During the last few months, the atmosphere in Chiapas has once again grown tense. The recurrence of violence by security forces has taken place within a context in which the Zapatista movement has taken new initiative and demonstrated its power of convocation. Since its meeting with representatives of civil society in November of 1998, the Zapatista referendum on “Indigenous Rights and Culture” last March, and the two referendum follow-up meetings (in May and June), the EZLN has been able to show that it continues to be a force that must be reckoned with.

At the state level, the holding of these last events has brought the EZLN closer to social organizations that in many cases present the same demands as the Zapatistas, even though all of them do not embrace the same methods of struggle.

At a national level, the EZLN has found an echo in other popular movements that have been having an impact on the current situation: the movement against the privatization of the electricity industry and the student movement at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (that has been on strike for several months now). Certainly the issue of Chiapas does not provoke as much interest as it did at the beginning of the conflict. Nonetheless, the EZLN has opened paths to other forms of organization and ways of doing politics. In addition, it has managed to place the indigenous question on the national political agenda and to keep it there.

In the face of the persistence of the Zapatista movement in spite of five years of efforts to undermine it, the response by the state government has been one of progressive adaptation. At the beginning of the year, several legislative proposals were introduced that appeared to be seeking a solution to the conflict, while excluding the EZLN: ‘The Amnesty Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas,’ ‘The Indigenous Rights and Culture Law’ and the redistricting proposal (see SIPAZ Report, Vol. IV., No. 2, May 1999).

Then, barely a week after the Zapatista referendum, a propaganda offensive began around purported Zapatista ‘desertions.’ The purpose of this campaign was to make the national and international public think that the conflict had lost intensity and that the EZLN no longer had the same level of support in the indigenous communities. The turning in of weapons and ski-masks was repeated in various places, creating much confusion, even though it was later revealed that the supposed ‘Zapatistas‘ had not been such since at least 1995, and some had never been Zapatistas. Some of them admitted publicly that they had lent themselves to this masquerade in exchange for financial aid. Through this campaign, that includes the promise of further aid, the government is counting on wearing down the indigenous communities after more than five years of resistance. It is trying to respond (some say that it is pretending to respond) to the demands presented by the Zapatistas (but without the Zapatistas) so that the impression is created that the situation in Chiapas is under control.

As a last recourse for weakening the Zapatista movement, the government seems to have opted for reverting to a strategy of force. As in the past, the harassment has been directed not just against the Zapatistas, but also against social and peasant organizations (possible allies of the EZLN).

Since March 1995 – immediately following the Federal Army’s incursion in the Lancandon Jungle in order to arrest the Zapatista leadership – the state and federal governments have maintained their public positions calling for peace and dialogue. During that time, however, there have been numerous periods of police-military harassment (in particular the dismantling of four Zapatista autonomous counties last year).

In the latest operations, the police played a more active role than the Army, since the actions of the latter are restricted in the ‘conflict’ zone (according to the March 1995 Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas). It is easy to find a pretext for entering the communities when the justification given is the existence of problems – some alleged and some real – between Zapatistas and PRI (ruling party) supporters. At the same time, the army is continuing to assume a role that does not correspond to it under the Constitution, displaying more and more aggressiveness at the checkpoints in the region, especially in the highlands.

These developments may have various objectives. On the one hand, they serve to maintain a ‘moderate‘ level of repression and constant intimidation that is aimed at generating sufficient fear to undermine popular support for the EZLN (in the terms of the counterinsurgency manuals, ‘taking away the water from the fish’). On the other hand they could be attempts to provoke a violent response from the Zapatistas, which would cause them to lose the support of civil society, or, in an extreme case, justify a more hard-line military strategy).

Some analysts speak of the creation of ‘paramilitary groups’ as part of the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. Following the Acteal massacre, widely condemned by national and international society, there have not been such visible violent actions by groups of this nature. Nonetheless, denunciations continue to mount of the establishment and training of armed groups or of threats made by them. In the Taniperlas region – where a Zapatista autonomous county was dismantled in 1998 – we heard an interesting and much broader definition of the function of paramilitary groups: “They are those who help the police or the soldiers,” pointing out community leaders, leaders of organizations, Zapatista sympathizers and even human rights promoters.

Some saw the appointment of the new Interior Minister as a positive sign for Chiapas, owing to Carrasco Altamirano’s work while he was governor of Oaxaca (including the passage of an indigenous rights and culture law). Others, however, upon hearing him say “there will be no change in the government position of favoring the solving of the conflict through dialogue,” conclude that, in practice, the government will continue the same policies. In fact, the police/military repression that intensified in early June followed on the heels of his becoming Interior Minister.

One element of concern regarding a possible resolution of the conflict is that, within the framework of the year 2000 presidential elections, the issue of Chiapas has been pushed into the background. The front pages of the newspapers are primarily covering the contests within the political parties to choose their presidential candidates. The fact that the PAN (center-right National Action Party) did not attend the first meeting between COCOPA and the new Interior Minister – because of disagreements with the PRI – seems to be an obvious demonstration of their partisan priorities.

It would not be of much benefit to the federal government if Chiapas were to be an issue of electoral debate, because of the lack of progress it has made in the resolution of the conflict. It would be more convenient for the Zedillo government to ‘administer‘ the conflict until the elections, continuing its policies of attrition in order to avoid, as far as possible, an open confrontation.

‘More of the same’ could be the phrase for summing up the prospects in Chiapas. On the one hand, the talk of dialogue and peace by the government, and along with it, social policies within a pre-election strategy. On the other hand, the EZLN promoting actions that give it greater national and international coverage and seeking alliances with other movements, so that it does not drop off the political agenda.

Given these facts, little progress can be expected in the delicate situation in the state. However, the events and political jostling at all levels that accompany the struggle for political power in Mexico may generate more conflict in Chiapas and elsewhere.