Summary

The July 1997 national elections marked a significant milestone in the democratization process in Mexico. The ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) lost its historic majority in the lower house of the Mexican Congress. Since then, there have been many signs of the changed political landscape. For the first time, the President’s Annual Report to Congress was followed by an opposition response. In the new Congress, instead of setting the terms of debate, the PRI must now negotiate them and in some cases accept the decision of a united opposition. In addition, opposition parties are insisting on discussion of controversial issues that could hurt the Zedillo administration.

In September, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) sent “1111” supporters to Mexico City to demand the demilitarization of Chiapas and implementation of San Andres Peace Accords. The Zapatista protest was aimed at making the unresolved conflict in Chiapas once again the focus of national attention. It was timed to coincide with the inauguration of the Zapatista Front for National Liberation (FZLN). In the Zapatista vision, the FZLN is not a political party and it will not seek state power. Rather it is an attempt to organize civil society with the goal of radically transforming the political and economic system of Mexico.

Initially the Mexican government indicated some resistance to the Zapatista presence. Subsequently government representatives said they would not restrict it and noted approvingly that the FZLN inauguration marked the successful integration of the EZLN into the political process. They called for the prompt resumption of the peace talks, criticizing the EZLN for being inflexible.

The EZLN insisted that the FZLN is not its political arm but an independent organization (although up till now the FZLN has clearly taken its inspiration from the EZLN). The EZLN continued to refuse to return to talks as long as the existing agreement was not implemented. It asserted that, “The war continues in the southeast of Mexico and we Zapatistas remain armed and ready for combat…”

In Chiapas a number of army bases were dismantled and then reinstalled several days later. The confusing signals led to protests and heightened tension. They also raised concerns about a possible split among authorities regarding Chiapas policy.

The National Mediation Commission (CONAI) reported that the number of police and military posts in Chiapas had increased 130% since February 1995. CONAI called for a reduction of the military presence in Chiapas as a sign of the government’s commitment to a peaceful solution.

Government negotiator Pedro Joaquin Coldwell indicated that if the EZLN withdrew its declaration of war, the government would reduce troop levels in Chiapas.

Meanwhile Bishop Samuel Ruiz became the target of a media campaign attacking him for destabilizing the peace process. The campaign appeared aimed at neutralizing the mediation role of CONAI, which he heads, in the peace process.
COCOPA, the congressional committee formed to assist the peace process, remained paralyzed. In the face of stiff opposition from the Zedillo administration, it was unable to achieve a consensus in favor of introducing to Congress its legislative proposal for implementation of the San Andres Accords. The new Congress recently named new members to the commission. Several opposition parties stated that they will push for implementation of the San Andres Accords.

The continuing violence in Chiapas, especially in the northern region, and the unaddressed legacy of injustice there prompted a steady stream of denunciations from prominent indigenous, civil society and church organizations.

The demonstration in Tuxtla Gutierrez, the state capital, by displaced persons from northern Chiapas ended unsuccessfully after 87 days. Ominously, there was evidence of increased organizational activity among the paramilitary groups that are a key source of the violence in Chiapas.

There were peacemaking initiatives as well. The state Congress in Chiapas created a commission to promote dialogue and nonviolent conflict resolution. However its impartiality was questioned because it is led by a state legislator who is identified as a leader of one of the paramilitary groups.

In early September an ecumenical gathering of grassroots evangelical and Catholic church leaders created a unique opportunity for dialogue and achieved modest progress in overcoming divisions that have allowed religion to contribute to the divisions in some communities. Seen as part of a larger process of such gatherings, the meeting raised hopes that the churches might be able to work together and instead become a force for peace and reconciliation in the communities.

Internationally the July elections improved Mexico’s democratic image. Initial fruits included an important economic agreement with the European Union and a passing improvement in the standing of Mexican stocks. The United States agreed to send Mexico an additional 20 helicopter gunships to assist with fighting drug trafficking. On the other hand, Mexico continued to be the target of harsh criticism by international human rights groups. For example, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for torture reported during his recent visit that he had received numerous first-hand accounts of torture by military officials. He noted that he only visits countries in which he has concluded torture is not limited to isolated cases.

After the breakdown in the San Andres talks a year ago and then the extended focus on the national election campaign, new possibilities for the peace process have now emerged in the changed political landscape. More conciliatory statements are being heard. Whether they will be translated into the actions necessary to restart the talks remains to be seen.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

• Urge the Zedillo administration to: respect the San Andres Accords and the inter national covenants that it has signed regarding the rights of indigenous peoples; order the reduction of federal troops in the conflict areas as a concrete signal of its willingness to seek a peaceful solution; recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
• Urge COCOPA and the Congress to carry forward the proposed constitutional revisions regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture in order to achieve the effective implementation of the San Andres Accords.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write to:

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 535 27 26

Carlos Medina Plascencia
Cámara de Diputados
Presidente de la Comisión
de Régimen Interno y Gobierno
Palacio Legislativo de San Lázaro
Edif. A, Col. El Parque
15969 México, DF—México
Fax: (52-5)-522-80-12/542-10-01/542-74-31

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Emilio Chuayffet Chemor
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 546 5350 / 546 7380

Lic. Julio C. Ruiz Ferro
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas – México
Fax: (52 961) 20917

In addition disseminate information – like this report – to mobilize international public opinion and be prepared to mobilize in the event of an escalation of violence in Chiapas.

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Writin a New History

First Steps Toward Greater Democracy

The effects of the surprising and in many ways encouraging electoral process for the July national elections are still being felt. The final results of these elections were ratified in August. These results confirmed the tendency towards an increase in pluralism in Mexico. And in contrast to 1994, when 1200 complaints of election law violations were filed, 189 cases were presented after the July elections.

COMPOSITION OF CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Source: Alianza Cívica

PARTY	NUMBER OF DEPUTIES	% OF TOTAL
PRI	239	48
PRD	125	25
PAN	121	24
PVEM	8	2
PT	7	1

 

COMPOSITION OF THE SENATE

Source: Alianza Cívica

PARTY	NUMBER OF CONTINUING SENATORS	NUMBER OF SENATORS	Total ELECT
PRI	64	13	77
PAN	24	9	33
PRD	8	8	16
PVEM	—	1	1
PT	—	1	1
TOTALES	96	32	128

 NOTE: One-fourth of Senate seats were up for election in July. These final figures update the preliminary figures in SIPAZ Report, Vol. II, No. 3. See Glossary for explanation of names and political orientation of the political parties.

On September 1, President Ernesto Zedillo presented his third Annual Report to the Nation after much controversy over the format and strong pressure on the part of the PRI which threatened to not attend the installation of the new Chamber of Deputies.

The presidential discourse focused mainly on economic and political themes, omitting other issues such as Chiapas, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), and the militarization of the country.

Nonetheless, inaugurating this new political era, a representative of the opposition responded to the president’s Annual Report for the first time. Porfirio Munoz Ledo, leader of the center-left PRD, took up the situation in Chiapas and the need to follow through on the San Andres Accords. He also asserted that the well-known Zapatista principle “to rule by obeying” (“mandar obedeciendo”) is the best way to govern the country.

Many analysts as well as the parties forming what is known as the “opposition block” (according to the new configuration of the Congress) affirm that from now on, the PRI (after its historic loss of the absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies) will have to learn to negotiate.

The Peace Process According to Its Protagonists

After months of absence from the political scene, the EZLN returned to gain national attention. In a communiqué on August 8, it was announced that 1,111 Zapatistas would gather in Mexico City from September 13-16.

In Mexico City, the Zapatistas peacefully demanded that the government comply with the San Andres Accords and that Chiapas, along with the rest of the country, be demilitarized. They also participated in the founding convention of the Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN).

This political organization, which has been in the process of formation since February 1996, announced that the convention would define its declaration of principles, program of struggle, structure and statutes, and plan of action and would elect new leaders. The EZLN asserts that the FZLN is not its political arm, nor a means of achieving state power. Rather it is an attempt to create a tool for the radical transformation of the political and economic system and of the relationship between the government and civil society.

From the beginning of the convention, it was clarified that the Zapatista delegation did not come to participate directly in the founding of the FZLN, but to be present as observers. In a communiqué, Subcomandante Marcos (who was not in Mexico City) explained:

“We are not going to transform ourselves into a peaceful civilian political force. The war continues in Southeast Mexico and the Zapatistas continue to be armed and ready for combat…, defying the supreme government with arms, with reason, and with history.”

On September 8, 15,000 indigenous Zapatista supporters gathered in San Cristobal de las Casas to see off the Zapatista delegation to Mexico City. In addition, various national indigenous organizations announced that they would unite with the Zapatista march to demand the constitutional reform on Indigenous Rights and Culture agreed to at the San Andres talks.

hese included the National Indigenous Congress, the National Pluralistic Indigenous Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA) and other organizations from the coast and highlands of Chiapas, along with other organizations from different states in Mexico.
Initially, there were apparent attempts made to impede the initiative. The offices of the FZLN in Mexico City were burglarized. The federal government gave mixed signals. On the one hand, it indicated that the Zapatista delegates would have to take off their ski masks in order to come to the country’s capital. On the other hand, it expressed its willingness to guarantee the security of the march. In the end, the initiative proceeded without serious difficulties.

During this same period, the EZLN also has turned to the international context to sustain attention and solidarity for the movement. The Second Intercontinental Gathering for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism was held in Spain in July. At least 3,000 people participated and two Mayan Zapatistas attended. The final declaration demanded the immediate demilitarization of Chiapas and the rest of the country and promised increased international pressure so that the San Andres Accords would be respected. In September, representatives from the EZLN attended the first European Conference Against Racism in Venice, Italy. An international Chicano-indigenous cultural gathering was held in Chiapas in August with the goal of “using art and culture as a form of resistance and means of promoting social change.”

The Zedillo administration continued to express its willingness to renew the peace talks in Chiapas. President Zedillo, in a July 23 speech to Latino leaders from Illinois (USA), called upon the EZLN to “renew the dialogue” and asked them to reconsider their “rhetorical rebellion.” Zedillo expressed his willingness to seek a solution on the basis of certain fundamental, non-negotiable principles (sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity). He also proclaimed his “inexhaustible patience.”

In early September, Secretary of the Interior Emilio Chauyffet stated that the federal government seeks to renew the negotiations with the EZLN as soon as possible but that the proposal of COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification) for implementation of the San Andres Accords would result in a “fissure” in the constitutional structure of Mexico and would threaten national sovereignty.

At the same time, the head of the government negotiation team in Chiapas, Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, commented that the conditions were present for the incorporation of the Zapatistas into the political process as competitors under the new equitable and transparent laws of Mexican democracy. He said that this could “greatly enrich the spectrum of Mexican democracy.” He noted that “there is a strong possibility of renewing the talks,” although he added, “There are many obstacles to be overcome. I believe that the elections were a very good sign, and we must continue to work on this gradually.” More recently, he said that if the EZLN would retract its declaration of war, the number of federal troops in the communities in Chiapas would be reduced. He also argued that, “The problem will not be resolved with false dilemmas and unchangeable attitudes.” Referring to the COCOPA proposal, he said that the Zapatistas “don’t want to change a single comma.”

In Chiapas, recent troop movements in the conflict area sent conflicting signals. On August 17, seven military bases were dismantled and about 5,000 soldiers in the highlands of Chiapas, the northern region and the Lacandon Jungle were relieved. Two days later, Undersecretary of the Interior Ausencio Chavez Hernandez said that the withdrawal of troops from the conflict area was an example of the “positive disposition of the government of Mexico” to renew the negotiations. However, the commander of the Chiapas military region explained that it only was a “readjustment” of the troops and not a withdrawal.

On August 22, the Mexican Army reinstalled its military base in San Cayetano (near the Zapatista village of San Andres Larrainzar, the site of the peace talks). About 300 soldiers aboard at least 30 military vehicles were confronted by thousands of Zapatista sympathizers who demanded the immediate withdrawal of the troops and the return of the land to its true owners. The situation in the area continues to be very tense.

As a result of this event, nine foreigners were accused of manipulating the indigenous people into confronting the military. This prompted immigration authorities to initiate an investigation of 320 foreigners. These foreigners are considered to be participating in activities in Chiapas that do not conform to their status as tourists.

It is important to note that military intelligence documents were recently published implicating high-ranking officials, other officers and troops of the Mexican Army in drug trafficking. This generated heated argument about the role of the army and its excessive prerogatives.

During the past few months, the CONAI (National Mediation Commission) has been under great pressure due to an apparent campaign on the part of the local press which has tried to discredit CONAI’s president, Bishop Samuel Ruiz, and to delegitimize the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, its priests and its religious workers. They are being accused of trying to destabilize the peace process.

At the end of August, CONAI issued two statements. In the first, CONAI backed the measures that the EZLN is taking to widen and consolidate its presence in the political arena as well as the Zapatista march in Mexico City. The second statement consisted of a special report on militarization in Chiapas. “Between the February 1995 offensive and December 1996, the points of police and military presence increased by 96, reaching a total of 170, an increase of 130%.” The report emphasized the need to reduce the presence of the army in Chiapas, as an “unmistakable sign of the federal government’s political will to strengthen confidence that democratic advances and the construction of a just and dignified peace are possible in Chiapas through peaceful and political means.”

Speaking of the troop presence, Mireille Rocatti, head of the official National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), said that the militarization of the state of Chiapas “is due more to an increase in crime than to the social problem.” This statement was characterized as “serious and disconcerting” by several non-governmental human rights organizations. With respect to COCOPA, after the July 6 elections, its work came to a standstill. On July 30, this commission declared that it would not present its legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture during the remainder of the congressional term. According to Juan Guerra of the PRD, the failure of COCOPA was “attributable to the lack of openness of the government.” Along the same lines, PAN General Secretary Antonio Lozano affirmed that the government had not reciprocated COCOPA’s efforts. He added that his party would push for implementation of the San Andres Accords. The new members of COCOPA for the current congressional term were named in September.

Other political parties weighed in as well. The Green Ecology Party (Partido Verde Ecologista Mexicano/PVEM) demanded the withdrawal of Mexican Army troops from Zapatista areas and the renewal of the negotiations. On August 22, leaders of the PRD met with Interior Secretary Emilio Chauyffet to support the reactivation of the dialogue. They informed Chauyffet that the PRD will push for implementation of the San Andres Accords through its members in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Mexican Congress.

Church leaders reaffirmed their concern for the violent situation in Chiapas, particularly in the northern region. In July, both the new representative of the Vatican in Mexico, Justo Mullor Garcia, and the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) expressed support for the work of bishops Samuel Ruiz Garcia and Raul Vera. From September 3 to 5, the Second Ecumenical Conference for Peace and Reconciliation took place in Chiapas (see Sharing Sorrow and Hope) It was an encouraging indication of the role that Christian churches can play in the peace process.

During the past few months, indigenous and non-governmental organizations have also on various occasions demanded demilitarization and fulfillment of the San Andres Accords. Among them: the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity (made up of 180 social, university, political, and church organizations from 17 states); the National Indigenous Congress; and the participants in the First Conference of Indigenous Women in Oaxaca.

In September, the new leadership of ARIC/Union of Unions, an important, longstanding peasant organization in Chiapas, agreed “to work for reconciliation among the communities located in the conflict area and also to give priority to negotiations and dialogue with other indigenous organizations in the canyons of the Lacandon Jungle.”

The Chiapas state government continued to promote unilateral actions that, according to the government, directly address the root of the problems and conflicts. For this purpose, changes were recently made in the cabinet. The results remain to be seen.

In Chiapas, post-electoral political violence increased in recent weeks. Municipal offices were taken over (Ocosingo, Oxchuc). In addition there have been threats and assaults against social leaders, roadblocks, land takeovers, etc.

In the northern region, the situation continued to deteriorate. On July 23, after an 87 day sit-in and demonstration in front of the Government Palace in Tuxtla Gutierrez, the displaced people from the northern region ended their demonstration with no response to their demands. At the same time, violence flared up. On July 21, Santiago Sanchez Torres, a representative of the armed group “Peace and Justice” was murdered in the community of Masoja Grande. On the road to the town of Tila, Bersain Vazquez Cruz, son of another leader of this PRI-affiliated group, was also killed. There were no clear explanations for these deaths. While “Peace and Justice” blamed the actions on catechists and members of the Diocese of San Cristobal, others spoke of an internal conflict due to anomalies in the administration of the organization’s resources. After these incidents, 450 people from the municipality of Tila and 2,742 in Sabanilla fled from their communities out of fear of reprisals.

Meanwhile, in the community of San Jeronimo Bachajon, municipality of Chilon, the resurgence of the paramilitary group “Los Chinchulines” was denounced. In addition, while state officials deny it, the press has begun to talk of the appearance of a new paramilitary force, the Antizapatista Revolutionary Indigenous Movement (MIRA), that is apparently operating in the highlands, the jungle, and the northern region.

The state Congress launched an initiative aimed at reducing tension and securing a resolution of the conflicts in the northern region. This Commission is headed by Congressman Samuel Sanchez, who is believed to be a leader and advisor to the paramilitary group, “Peace and Justice.” As a result, there is concern among some indigenous Chol communities that this initiative may be biased.

Mexico and the International Community

Since the July 6 elections, Mexico has received much favorable comment from the international community regarding its democratic transition. This contributed to the successful signing of the Agreement of Economic Association, Political Collaboration, and Cooperation with the European Union on July 23, after a controversy about a clause concerning democracy. (The Europeans were requiring clear and concrete indications of democratic advances, and Mexico did not want to sign on to such language.) Another favorable international sign was the positive reaction of the New York Stock Exchange to President Zedillo’s Annual Report to the Nation. Bill Clinton said that the speech was “another step forward” in the process of democratization in Mexico.

At the military level, there were worrisome signals. On July 20, the highest ranking military official of the United States visited Mexico and proposed greater tactical cooperation in the war against drug trafficking. He agreed to send 20 new helicopter gunships to Mexico. On the other hand, the Mexican government continues to be heavily criticized by international human rights organizations. After waiting a year and a half for permission, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for torture, Nigel Rodley, visited Mexico in August. He reported that he had received numerous testimonies of victims of torture by military officials. He noted that he only visits countries in which he has concluded torture is not limited to isolated cases. The visit had strong repercussions. Even though Rodley has not yet issued his recommendations, his visit increased the possibilities for UN Special Rapporteurs to investigate forced disappearances and arrests related to the issue of freedom of expression (although the Mexican government recently denied permission for the latter to visit the country).

In August, Amnesty International denounced the violence taking place in the northern region of Chiapas. At the end of August, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of the United Nations announced its conclusions on the situation in Mexico, including 3 positive and 12 negative points. The report strongly criticizes Mexican authorities and condemns the unresolved situation in Chiapas, pointing out that the result is the increasingly precarious plight of the indigenous people of the region.

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Analysis

In a climate where peace talks have been suspended for more than a year and the San Andres framework for the talks may be exhausted, where the initial peace agreements have not been fulfilled and the government sends contradictory signals regarding the conflict in Chiapas, key actors, including the EZLN, indigenous organizations and the churches have decided to try again to renew the peace talks and to re-establish social relations in the areas of conflict.

In this context the EZLN organized 1,111 delegates (from as many communities sympathetic to their cause) to travel to Mexico City. In the political and economic center of the country their cause would be joined by other voices of social dissent in urging the federal government to honor the promises it made in San Andres.

Retracing the steps of Emiliano Zapata in 1914, the Zapatistas legally and nonviolently occupied the Central Plaza (the renowned Zocalo), forcing the federal government to break its silence on the conflict in Chiapas. The demonstration commanded media attention and received expressions of support from a broad range of political and social groups, including political parties. It put the urgency of peace and the unresolved status of Mexico’s Indians once again at the center of the national agenda and revitalized solidarity with the indigenous struggle and with the broader struggle for social change in Mexico.

The July 6 elections inaugurated a new era for democracy in Mexico. The results demonstrated that the electorate had lost faith in the ruling institutional PRI. Most voters supported other parties, thus changing the balance of power and introducing a dynamic of political negotiation in Mexican politics.

This change was evident in President Ernesto Zedillo’s third Annual Report to the Nation. For the first time an opposition party had access to the platform. And both the delivery and content of the rebuttal by PRD leader Porfirio Munoz Ledo exemplified a high standard of democratic civility and respectfulness and not, as many expected, an opportunistic political attack.

In his speech Munoz Ledo reminded the president and the nation that the legislative branch and the executive branch of government are at the same level, and he asserted that henceforth they will relate on that basis. The replacement of a rubber-stamp Congress with one that insists on its proper role in government will be no doubt one of the most significant achievements in the democratic transition of Mexico. Munoz Ledo also identified a number of controversial issues that were omitted from President Zedillo’s address, and he called for the legislative and executive branches to work together to ensure that they are dealt with promptly and adequately. These include the conflict in Chiapas, the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords, the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army), the excessive military presence in 25 states, the negative impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), unsolved political assassinations, and corruption scandals.

This more open and pluralistic political arena could give Mexico a new social, political and even economic direction. However it is still not palpable in the more marginalized and conflict-ridden states. It is not coincidence that the most militarized states—Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Veracruz and Hidalgo—also have the highest proportion of indigenous people. In these states local leaders may be attacked, persecuted, arrested and even murdered for the sole “crime” of supporting an organization considered to be of the opposition.

In Chiapas political intolerance, the struggle for power, economic greed, and the overwhelming military and paramilitary apparatus that controls large areas of Zapatista support result in a reign of terror and attrition that continues to make internal refugees, displacements, disappearances and murder commonplace—especially in the northern region.

Some observers believe that the contradictory nature of official reports concerning troop movements in Chiapas may be indicative of division at the federal level, or between the armed forces and the government, about how the conflict should be handled. The attacks and attempts to discredit Bishop Samuel Ruiz and the Diocese of San Cristobal, accusing them of instigating violence, clearly seem to be aimed at undermining CONAI as a mediator of the conflict. The result is a tense and violent armed peace and a climate of tension and confusion not propitious to conflict transformation.

Many obstacles need to be addressed for the peace process to regain its momentum. These include implementing the San Andres Accords, reducing the military presence and disarming the various paramilitary groups, and addressing the crisis in the northern region and the situation of the those who have been incarcerated as a result.

Nonetheless, the political changes at the national level have created new possibilities. Moreover, recent efforts by the local religious leadership may develop into a significant force for the reduction of intolerance and violence in Chiapas, especially in the northern region. The coming together of evangelicals and Catholics makes clear that the origin of the conflicts is not religious. In the process it is also helping to unmask the true interests of those who promote violence in the communities.

The international community continues to demonstrate its concern. Recent Zapatista delegations to Spain and Italy have helped to keep international solidarity alive. Recent visits to Mexico by international human rights organizations have underscored the systematic violations of human rights and the need for change. The continued mention in international forums of torture, disappearances and manifestations of racism in Mexico highlights the urgency.

Taking the issue to the capital served to bring the conflict in Chiapas back into focus not only nationally but internationally as well. International observers accompanied the thousands of Mexicans who, representing the millions of marginalized, demanded: “Never again a Mexico without us!”

Today there is a sense of renewed hope for peace in Chiapas. Clearly it will not come solely based on the willingness of one side of the conflict but rather from the efforts of all, with no one being excluded. A constructive approach, and a readiness to embrace compromise is required. Jaime Martinez Veloz, PRI-member of COCOPA says succinctly:

“What’s at stake in Chiapas is not who is going to win and who is going to lose, but the fate of millions of indigenous Mexicans. Solving the issues in Chiapas is not a question of public image, but of the principles that govern us as a nation. Those who are intent on winning must learn that compromising is not losing.”