiano Carranza). Non-governmental organizations working in Chiapas have been repeatedly harassed and some have received death threats. Javier Lopez Montoya, staff member of CONPAZ, a coordinating agency for non-governmental organizations, was kidnapped and tortured together with his wife and children. Approximately 30 persons from CONPAZ and other organizations received death threats during the month of November.

At the beginning of December, the PRI-dominated State Congress confirmed interim Governor Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro (PRI) to complete the full term of office (through the year 2000) in spite of calls from the opposition for special elections.

In November efforts continued to draft a bill for constitutional amendments dealing with the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture. After several frustrating attempts at reaching consensus, COCOPA requested that each side submit their final position paper. Based on common ground found therein, on the 29th of November COCOPA presented a “final” draft of constitutional amendments with an ultimatum that it would have to be either accepted or rejected but could not be modified. Should either side reject the document, the COCOPA legislators threatened to resign.

While the EZLN let it be known that the “final” COCOPA document fell short of their expectations, they accepted it, considering it a step forward in the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights. After three tension-filled days, the Ministry of the Interior announced that the text needed some modification before it could be approved. They requested time to make revisions. The Zapatista leadership immediately responded that, given the terms set by COCOPA, it took that as a “no“, that is, that the government was reneging on the agreements it had signed in San Andrés.

In yet another attempt to prevent a complete breakdown of the negotiations, COCOPA representatives met separately with the Secretary of the Interior and the President in early December. At these meetings it became apparent that President Zedillo was both uninformed and misinformed on the negotiations that had transpired to date. He appeared to be unfamiliar with the background and content of the work presented by COCOPA.

The President asked the legislators for two weeks in which to study the situation and consult with experts in constitutional law. Despite the opposition of the Interior Ministry, he sent a message to the EZLN promising to give them his reply by December 23.

On the 19^th of December, several members of COCOPA delivered a confidential message to the EZLN that contained President Zedillo’s counterproposal. The EZLN announced in a terse message that they would make their reply known on January 11. On the 1st of January, the third anniversary of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN called for consultations with their advisors and the members of the National Indigenous Congress.

On the 11^th of January the EZLN rejected “totally” the government’s counterproposal declaring that it “implies a grave negation of the spirit and the letter of the San Andrés Accords” and is “a vile and blatant mockery of the indigenous people of Mexico.” The EZLN communiqué affirmed that, “Today the bellicose inclinations of [President] Ernesto Zedillo are clearly revealed,” arguing that each right conceded to the indigenous peoples in the counterproposal is either conditioned and subordinated by the subsequent text, or postulated in a manner that gives the state and federal authorities discretionary powers over them. The EZLN concluded that, coupled with the condescending overtone, it had the clear political significance of reducing the indigenous peoples to second-class citizens. The EZLN issued a call to COCOPA to put aside the proposal of the government and “to defend and carry forward your own proposal.” (For more details, see Feature article: Indegenous Autonomy.)

The government responded with a press release saying, “It has been – and continues to be – the concern of the government to undertake the necessary legal reforms in order to achieve a new relationship between the State and the indigenous communities of the country.” The leader of the government delegation to the talks, Marco Antonio Bernal, affirmed, “The government complied with that which had been agreed at San Andrés…,” and he called on the Zapatistas to translate into action their declarations that they desire peace.

COCOPA announced that faced with this delicate situation, they would take the time necessary to study how the two sides might be brought back to the negotiating table.

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Analysis

Notwithstanding the efforts of the Mexican government to contain the conflict within the borders of Chiapas, in our opinion it is impossible to understand the dynamics of the conflict or the behavior of those involved in the peace process without relating them to the broader national context. This becomes most evident in an election year in which it is likely that the Chiapas peace process will be overshadowed by the national congressional elections that will take place in July.

In recent months several indicators have suggested that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is losing its historical hegemony. A number of well-known political figures and high ranking ex-military personnel have renounced their allegiance to the ruling party and joined other political parties. In municipal elections in several states, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) have displaced PRI candidates. Faced with this situation, the PRI party chairman was replaced and President Zedillo fired the Attorney General, who had been the only member of the opposition in the government. In addition, the PRI felt obliged to block an electoral reform, two years in the making, that would have resulted in new openings for the opposition. The PRI majority then voted in its own reform proposal.

As the mainstream opposition parties gain political ground, other factions are becoming more radicalized in their expressions of dissent. At the far end of the spectrum, Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) activity has increased and other new guerrilla groups are emerging. There are also many important initiatives for political change throughout the country that are emerging from the network of organized civil society. These expressions are an important contribution to the peaceful transition to participatory democracy in Mexico. Unfortunately, it seems that the most frequently felt reaction from the government is indifference, repression or authoritarian solutions.

On the national scene military personnel are assuming high ranking posts in the police force and troops are being used to carry out many civic functions (road building, development, material aid, etc.) as a facet of a clearly articulated counterinsurgency strategy. The military has frequently been accused of violating fundamental human rights of the civilian population, especially in the more isolated communities. Particularly vulnerable have been groups identified with the social or political opposition, human rights workers, civic organizations, etc.

The deteriorating situation of human and civil rights throughout the country has been denounced by international agencies that have visited Mexico, including Amnesty International and the Inter- American Human Rights Commission (IHRC) of the Organization of American States.

The persistent environment of social and political violence in Chiapas and other states, combined with growing militarization and authoritarianism, promotes, in our opinion, a climate that is highly unfavorable for any negotiating process that aspires to effect the roots of the conflict.

The uncertainty provoked by the prolonged suspension of talks between the EZLN and the government since September and President Zedillo’s delayed response to COCOPA’s “final” document gave way to a new crisis on January 11th when the EZLN rejected the government’s counterproposal. To this must be added the debilitation that is the result of the fact that after three years of negotiations, the indigenous communities have continued to suffer the effects of poverty and marginalization, with nothing significant to show for their struggle. Much of the government’s development and material aid programs, apart from being insufficient, have been distributed on the basis of loyalty to the ruling party (PRI), thus increasing confusion and division within the communities.

After expanding its presence into the Lacandon jungle and the central valleys (the cañadas), the military is now penetrating the northern region of Chiapas, a strategically important mountainous region that includes the corridor between Chiapas and Tabasco.

Security forces (army and police) stationed in the northern region openly tolerate and in some cases seem to encourage the harassment of inhabitants by armed paramilitary groups. With absolute impunity, the paramilitary groups set up roadblocks that prohibit free transit, arbitrarily detain people, and carry out acts of physical violence and theft. While it is not entirely clear what is behind such activities, it seems apparent that they reflect powerful interests related to political control and national security.

Various hypotheses concerning the underlying causes of the violence in Chiapas draw a correlation between the escalation of violence and advances in the peace process. Some point to Secretary of Government Eraclio Zepeda, leader of the “hard-line” faction of the state government of Chiapas. He has strong ties to local paramilitary groups, the ultraconservative indigenous bosses (caciques) and the security forces. At the federal level this group is aligned with the element which, behind a posture of promoting negotiations, is implementing a counterinsurgency strategy to attack organized civil society, create a climate of fear and insecurity, and destabilize the peace process.

On the urban scene most analysts agree that ultra-conservative and racist sectors of the population, who see the indigenous movement and the EZLN as a threat to their interests, are behind much of the violence. The so-called “auténticos coletos” (“authentic natives of San Cristobal“), include a good part of the oligarchy of the colonial city of San Cristobal de las Casas. Throughout the past three years the “auténticos coletos” have openly demonstrated their rejection of the Catholic Church under Bishop Samuel Ruiz, local development, peace and human rights groups, and internationals, considering them all to be allied with the Zapatistas. Since November, churches and symbols identified with the interests of indigenous people have been targets of crude bomb attacks and other forms of intimidation.

The other powerful lobby is led by the governor of Chiapas, Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, who together with some members of Congress from COCOPA, represents the “softer line” of negotiation and dialogue. Ferro’s recent confirmation as governor raised expectations that some of his cabinet changes might include the replacement of Zepeda and others from the “hard-line” group.

Challenges

We can expect political parties and movements to focus their attention on political campaigning until the July elections.
The stalled peace talks between the government and the EZLN on a draft bill for a constitutional amendments on indigenous rights, combined with the electoral campaigns, have put the peace process at a dangerous crossroads. As national attention is focused on the elections, it is thought that further work on the peace process will become a lower priority and the violence in Chiapas will escalate. The future of the peace process is very much up in the air.

The government strategy seems clear enough. The government insists that its proposal puts into practice the San Andrés Accords. The government has undertaken a powerful media campaign to blame the failed peace negotiations on the “intransigence” of the EZLN. At the same time, it seeks to neutralize the Zapatistas politically by minimizing the significance of the San Andrés talks and by opening new avenues of strategic dialogue and making deals with each indigenous ethnic group separately. Such divisive maneuvers disrupt the consolidation of the indigenous movement.

The Zapatistas demand that the government live up to the San Andrés Accords that were signed nearly a year ago, and that the legislators of COCOPA present Congress with their draft law on indigenous rights so that it can be debated in an atmosphere of plurality and representation of all political sectors of the country.

The fate of the EZLN depends more than ever on its fundamental wager that the indigenous movement and organized civil society will continue to actively support the peace process. However, the support network of the EZLN has been somewhat debilitated and its capacity to mobilize public opinion is less than in 1994 when it was instrumental in halting a civil war. Furthermore the indigenous movement is more a latent force than a consolidated reality. Its future depends on its ability to unify and to resist efforts of the government to divide it.

The future of COCOPA is uncertain. As this report goes to press, its members seem to face two choices: fulfill its stated intention of presenting its proposal to Congress – even in the face of opposition from the Executive Branch – or lose the opportunity to affirm, with that act, the independence of the Legislative Branch in a truly democratic system. Numerous voices, including CONAI, have exhorted COCOPA to carry its initiative forward in order to avoid the failure of the peace process and to set an historic precedent for the process of democratization in Mexico.

In the first case, regardless of what might happen to the legislation in Congress, COCOPA would obtain a moral victory for having lived up to its word. In that instance, it would be difficult, but not impossible, to achieve the constitutional revisions regarding indigenous peoples that could serve as a step forward in the tortuous path of the peace process. In the second case, COCOPA would lose the considerable political capital accumulated in recent months, and it might end up dissolving completely. This would be a serious blow to the peace process.

It remains to be seen whether COCOPA will choose one or the other or discover an as yet unforeseen alternative.

For the Interior Ministry, this is a crucial moment. In spite of the media campaign aimed at presenting the government as the real peacemakers while blaming the EZLN for the breakdown in negotiations, there is no doubt that the government is responsible for the stalemate in the negotiations for having rejected in November the agreements it had made in February at San Andrés Larrainzar.

As the New Year approached, President Zedillo presided over the signing of the Peace Accord in Guatemala. He spoke “of the triumph of politics over violence, of dialogue over intransigence, and reason over irrationality.” He declared that “resources of war should become resources of social well-being; irreconcilable differences should be settled through the democratic process; and plurality should be the way to achieve the common good: justice, liberty, legality, security and peace.”

It would be commendable if these criteria and values were adopted in Mexico.