The large presence of the Mexican army in Chiapas since the Zapatista uprising in 1994 has been the object of criticism from the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), indigenous and social organizations, national and international human rights organizations, and opposition political parties. On the other hand, its presence has been explicitly requested by various groups affiliated with the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), and the government has defended its deployment there. In the current political situation, the army continues to play a key role in the possibilities for renewed peace talks in Chiapas.

Historical Pact

In order to understand military plans and doctrine in Mexico, it is necessary to look back a bit in history. According to the authors of a recent study (Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico): “There is a civilian-military pact in Mexico in place since the 40s, based on two unwritten laws that resulted from one historical event. In 1947, when Miguel Aleman, the first civilian president of the revolution, took the office offered to him by the generals of the revolution, he accepted it in exchange for one commitment: Absolute respect for the institution of the military. Concomitantly, the second norm was derived …: The military would respect civil authority ‘by cape and by sword.’ … In that respect, the Mexican army was never autonomous in relation to the political system, … and because of that, it was not a factor of instability.” ⁽¹⁾

War Plans

The war plans and doctrine that determine the deployment of the Armed Forces are derived from the Constitution and from the laws that regulate its activity: Preparation for external defense (described in the plan known as DN-I); guarantee of internal security and social peace (DN-II plan); and, since the 70s, intervention in the case of natural disasters (DN-III).

Many of the criticisms of the Armed Forces are related to the DN-II plan, whose mission is quite broad. “It ranges from preparation and training for the war against drugs, fighting it constitutionally in support of the federal Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduria General de la República/PGR); to counterinsurgency; to supporting inefficient public security forces; to carrying out so-called civic action which includes vaccination and dental services for the population in marginalized rural areas, protection of natural resources, and other actions… The army is directly responsible for controlling insurgent groups that have declared war on the state, such as the EZLN, the EPR (People’s Revolutionary Army) and the ERPI (Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People), and its actions are carried out in close coordination with the Interior Ministry. With regard to drug trafficking or public security where the military substitutes for inefficient county, state, and federal public security forces, its coordination is with the federal Office of the Attorney General.” ⁽²⁾.The criticism with regard to this sort of civic action is that, according to the Mexican Constitution and its laws, it is the responsibility of other federal and even county and state agencies.

Chiapas: The Reality

Since the Zapatista uprising in 1994, the exact number of soldiers in Chiapas has been the focus of much unresolved debate. “While the government and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA) have reported from 17,000 to 25,000 soldiers at different times, indigenous, peasant, and human and civil rights organizations have reached a public consensus of approximately 70,000 troops.” ⁽³⁾. At the same time, it is recognized that “… the exact number of troops in Chiapas will never be truthfully or accurately known …However, there are other criteria to measure militarization in quantitative terms and to make a calculation not only of the number of troops, but also of their positions, actions, and consequences to society …” Regarding their positions, in February 2000 the authors of Always Near, Always Far counted “259 geographic points: 175 fixed positions, 24 permanent checkpoints, 60 intermittent checkpoints” spread out over 58 counties (more than half of the 110 counties in Chiapas).⁽⁴⁾

The official reasons given for the presence of the Mexican army in Chiapas are national security; combating drugs, terrorism and the absence of the rule of law; and so-called civic action or social work. Some examples of the latter are road construction, reforestation, and military camps that offer food, medical attention, information about family planning, haircuts, and building repair or building materials to local residents.

While military sources emphasize the legality and the necessity of the military presence, during the past seven years there have been hundreds of accusations against the military by the indigenous population. These include interrogations, harassment at checkpoints and through low flying planes and helicopters, the occupation of community buildings such as schools, the introduction of prostitution and venereal diseases in communities, the rape of girls and women, the forced displacement of the population through military/police operations, support or protection of paramilitary groups, theft of hardwoods, obstruction of freedom of movement, profanation of sacred sites, attaching political conditions to the delivery of humanitarian aid, distribution or control of public resources based on political affiliation, environmental pollution, planting marijuana, creating division in the communities, and contributing to the de facto impunity that characterizes the region. Because of these accusations, a large number of indigenous Zapatista supporters and displaced persons have rejected the social services of the army.

In an analysis of 1160 complaints from communities and indigenous organizations found in the Historical Archive of the National Mediation Commission (CONAI) for the period 1994-98, the police and the army were the most frequently identified aggressor (36%) ⁽⁵⁾. For the year 1999, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center concluded that “of the totality of cases of alleged violations of human rights received by the Center, 39% were carried out by the Mexican army, making it the main aggressor. The majority of cases referred to violations of physical integrity and guarantees of due process.” ⁽⁶⁾.

International Criticism

In February 2000, the Commissioner for Human Rights and Indigenous Affairs of the United Nations (UN), Erika Irene Daes, appealed for the federal army to return to its barracks. That same month the report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Arbitrary, or Summary Executions, Ashma Jahangir, recommended that the Mexican government “achieve the demilitarization of society and avoid delegating the maintenance of public order or the fight against crime to the Armed Forces.” ⁽⁷⁾.

A few months later, the UN Committee for Human Rights declared that “the Committee is … concerned by the growing intervention of the military in civil society, especially in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca where it is responsible for activities that are more appropriate for police forces.” It also observed that, “The Committee is deeply concerned with the nonexistence of institutionalized processes to investigate allegations of violations of human rights alleged to be committed by military and security forces and which, as a consequence, frequently are not investigated.” It recommended that “the maintenance of public order within the country’s territory must be carried out by civilian security forces” and that “the State must establish adequate procedures to carry out independent investigations of accusations of violations of human rights attributed to the military and the security forces to ensure that those accused of such violations be brought to justice…” ⁽⁸⁾.

The Organization of American States (OAS) recommended in 1998 that the Mexican government “revise the content of the National System of Public Security Law in order to assure that the Armed Forces remain in the role originally intended for them, according to what has been established in international legislation on the matter, especially by article 27 of the American Convention.” ⁽⁹⁾.

Proposals for Change

Recently there was a proposal from the state and federal governments and from the army for a modernization of the Armed Forces and a readjustment of their activities specifically in Chiapas.

Shortly before the last annual report of outgoing President Zedillo in September 2000, in an unprecedented act that responded to national and international criticism, General Cervantes Aguirre, then Minister of National Defense, stated that the federal army’s presence in Chiapas is a painful subject for the conscience of military personnel.

In preparation for the incoming Fox administration, and at his invitation, the State Reform Studies Commission, in a document delivered to President-elect Fox on November 22, 2000, identified as an “urgent measure” for the peace process in Chiapas the retreat of the army from the immediate surroundings of the rural communities in Chiapas. Additionally, it recommended: “prohibition of Armed Forces’ participation in any tasks foreign to their constitutional mission, such as public security and combating drugs; … reform of Article 93 of the Constitution to ensure that chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces may be required to testify before Congress to provide information when a law is being debated or a matter pertinent to them is being studied; and … strengthening of the powers of legislative commissions in matters of national defense, with the objective of granting them competence to revise and audit the budgets administered by military authorities and institutions.” ⁽¹⁰⁾. President Fox will decide which of these proposals will be sent to the Congress for further discussion.

Commitments and Facts

During December 2000 and January 2001, there were various changes at a military level in Chiapas. In the first weeks after taking office, Fox ordered the dismantling of dozens of checkpoints and, in response to the conditions demanded by the EZLN for the renewal of peace talks, he ordered the withdrawal of several military bases.

These initiatives require continuous monitoring, since several indigenous organizations charged that soldiers, dressed as civilians, continue to carry out their jobs by the side of the road at dismantled checkpoints; that some checkpoints that had been dismantled have been re-established; and that some military camps have been reinforced.

Community Divisions

The steps taken by the president have caused some relief in many indigenous communities, and disagreement in others. In recent years, the withdrawal of the army from indigenous communities has been a constant demand of a number of indigenous organizations and groups from the communities. On the other hand, some PRI-affiliated groups call for the army to stay, arguing that it is needed in order to restore normal order to the public and institutional life of Chiapas and to solve the problems that lead to the Zapatista uprising. They also say that the withdrawal of the military would be a violation of community reconciliation agreements.

This divergence of understanding presents a real challenge. Reconciliation among the people of Chiapas is one of the most important priorities for the state government, given the damage sustained to the social fabric since the 1994 uprising, and even before.

Democratization

Sería demasiado fácil creer que la ‘desmilitarización‘ de Chiapas se resolvería con sólo un reposicionamiento o repliegue deIt would be very easy to believe that the “demilitarization” of Chiapas will be solved with only a repositioning or withdrawal of the army. However, any withdrawal should be accompanied by a guarantee that the abundant presence of guns and/or the harassment of the population are not simply copied by the police who would take over primary responsibility for public order. In addition, it is essential that paramilitary/armed civilian groups be dismantled since they represent a continual source of great tension in the region. Chiapas Governor Pablo Salazar indicated in mid- December that the retreat of the army will be accompanied by a withdrawal of state police. It remains to be seen whether the federal government will commit to not establishing a strong presence of federal police. Such challenges require greater stability and governability in Chiapas, which are negatively affected by the growing conflicts within the state government. (See Update and Analysis in this issue.)

Even so, a resolution regarding the army presence in Chiapas cannot be separated from a broader resolution that includes the political and social situation in the region and in the rest of the country. While the federal government is responsible to ensure that activities under the broad heading of “civic action” be assumed by federal and state institutions, this requires a process of democratization of the nation’s political system. And that, in turn, goes hand in hand with the struggle against corruption and impunity at all levels of government.

At the moment, a number of cards are on the table. To the degree that the Armed Forces respect civilian authorities, and to the extent that the civilian authorities fulfill their promises, the army may become a factor that facilitates the renewal of the peace process.

• 1 Siempre cerca, siempre lejos: Las Fuerzas Armadas en México, Global Exchange, CIEPAC, CENCOS, 2000, p. 16-17. Published in English as Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico. Citations in this article refer to the Spanish edition (Return)
• 2 “Siempre cerca….”, p.24. (Return)
• 3 “Siempre cerca….”, p.132. (Return)
• 4 “Siempre cerca….”, p.133. (Return)
• 5 “Siempre cerca….”, p.124. (Return)
• 6 La guerra en Chiapas: ¿Incidente en la historia?, Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas A.C., April 2000, p. 54. (Return)
• 7 Recommendation 107.b, February 2000. (Return)
• 8 Human Rights Committee, 66º Session, UN, July 1999. (Return)
• 9 “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico,” OAS/IAHRC, September 1998. Recommendation 738, p. 167 (Return)
• 10 Proceso 1255, November 19, 2000, p. 22-23. (Return)