Almost six years since the armed Zapatista uprising – and a few days from the end of the millennium – peace in Chiapas still does not appear to be on the horizon. The new federal proposal (see details in Update article elsewhere in this issue) for the renewal of dialogue between the government and the EZLN was a surprise to many, especially because of the hard-line strategy the government has been implementing in dealing with the Chiapas conflict over the last three years. This proposal represents a significant, although not sufficient, advance on the part of the government. It contributes minimally to reducing tensions in some communities and to controlling somewhat the way in which the state government is confronting the conflict. It remains to be seen if the proposal is really an attempt to break the impasse in dialogue, or if it is a maneuver for gaining time within the framework of the fast approaching national and local elections. It could even be seen as an opening by the government to the United Nations High Commissioner, Mary Robinson, in anticipation of her visit to Mexico, scheduled for November 23 to 27 this year.

This initiative, widely disseminated in the media, is a small crack of light in the dialogue process, stalled for three years now. Among the new items it contains is the invitation to the COCOPA to present its proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture in the Senate. While this has its merits, it does not guarantee that the San Andes Accords, signed by both parties, will be honored. President Zedillo’s proposal, which backs off on several points from what was agreed to at the dialogue table, remains in the wings. (For a comparison, see SIPAZ Report, Vol. III, no. 2, April 1998, or SIPAZ web page: www.sipaz.org). Some opposition senators have expressed reservations about voting on COCOPA’s proposal since, in doing so, the PRI majority could prevent its passage.

By proposing that the issue of constitutional changes on indigenous rights and culture be debated in the Senate, it would appear that the Ministry of the Interior is not taking into consideration the dynamic that allowed the San Andres Accords to be achieved, where reflections and experiences were gathered from academics, researchers and, most particularly, from indigenous organizations throughout the country.

In this regard, as long as the federal government does not accept the COCOPA proposal, as the EZLN did in October of 1996, it is difficult to foresee a resolution of this issue during the remainder of the current term. President Zedillo would have to change his mind, withdrawing his own proposal and accepting the COCOPA’s. Alternatively, it would have to wait until there were a new president and/or new configuration in the Senate, in which the PRI no longer held the majority. Given the imminent elections, the federal government could be counting on passing the problem along to the next administration with an unanswered proposal for dialogue, perhaps strengthening prospects for keeping the PRI in power.

The federal initiative also proposes a new civil mediation body, in response to the June 1998 dissolution of CONAI (National Mediation Commission). This body should certainly be accepted by both parties and it should also have the respect of both. It is important to mention this because, during its time, the CONAI was strongly criticized by the government, discrediting its members and its work.

Another positive aspect of the new proposal is that the Minister of the Interior himself has expressed his willingness to be the one to head the government delegation for dialogue.

This proposal, although significant and expressing a certain willingness to reactivate the peace negotiations, does not completely meet the conditions presented by the Zapatistas in September of 1996 when they left the negotiating table. It may be difficult for the Zapatistas to respond affirmatively to this proposal, since it leaves aside, or only partially touches on, some of the key issues in this troubled, and now lengthy, negotiating process.

One issue the proposal does not address – and a controversial one in the renewal of the dialogue process – is the repositioning of the Mexican Army in Chiapas. Tens of thousands of soldiers are in the communities, negatively affecting the social and psychological lives of the residents, especially of the women and children. The heavy-duty nature of the barracks construction in strategic places throughout the entire state suggests that the military will not be leaving soon and that, as they themselves have expressed: “they came to stay.”

The positions on this issue are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, the Minister of the Interior has said that the Army’s presence is a delicate issue that will be discussed once dialogue is reestablished. For the EZLN, however, the withdrawal of the Army from the indigenous communities is one of its conditions for renewing dialogue.

The release of some Zapatista sympathizer prisoners was read by many as a ploy by the state government, since it did not release all those it said it had, nor were all those released recognized as being EZLN supporters. (The Voice of Cerro Hueco continues to number around 100 prisoners; see Feature in SIPAZ Report IV, No. 2.) In addition, many of these prisoners have been accused of precisely those “crimes of violence” which are not included in the government proposal.

Some groups view the federal proposal as a sham, since the state government continues to implement a policy of force and belligerent discourse against the EZLN. It justifies the incursions of the state police, as well as of the Army itself, with the statement that “the majority” of the people in the communities are asking for the presence of the armed forces “for security.” “They are not going to listen to the voice of just a few and prevent the people from eating and making progress,” as the State Attorney General said.

In the world arena, the government’s words regarding progress in the human rights situation in the country continue to be called into question. If there indeed has been progress, it has not been enough to be able to say that Mexico is today in a different situation. Several United Nations committees, as well as the Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, have expressed their “worry” and “profound concern” over various issues, among them Chiapas and the administration of justice. It is possible that these opinions will not change the willingness of governments to make Mexico a commercial partner. It could, however, be significant in the implementation of clauses in those agreements, calling on the Mexican government to go further in its commitment to peace, justice and human rights.