“My daughter is with them [‘Development, Peace and Justice,’ DPJ; also known as ‘Peace and Justice’]. She comes to see me only in secret, in order to warn me that I’m still being threatened in the community where we came from, that I can’t return or go through that community.”
Displaced person from the lower Tila region. ⁽¹⁾

“In the beginning, the entire community was with Peace and Justice. They told us we were going to organize so that all the communities would be working together, and that they were going to send us credits for economic projects and government works. But the leaders didn’t follow through. The only thing we received was problems: there have been many deaths. The leaders of that group are enjoying themselves while the people are suffering.”
Former member of DPJ (La Jornada, 4/5/99)

In 1994, the Zapatista uprising brought public attention, nationally and internationally, primarily to the Canadas of the Lacandon Jungle, the base of operations of the EZLN. However, following the elections in August of 1994 and leading up to those in October of 1995, violence broke out in the northern region, making it one of the most troubled areas in the state.

Today, the northern region continues to be an area that is very rarely visited, but it is an area of high tension that suffers from recurrent outbreaks of violence. The small number of national and international observers is owing to the history of violence against them. The lack of interest in this region can be explained by its geographic, historical, political and cultural isolation.⁽²⁾) SIPAZ is one of the few organizations that visits the region, meeting with the different actors and seeking a better understanding of the complicated dynamics among them.

The Groups in Conflict

Members of the opposition identify themselves as being from the PRD (the Democratic Revolutionary Party), from Abu Xu (Arrieras Nocturnas), Catholics associated with the diocese of San Cristobal, EZLN supporters, or members of civil society, “The Organization” or “Organized Civil Society.” They began organizing in the late seventies, with the Catholic Church or by themselves, in order to respond to economic disasters (such as the steep decline in world coffee prices) and to community leaders’ disillusionment over the neglect and perceived contradictions in government practices ⁽²⁾.

Following the 1994 uprising, some communities, or some parts of them, became (or were publicly identified as) Zapatista supporters.

The varied identity of the opposition can be explained by its very isolation. All of these groups are struggling for change, but given the context of war they live in, they have chosen not to clearly tie themselves with one side or another in order to avoid more harassment.

Regarding DPJ members, they say they already existed prior to 1994, “but before they were called PRI” (indicating their clear ties with the ruling party). Various statements from members of DPJ indicate that their organization, including taking up arms, began in order to defend themselves from attacks by the Zapatistas. As is explained in “Neither Rights, Nor Human,” ⁽³⁾: “Terror and death began to reign throughout the Ch’ol region. No one worked in peace any longer. They had to dedicate all their time to political-religious activism. The movement was everything. You had to go out under the shadow of night, masked, attacking, robbing, kidnapping, and assassinating community leaders who were against you. The slogan was, ‘everyone is part of the Nocturnal Ants’ [Arrieras Nocturnas, the Spanish translation for the Ch’ol name, Abu Xu].”

On various occasions, the conflict in Chiapas has been presented as a religious conflict, especially in the northern region. However, as we have observed in the past, it is more accurate to see it as religious differences being used to reinforce political divisions. In some cases, the words of the religious leaders themselves have created more polarization and aggression at the grassroots level.

In 1995, as state election campaigns were underway, violence was unleashed (attacks, roadblocks, assassinations and displacements). It became apparent that the political opposition had a chance of winning, which would have been the first proof of the PRI’s loss of hegemony in the region (a decline that had begun in the late 70’s).

The Role of the Government and of the Army

Several human rights organizations emphatically hold that DPJ (registered in March 1995 as ‘Development, Peace and Justice, A.C.’) is the façade for a paramilitary organization and that its relationship with the state government is part of a strategy of low intensity warfare that includes support for groups made up of local people who sow terror in order to destroy political opposition.

In May of 1999, Congressman Gilberto Lopez y Rivas (PRD) presented a complaint to the federal Ministry of Justice concerning the existence of paramilitary groups in Chiapas, including documents to back up his statements. The Fourth Report by the PRD Parliamentary Group⁽⁴⁾, refers to “the application of a counter-guerrilla military tactic known as ‘anvil and hammer,’ that involves the Army and police forces adopting the role of containment (anvil), and allowing paramilitary groups to carry out the attack role (hammer) against the EZLN and its sympathizers.” It also explains that “the primary goal is to avoid for the Armed Forces the disrepute of carrying out an unequal war.”

Pedro, a former DPJ leader in the community of Cruz Palenque, states that “the paramilitaries are watching over the roads, collecting taxes, ambushing, stealing the property of opposition peasants, threatening and killing those who don’t support them…There are paramilitaries who are working as Public Security [state police] officers and patrolling communities in the region. They receive training in military camps in the area.” (La Jornada, 4/5/99)

There are thousands of witnesses to the presence of the Mexican Army and state police standing alongside of DPJ, in the displacements of 1996. The dislocated people even saved gun cartridges from weapons that are for the exclusive use of the Army. Despite these factors, officials have always denied the existence of paramilitary groups. According to them, it is just “armed civilian groups whose purpose is self-defense.”

As a result of the 1995 elections (in which there was fraud and an abstention rate of 63%), many DPJ leaders were elected as public officials. This seemed to legitimize their control over the region. Samuel Sanchez Sanchez, one of the founders, was elected to the state congress, and several leaders ended up on the Tila County Council.

Two days prior to the 1997 elections, the state government, through its Interior Ministry, signed an agreement for economic development with DPJ for a total of 4,600,000 pesos (US$580,000 at that time). This agreement was signed by representatives of the state government and, as an ‘honor witness,’ by the Commander of the VII Military Region, Mario Renan Castillo. The PRD’s Fourth Report states: “Renan Castillo was trained by the United States Army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, one of the main counterinsurgency schools. Hence, one of his primary tasks was applying in Chiapas what he had learned in matters of counterinsurgency warfare…” ⁽⁴⁾

Current Situation

It is quite difficult to obtain exact figures on the violence in the northern region. Estimates of the number of killings varies from dozens to hundreds. DPJ has been accused of having committed the great majority of these violent acts. Members of opposition organizations commented to us that on some occasions they have responded with ambushes to the attacks, roadblocks, killings and displacements perpetrated by DPJ. On the other hand, those from DPJ present themselves as victims. In “Neither Rights, Nor Human” they mention that, between 1995 and 1997, there were 89 assassinations, with 66 of the victims from DPJ. ⁽³⁾

The testimony from the former radio operator for DPJ is chilling: “Here there is neither peace nor justice, we have only killed among brothers, all because of the government and of the Peace and Justice leaders, who take advantage of the people for their own benefit… They are robbing and killing, no one stops them; no one is controlling them any more, not even their own leaders.” (La Jornada, 4/5/99)

Since the middle of 1997, violence has diminished substantially, although some violent incidents have occurred: assassinations, shoot-outs, roadblocks, incursions by the Army. One explanation of this could be that DPJ managed to achieve control over the region. The fear sown between 1995 and 1996 was enough to prevent opposition persons and observers from traveling about freely. Rumors have been one of the most widely used mechanisms for fanning the fear. The consequences of these rumors have been greater polarization among the peoples and the prevention, in many cases, of possible rapprochement.

Questioned concerning the latest assassinations in the region, Diego Vazquez, a founding member of DPJ, responded: “If people from DPJ were involved, they should be punished, because they shouldn’t go on as before. Here in Limar, those from the PRD and DPJ are planting together. There is a bit of coexistence now. We shouldn’t be fighting anymore.” ⁽¹⁾This kind of surprising statements create a certain confusion.

The Critical Situation of the Displaced

One of the most visible and dramatic consequences of the violence unleashed in the region is the more than 4000 displaced, most of whom belong to the opposition. ⁽¹⁾ DPJ speaks of “self-displacements,” suggesting that opposition members do it intentionally, in order to create more confusion.

Many of the displaced feel that conditions for their return do not exist. They are living on lands lent to them by other peasants, barely providing them with enough to eat. One displaced person from Ojo de Aguas commented to us: “Since lands are scarce, no one wants the displaced. I believe it’s because they are not suffering. Because of that, they have no idea…They don’t understand what a displaced person suffers…We don’t know where to go, or what to do…I just think and think all night long. And I’m getting myself sick from thinking so much.” ⁽¹⁾

Those who returned between 1996 and 1997 have more security as to their harvests. Nonetheless, they are not without problems. They are often pressured by those in DPJ to join their organization, to abandon the Catholic religion, or to report on their meetings, and they must ask permission in order to leave the community. ⁽⁵⁾

One of these returned persons commented to us: “On July 18, 1996, they carried out an operation, the Army and the police, along with DPJ. They shot up the church, they broke the images, they looted houses and stole our animals. We went to the mountains to hide. Many people died. One of my little boys died, he got sick and we couldn’t take him to the doctor out of fear of ambushes by Peace and Justice. On October 10, 1996 we managed to return. But we have no guarantees for our lives.” ⁽¹⁾

Another critical point is the demand presented by delegates of 18 opposition communities of the lower region of Tila, demanding indemnification from the state government for the losses of stolen cattle, destroyed houses, lost harvest, etc., that occurred in previous years during attacks by DPJ where state police were present. They have still not received a response. The government argues that it cannot pay because it was not responsible. On the other hand, they are being offered programs. But, according to Manuel from Jolnixtie: “We don’t want their programs, we want justice. We want them to return to us what they have stolen, whether in money or in animals. Or could it be that the police and the Army aren’t from the government?” ⁽¹⁾

Reconciliation and Challenges

Despite all the foregoing, there are encouraging signs of rapprochement. In the community of Emiliano Zapata, county of Tila, despite the divisions (40 families from DPJ and 25 from the opposition), they managed to avoid displacements. One of their representatives commented to us that those from DPJ wanted to make them join their ranks. “We dialogued with them, and got them to respect us. We made an agreement with them, right from the beginning, so that those from DPJ in other communities will respect us as well. It was very difficult to reach the agreement, but after three months of talks, we managed to reach an agreement with the ejidal (communal lands) commissioner.” ⁽¹⁾

On February 27, 1999, fourteen displaced families returned to Cruz Palenque, where they were welcomed by 20 of the 26 families from DPJ who had remained in the community. The former leader of DPJ had repented, and he had sought out the Inter-institutional Regional Coordinator (of the state government) in order to begin negotiations. Six families from this community, however, are still with DPJ, and tensions continue. There have been conflicts concerning the community radio, which is in the hands of DPJ, and over the death of a dog, killed by the son of DPJ leader. According to the son, it was in self-defense. According to Pedro (his uncle and the dog’s owner, who no longer belongs to DPJ), the killing was intentional. A meeting was called with the County President, the Inter-institutional Regional Coordinator and DPJ leaders. Up to this moment, the problem still has not been resolved. The meeting has not yet been held because of the failure of the County President and government representatives to follow through. This example of disagreement might appear insignificant, but it is symptomatic of the polarization, the precariousness and the explosive nature of the situation in this and in other communities.

A new factor in the dilemma: The internal divisions in DPJ

Over the last few months, alleged internal divisions in the DPJ organization have begun coming to public light. The dissidents (under the leadership of Cristobal Gomez Torres and Diego Vazquez) are accusing former leaders Samuel Sanchez, Marcos Albino and Raymundo Trujillo of having stolen more than four million pesos (US$430,000) the organization had received for economic programs. Over the course of more than four years, no results had been seen from these funds.

In the face of these divisions, the state government has demonstrated extreme diligence in attending meetings of rapprochement between the two sides. This availability for DPJ is in contrast with the government absence in the meetings to resolve conflicts in Cruz Palenque, as we have already mentioned.

As detailed elsewhere in this report, the federal government is calling on the EZLN to return to the dialogue table. This initiative could mean a new effort for détente in the northern region, which the EZLN included as one of its conditions for renewing peace talks.

According to some analysts, another explanation of the government’s attitude in the region is that the government has an interest in supporting DPJ in order to prevent a new deterioration of the situation or an opposition victory in the next elections.

Waiting for the Elections

The relative decline of violence in the northern region over the last two years (in comparison with 1995 and 1996) is certainly encouraging. Nonetheless, it is in large part owing to the fact that terror has already been well-established. Down deep, the situation has not changed. Mistrust, polarization and violence always on the point of exploding continue to prevail. It will take time to overcome the fear of the “other” and end talk such as “we don’t speak with them anymore, and we’re not going to speak, because we don’t know what is in their hearts anymore.”

As long as this situation does not change, the northern region could once again become the scene of a type of war that, even if not open, nonetheless results in killing after killing and does not end. In this context, reporting on what is going on in the region can help to break the cycle of fear and prejudice.

From both sides, we hear: “We are tired. We don’t want any more violence. We want to work, we just want to work…” But what do the leaders really want? And how much might they be serving other interests? Whom do these divisions serve?

Sadly, the conclusion of the SIPAZ April 1997 report still obtains: “On the other hand, the launching of the electoral campaign and the proximity of the elections…present a new threat and a new challenge for the political actors in the north: a repetition of the experiences of 1994 and 1995, that almost led the Ch’ols to civil war, or taking on the legitimate and respectful political struggle of the different electoral options. The state and federal governments will have a great responsibility in the direction events take here…”

• ⁽¹⁾ SIPAZ interviews in the lower region of Tila between March and August of 1999.(Return.)
• ⁽²⁾ SIPAZ Report, April 1997, Vol. II, No. 2 (Return)
• ⁽³⁾ “Neither Rights, Nor Human in the Northern Region of Chiapas: The Other Truth of Events in the Ch’ol Region, as a Response to the Version Disseminated by the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center – January 1994 to September 1997,” Development, Peace and Justice. November 1997.(Return)
• ⁽⁴⁾ “Fourth Report on the Mexican Armed Forces,” Parliamentary Group of the Democratic Revolutionary Party, LVII Legislature of the Congress of the Union, April 30, 1999. Presented by Federal Deputy Gilberto Lopez y Rivas in his role as Acting President of the COCOPA, to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic. (Return)
• ⁽⁵⁾ “Displaced Population of Chiapas,” Onécimo Hidalgo and Gustavo Castro, of the Center for Economic and Political Research of Community Action (CIEPAC), July 1999. (Return)

Document consulted: “Neither Peace Nor Justice, A General and Broad Report on the Civil War Suffered by the Ch’ols of the Northern Region of Chiapas – December 1994 to October 1996,” ‘Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas’ Human Rights Center,” October 1996.