Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, representing the opposition Alliance for Chiapas, was elected governor on August 20. Salazar took 51.5% of the vote compared to 45.7% for Sami David, candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The defeat was a stunning setback for the PRI, which has dominated Chiapas politics for decades.

Like many opposition leaders in Mexico, Salazar was a lifelong member of the PRI, holding both state-level and federal positions, until he left the party in 1999 to lead an opposition campaign for governor. One of the main issues that led to his departure was the PRI’s handling of the Chiapas conflict. As a PRI Senator, Salazar was a member of COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification, charged with assisting the peace process in Chiapas). He played a key role in the drafting of legislation to implement the 1996 San Andres Accords between the federal government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). President Zedillo rejected the COCOPA proposal and substituted one of his own. Neither have been voted on, and peace talks remain suspended.

Remarkably, Salazar put together an opposition campaign including virtually all political parties in Chiapas. (For its part, the EZLN maintained its silence about the campaign, and turnout was especially light in Zapatista areas.) Campaigning on a platform of change, he managed to convince a skeptical public that it was possible to break the PRI’s hammerlock on Chiapas politics. While polls consistently showed him well ahead, there was considerable concern that the PRI, known in Chiapas for its strong-arm tactics and recourse to fraud, simply would not accept defeat. An increase in agrarian disputes and paramilitary activity in the period leading up to the vote only increased such fears.

In the end, while there were numerous cases of pressure, intimidation, and various kinds of irregularities, the vote was largely peaceful, the vote count was transparent, and the PRI conceded the popular verdict. (For more information, see “Report on Electoral Observation” on the SIPAZ website: www.sipaz.org)

Although he received a strong electoral mandate, Salazar will govern with little support from the PRI-controlled state congress or from local governments that remain largely in PRI hands. He faces enormous challenges: overcoming poverty and marginalization, controlling political violence, rebuilding the social fabric in an extremely polarized region, etc. It will be difficult to maintain cohesion among the diverse political forces that united behind him. At the same time, his commitment to inclusivity, including of indigenous and peasant groups, holds out the hope for a new kind of politics in Chiapas.

The opposition victory in Chiapas benefited from the election of Vicente Fox in July. When he takes office on December 1, Fox will be the first non-PRI president in 71 years. No party will have a majority in either house of Congress. In the new Chamber of Deputies, the PAN (National Action Party) has 213 seats, the PRI 210, and the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) 44. In the Senate, the PRI has 59, the PAN 46, and the PRD 15.

One of the big challenges facing both Fox and Salazar is the unresolved conflict in Chiapas. Fox has indicated that one of his first acts as president will be to send the COCOPA proposal to Congress for approval. He has also expressed his intention to renew peace talks with the EZLN and to reduce the massive military presence in Chiapas (currently as many as 70,000 – about one-third – of all federal troops.) However, the COCOPA proposal will not face smooth sailing in the new Congress, and Fox has not made it clear that he is prepared to make the effort necessary to achieve a successful outcome. Regarding the military presence in Chiapas, it remains a highly charged issue. Fox would like to use it to nudge the EZLN back to the table (pullback troops if the EZLN agrees to dialogue). For its part, the EZLN has made no response to overtures from the Fox transition team, but in the past it has stated pre-conditions for reinitiating talks that focus on its lack of confidence in the peace process (unfulfilled agreements) and the urgent need to end the siege of indigenous communities (military presence.)

While as state governor, Salazar can neither order the withdrawal of federal troops nor resolve the conflict with the EZLN, he can contribute to building the confidence and improving the conditions that are necessary for real dialogue.

The October 28 arrest of eleven alleged paramilitary members on federal charges in the northern region of Chiapas may signal new limits on the impunity that these groups have enjoyed. However, the fact that top state government officials (from the outgoing PRI administration) are rallying to their defense only underscores the continued limits on the rule of law.

Meanwhile, the latest in a series of high-level UN investigations of Mexico’s human rights situation in recent years underscored the remarkable degree of continued international concern in this regard. In August, Erica Irene Daes, President of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, reported to the UN Sub-commission for Human Rights on her April 2000 visit to Mexico. She observed that the militarization of indigenous communities and the increasing use of the Army in police operations contribute to an atmosphere of fear and violation of human rights, including the rights to life, physical integrity and protection from arbitrary arrest.

Recommended Actions

• Congratulate President-elect Vicente Fox on his election and on his announced intention to introduce to the Mexican Congress the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords and to renew peace talks with the EZLN.
• Noting the lack of consensus in Congress on the COCOPA proposal, encourage him to make the effort necessary to ensure approval of implementing legislation that is consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the San Andres Accords.
• In view of the massive presence of the Mexican Army in Chiapas and the explosive tension that often results in indigenous communities, urge President-elect Fox, when he assumes power, to order an immediate withdrawal of a significant number of military camps in areas where their presence is provoking particular tension. Note that such action would not only reduce tensions but would also serve as a confidence building measure that would improve the conditions for renewed peace talks.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

(before December 1)
Lic. Vicente Fox
Reforma 525, Colonia Lomas de Chapultepec
Código postal 11000 México DF, México
Fax: (int-52)(5)520 7125

(after December 1)
Lic. Vicente Fox
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF, México
Fax (int-52)(5)515 4783