After months of renewed hope, peace efforts in Chiapas entered a new crisis at the end of April when the federal Congress approved an indigenous rights law which key indigenous and popular movement organizations denounced as a betrayal.

To review the history a bit, in November 1996 the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA), in an effort to move the stalled peace process forward, agreed to prepare a legislative proposal on indigenous rights and culture. The purpose was to integrate into the federal constitution the San Andres Accords, which had been signed in February of that same year. The COCOPA proposal was accepted by the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in December 1996, but the government rejected it and made a different proposal. Neither of the proposals came to a vote in Congress during the term of President Zedillo. Since then, the Zapatistas have insisted that the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords is a necessary condition for the renewal of peace talks.

On December 5, 2000, several days after assuming office, President Vicente Fox sent the COCOPA proposal to Congress. Later the Zapatistas staged a highly-visible, two-week caravan from Chiapas to Mexico City. Then on March 28, a delegation of Zapatista commanders and representatives of the National Indigenous Congress (CNI), was given the opportunity to advocate for the COCOPA initiative from the floor of the Congress.

However, on April 25 the Senate unanimously approved a significantly different proposal. On April 28, the Chamber of Deputies approved the same proposal, with the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the PAN (National Action Party) voting in favor and the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) voting against. As a constitutional amendment, subsequent approval by the state congresses was also required.

Voices in favor

The PAN defended the new law, arguing that the Congress “concerned itself with attending to the details that the COCOPA proposal had not considered” and that it had avoided a situation “in which national unity might be broken and the country might become balkanized.” The PAN actively lobbied state-level PAN leaders to insure ratification of the reform.

Enrique Jackson, leader of the PRI senators, stated that it was an error of President Fox “to suppose that the National Congress is here to please him or an armed group.” He added that the issue “is now closed.”

The Mexican Bishops Conference (CEM) declared that this law is better than nothing. It underscored the importance of the recognition of the authority of the Congress and that the indigenous rights reform be accepted as a basis for building peace. The CEM also acknowledged that the new law is generating political tensions and that the peace process is at risk.

Position of the Fox administration and reactions to it

Initially President Fox recognized the work of the Senate, then later he spoke about the limitations of the new law. On May 20, he addressed the issue of Chiapas: “This issue is finished. A law has been approved and there is interest on our part in renewing peace talks. There are no other comments about the issue other than that we have to return to dialogue.”

In June, during a visit to El Salvador, he stated: “The issue of Chiapas is not by a long shot the issue of Mexico. It needs to be placed in its proper perspective. At the same time, there is a very firm effort to deactivate the conflict. In fact, there is no conflict. We are in holy peace.” He added, “The Puebla Panama Plan [see glossary] is a thousand times more than the Zapatista movement or an indigenous community in Chiapas.” In response to these statements, members of COCOPA asserted that there is a conflict in Chiapas and that it requires a solution. They added that while the conflict is not primarily in a military phase, neither can it be said that there is “holy peace.”

During his July 5 visit to Chiapas, President Fox focused his public talks on the necessity to promote development programs so that “harmony might return to the communities.”

The government peace commissioner, Luis H. Alvarez, recognized the need to extend the new law in several important areas. On May 11, he announced that the administration would prepare regulatory laws aimed at implementing the constitutional reform. He also said that the government would focus its efforts on the causes of the conflict. On June 28, he called on the EZLN to “respect the decisions of the indigenous communities, whether or not they sympathize with your movement, and refrain from blocking the implementation of social programs.”

Rodolfo Elizondo, the administration’s coordinator for the Citizen’s Alliance and an advisor on Chiapas, defended the government’s position saying, “that the law does not fulfill the expectations of the EZLN and the CNI and has not been accepted by them is not a matter that the administration can resolve.” Alluding to the absence of the EZLN during the discussion of the law in congress in April, he asked, “Where was the EZLN during the process of approval of the law?”

Xochitl Galvez, head of the President’s Office for the Development of the Indian Peoples, was critical of the law from the beginning: “The constitutional reform that was approved includes some of the concepts of the president’s proposal. However it leaves out others which require further efforts to find political solutions that will permit the respective advances.”

Rejection by indigenous organizations and civil society

On April 27 the CNI emitted a statement denouncing the new law because it differed from the COCOPA proposal on the following key points: autonomy and self-determination, recognition of indigenous communities as legal entities, rights to lands and territories, use and enjoyment of natural resources, election of authorities, and the right to regional association.

On April 29, the EZLN stated that it “…formally refuses to recognize this constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture. It is not in the spirit of the San Andres Accords, it does not respect the COCOPA legislative proposal, it completely ignores the national and international demand for recognition of indigenous rights and culture, it sabotages the incipient process of rapprochement between the government and the EZLN, it betrays hopes for a negotiated solution to the war in Chiapas, and it reveals the total separation of the political class from popular demands.” As a result, the EZLN broke off the contacts it had recently re-established with the federal government.

The National Indigenous Multi-ethnic Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA) also criticized the law for not complying with the San Andres Accords: “It is a simulation, a doorway to war.”

In May, both the ERPI (Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People) and the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army) expressed their support for the EZLN in its decision to suspend contacts with the federal government.

Governors Pablo Salazar (Chiapas) and Jose Murat (Oaxaca) also strongly criticized the law. Salazar stated that the law was similar to the proposal of former president Zedillo and added that the legislation “was not at the level of the needs and the demands of the indigenous and of Mexican society. In the Congress, political and ideological considerations prevailed and not an objective evaluation of an initiative based on an agreement made by the government.” On July 11 Salazar and Murat signed a joint statement (“Call from the South”) exhorting the state congresses that had not yet voted to reject the new law.

An intense lobbying campaign was waged with the state congresses, and in each state there were demonstrations organized by indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On July 3, 1400 writers, intellectuals, religious leaders and representatives of Mexican and international NGOs released a public statement calling on the local congresses to reject the constitutional reform.

In the state congresses

In several states, the law was voted on amidst popular protests. In Chiapas, in the consultative forums organized by the state Congress, the mayors from the highlands (all of them from the PRI), representatives of several ethnic groups, and dozens of social, indigenous, peasant, and non-governmental organizations spoke out against the law. In the end, the constitutional reform was defeated in Chiapas by a vote of 30 to 5, with deputies from all the parties joining together to oppose the law.

Nationally, the reform was finally approved, with 17 state congresses voting in favor and nine voting against. Significantly, those voting against the law included the states with the highest concentration of indigenous (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Hidalgo.)

Governor Salazar observed, “Here we have a conflict between representative democracy and participatory democracy…Those for whom the law was created are largely rejecting it.”

“Fast track” approval

On July 16, the votes of the state congresses were officially tabulated in the federal Congress. This was despite the fact that the law had not yet been voted on in some states and the issue had not been placed on the agenda of the Permanent Commission of the Congress.

That same day, the administration expressed its full respect for the Congress. On the other hand, Luisa Maria Calderon (PAN), who occupied the rotating presidency of COCOPA, criticized the accelerated tabulation process: “It was not appropriate. There was a lack of prudence. There was no need to not respect the normal legislative schedule.”

Initial reactions

On July 25, the CNI and a variety of civil society organizations organized a demonstration in front of the Senate, repudiating the reform. On July 30 thousands of Indians blocked the main highways in Chiapas in protest of the indigenous rights law and of the Puebla Panama Plan. They also demanded the release of Zapatista prisoners, the cancellation of arrest warrants against popular movement leaders, the punishment and disarming of paramilitary groups, and the withdrawal of the Mexican army from Chiapas.

Others sought legal remedies. The county of Molcaxac (state of Puebla) was the first to present an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the law’s constitutionality. Several days later the high court agreed to hear the case. The county authorities opposed the constitutional reform as a violation of the rights of the counties, because the indigenous peoples had not been consulted, and because it does not respect the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which was ratified by Mexico.

In August two other counties, Texpatepec (Veracruz) and Copalillo (Guerrero), appealed to the Supreme Court for a stay. The stay was denied on the basis that the legislative process had not yet concluded and that a stay could not be issued against a law that has not been formally published.

The PRD presented another constitutional complaint against the federal Congress and eight state legislatures “for not having complied fully with statutory requirements regarding constitutional reforms.” The cases in question were ones in which the reform had been approved by a simple majority, whereas, although it does not appear explicitly in all the state constitutions, the PRD argued that a two-thirds majority is required in the state congresses, just as it is in the federal Congress.

Oaxaca was the first state to file a constitutional appeal. Governor Jose Murat criticized the indigenous law as “an agreement that is capricious, factional and partial.” He said that the state appeal is backed by the 16 indigenous ethnic groups in Oaxaca and by the 418 counties that are governed by traditional practices and customs.

On August 10, around 100 national and international NGOs and 120 civil society representatives sent a request to the International Labor Organization and to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Fundamental Liberties of Indigenous Peoples (Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who is Mexican), calling on them to recommend to the Mexican government the fulfillment of its international commitments in the area of indigenous rights.

On August 14 President Fox published the constitutional reform on indigenous rights in the Official Daily of the Federation, at which point it went into effect. Additional protests and legal appeals are expected in the coming weeks. The explosion of small homemade bombs at branch offices of the Banamex bank in Mexico City on August 8, for which a group called the FARP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People) took credit, did nothing to diminish fears that more groups may opt for violent means of struggle.

Tensions in Chiapas

Meanwhile in Chiapas the tension has increased since the approval of the law. In addition to the new stalemate in peace efforts, there are other problems on the southern border (illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons and undocumented migrants). On June 4, after a six month lapse, the Defense Ministry, the Federal Office of the Attorney General, and the state government reactivated the patrols of the BOM (Mixed Operation Bases), inter-agency military/police initiatives.

A short while later, contradictory accounts were given regarding the reinforcement of the presence of military, police and immigration agents on the southern border. Chiapas Governor Pablo Salazar denied that there was a buildup and asserted, “The number of military troops is the same as before Congress resolved the issue of indigenous reform, but I have been informed that there is no increase in the patrols of the army nor other maneuvers that have not been undertaken on a routine basis.”

Nonetheless, the number of denunciations has been increasing from communities in the conflict areas (the highlands and the Lacandon Jungle) regarding an increase in land and air military patrols as well as in the number of troops in the military camps. At the same time, intra-community conflicts, especially regarding land issues, continue to increase.

On August 28, 61 families of the civil society group Las Abejas (the Bees), returned to their home communities after several years living in displaced persons camps. They did so in spite of the fact that they don’t believe that conditions for their safe return exist (in particular because of the continued impunity enjoyed by some of the paramilitary groups in the area). Governor Salazar had offered security guarantees to permit their return. While their well-publicized return was without incident, the prospects for their longer-term security are less clear.

Economic and international aspects

On May 11 in Panama, the Millennial Conference of Indigenous Peoples rejected the indigenous rights and culture reform approved by the Mexican Congress, saying that it is discriminatory and does not respond to the demands of the indigenous peoples.

Also during May, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers arrived in Mexico. He made strong criticisms regarding the way in which justice is delivered.

One hundred and nine organizations from southeastern Mexico and Central America rejected the Puebla Panama Plan (PPP) at a meeting in Tapachula (Chiapas). The PPP was approved by the governments of Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Belize and Nicaragua on July 12. Florencio Salazar Adame, general coordinator of PPP, stated that the future of the plan is not dependent on the pacification of Chiapas and that the fact that the dialogue between the EZLN and the Mexican government is broken off “does not worry” European investors. However, he added that it would not be implemented in the communities that did not wish it.

In a report released in June, the organization Public Citizen (USA) reported that at least 15 million Mexican peasants abandoned their traditional forms of subsistence in the face of the 46.2% fall (between 1993 and 1999) in the price for corn paid to Mexican producers. The report identified the main factors as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which resulted in the importation of cheap corn from the US, and the reduction by 90% (over seven years) in federal investment in agricultural projects.

In August, the Third Congress of the Latin American Coordination of Farm Organizations, meeting in Mexico, included in its final declaration a rejection of the indigenous law approved by the Mexican Congress and reiterated its support for the COCOPA proposal. A similar declaration was made by the International Conference of Social Movements, which also took place in August in Mexico City.